Ban Ki-moon, 2007–2016

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Gowan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Central African Republic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cautious Approach ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
The Face

During Ban Ki-moon’s tenure, the Security Council was shaken by P5 divisions over Kosovo, Georgia, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Yet it also continued to mandate and sustain large-scale peacekeeping operations in Africa, placing major burdens on the UN Secretariat. The chapter will argue that Ban initially took a cautious approach to controversies with the Council, and earned a reputation for excessive passivity in the face of crisis and deference to the United States. The second half of the chapter suggests that Ban shifted to a more activist pressure as his tenure went on, pressing the Council to act in cases including Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Syria. The chapter will argue that Ban had only a marginal impact on Council decision-making, even though he made a creditable effort to speak truth to power over cases such as the Central African Republic (CAR), challenging Council members to live up to their responsibilities.

The penholder system and the rule of law in the Security Council decision-making: Setback or improvement?

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-156
Author(s):  
Marie-Eve Loiselle
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Council Decision

AbstractThis article analyses the decision-making process of the UN Security Council when it adopts outcome documents, such as resolutions, Presidential statements and press statements. It is commonly assumed that because of their veto power and permanency China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have greater influence than their elected counterparts in shaping those outcomes. In recent years, that control has been strengthened by the penholdership system. Under this practice, one or more members, usually France, the United States or the United Kingdom (P3), take leadership over a situation on the agenda of the Council. When ‘holding the pen’ a member often decides what action the Council should take, then drafts an outcome document that it negotiates with other permanent members before sharing the text with elected members. This article explores the development of this practice and its impact on the respect for the rule of law in the Security Council’s decision-making process. It argues that, while concentrating power in the hands of the P3, hence diminishing transparency and the opportunity for all members to participate in the decision-making of the Council, at the same time the penholdership system also provides an avenue to strengthen elected members’ influence in ways that promote respect for the international rule of law.

Planning or Improvisation

2020 ◽  
pp. 116-120
Author(s):  
Alasdair Roberts
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Governance Strategies ◽  
The Face ◽  
Imperfect Knowledge

This chapter assesses the role of planning in the design of governance strategies. Enthusiasm for large-scale planning—also known as overall, comprehensive, long-term, economic, or social planning—boomed and collapsed in twentieth century. At the start of that century, progressive reformers seized on planning as the remedy for the United States' social and economic woes. By the end of the twentieth century, enthusiasm for large-scale planning had collapsed. Plans could be made, but they were unlikely to be obeyed, and even if they were obeyed, they were unlikely to work as predicted. The chapter then explains that leaders should make plans while being realistic about the limits of planning. It is necessary to exercise foresight, set priorities, and design policies that seem likely to accomplish those priorities. Simply by doing this, leaders encourage coordination among individuals and businesses, through conversation about goals and tactics. Neither is imperfect knowledge a total barrier to planning. There is no “law” of unintended consequences: it is not inevitable that government actions will produce entirely unexpected results. The more appropriate stance is modesty about what is known and what can be achieved. Plans that launch big schemes on brittle assumptions are more likely to fail. Plans that proceed more tentatively, that allow room for testing, learning, and adjustment, are less likely to collapse in the face of unexpected results.

Remarks by Stephen Pomper

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 123-127
Author(s):  
Stephen Pomper
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Single Event ◽  
Humanitarian Emergency ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Face ◽  
Legal Justification ◽  
The U.S

We are having this conversation now because of the April 7 strikes on the Shayrat Airfield in Syria, but the question of how one justifies forcible measures in the context of a humanitarian emergency, and in the face of a deadlocked Security Council, is one that deserves urgent attention beyond the context of any single event. Progress toward answering this question has, however, been mired in a long-standing debate between those who believe that there is no credible international law justification for humanitarian intervention—and that the U.S. government should instead justify interventions like those taken at Kosovo and Shayrat as morally “legitimate”—and those who believe a legal justification can and should be put forward. I am very much in the latter camp and will use my time now to explain how I arrived at this position as a policy and as a legal matter by looking at three questions: the first question is whether legal justification is the direction that the United States should go in as a matter of policy. The second question is whether legal justification is credibly available as a matter of international law. The third question (which assumes the answer to the first and second is yes) is how to go about articulating and disseminating such a justification. Let me take these in order.

Saving Darfur

2019 ◽  
pp. 95-113
Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
African Union ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Building Process ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The United Nations

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

scholarly journals COVID-19 and its possible impact on the UN system

2020 ◽  
pp. 444-447
Author(s):  
Yaryna Zhukorska
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
World Health ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Health Organization ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact

In the article, the author analyzes the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the activities of the UN system. Draws attention tothe ineffectiveness of the UN itself, WHO, as well as the activities of the Security Council and the General Assembly during this period.Draws a parallel with the Spanish flu of the early twentieth century and explores its impact on the development of international orga -nizations.The coronavirus pandemic has shown that the priority for any state is primarily national interests, not common ones. The existenceof international law and international mechanisms has simply been forgotten in the context of protecting national interests. Internationalorganizations such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization have proved ineffective and inflexible and tooslow to deal effectively with today’s threats.In fact, during the pandemic, the UN failed to reach a consensus on joint action in a critical international situation. The Secretary-General has openly stated that he expects the problem to be resolved and concrete measures to be taken by the G-20.As for WHO, its actions have been somewhat slow, but it has responded to information from Member States.According to the WHO, the main reason for such a rapid spread of the virus was the reluctance of states to heed the recommendationsof the WHO.There is currently no alternative to health cooperation other than WHO. Despite the shortcomings in its operation, which haveemerged in the face of such a large-scale and rapid threat, it is appropriate to improve decision-making in such situations, as well as toprovide additional leverage over Member States. Collective security must come first here, not the sovereign interests of an individualstate, be it China, the United States or Germany.The main problem for both the UN and WHO has been the imperfect decision-making mechanism. On the issue with the UN –the right of veto in the Security Council, WHO – the recommendatory nature of the decisions. Considers the possibility of grantingsupranational powers to the UN in key areas where the issue of collective security must clearly prevail over national interests. Jointaction must be the only right solution for the international community in combating today’s threats. And the national interest in suchcases must come after collective security.

Cuban Complaint of Aggression

1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-578 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Cuban Government ◽  
The Face ◽  
History Of ◽  
Cuban Sugar ◽  
The Government ◽  
Self Protection

From its 874th through its 876th meetings the Security Council considered the complaint of the government of Cuba that that country had been subjected by the government of the United States to “repeated threats, harassments, intrigues, reprisals and aggressive acts.” The discussion was opened by Mr. Raúl Roa, Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs, who began by asserting that Cuba had been under no juridical obligation to bring its complaint to the Organization of American States (OAS) before submitting it to the Council. He then traced the history of United States hostility to the revolutionary government of Cuba, hostility based, in his opinion, on opposition to the Agrarian Reform instituted by that government and culminating in the recent drastic curtailment of the Cuban sugar quota. In his reply to Mr. Roa, Mr. Lodge (United States) assured the Cuban government that the United States had no aggressive purposes against Cuba, and deplored the removal of the controversy between the two nations from its rightful forum in OAS to the Security Council. He also indicated, after a summary of Cuban-United States relations during the preceding year and a half from the United States point of view, that the reduction of the Cuban sugar quota had been no act of economic aggression, but rather a justifiable measure of self-protection on the part of the United States to ensure its needed supply of sugar in the face of acts by the Cuban government which made this supply extremely insecure. In conclusion, Mr. Lodge stated his belief that someday, somehow, Cuba and the United States would again be friends.

scholarly journals Decorating the “Christmas Tree”

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-250
Author(s):  
Kseniya Oksamytna ◽  
Magnus Lundgren
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Original Data ◽  
The United States ◽  
Christmas Tree ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
The One ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions ◽  
Two Bodies

Abstract Contemporary peacekeeping operations carry out many disparate tasks, which has triggered a debate about “Christmas Tree mandates.” Did the UN Secretariat or the UN Security Council drive this expansion? Using original data on nineteen UN peacekeeping missions, 1998–2014, this article compares peacekeeping tasks recommended by the Secretariat to those mandated by the Council. It finds that the two bodies expressed different preferences regarding the nature, number, and novelty of peacekeeping tasks. First, the Council dropped Secretariat-recommended tasks as often as it added new ones on its own initiative. Second, the two bodies disagreed more over peacebuilding and peacemaking tasks than over peacekeeping tasks. Third, the Council preferred to be the one to introduce novel tasks that had not appeared in previous mandates. Finally, among the countries that “held the pen” on peacekeeping resolutions, the United States was the most prone to dropping Secretariat-proposed tasks and the least willing to add tasks itself.

scholarly journals Assessing the 2004 Campaign Websites: The Role of the Internet in Elections and Civil Society

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Kenneth S. Coggeshall ◽  
Alexandra Michael ◽  
Shweta Bhatnagar ◽  
Patricia D. Moynihan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Public Support ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Initial Correlation ◽  
The Face

The Internet is changing the face of political campaigns in the United States; not since the introduction of television have the tools used to communicate with the electorate changed so notably. This study uses the 2004 campaign websites created by the Democratic primary candidates and President George W. Bush to evaluate both the ways in which websites can help voters participate in democratic decision-making, and the ways in which websites may help candidates gain public support. We find that, given a list of 41 criteria deemed important to an informative, participatory and easy to use website, the average candidate's site earned just over half the possible points. Still, initial correlation analyses suggest that better websites may mean more votes on Election Day.

MAXIMIZING DISPERSANT PREPAREDNESS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2007 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS FULL SCALE EXERCISE

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 805-809
Author(s):  
Kim Beasley ◽  
C. Curtis Martin ◽  
Roger Laferriere
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Data Transmission ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
And Control

ABSTRACT Large scale dispersant exercises have been conducted nationally and internationally ever since their first large scale use during the Torrey Canyon Spill of 1967. Few of these exercises are conducted on the grandest scale intended to exercise all aspects of the operation; from command and control, pre-application testing, application, monitoring and data transmission. Clean Islands Council in cooperation with the State of Hawaii'S Department of Health and the U.S. Coast Guard conducted a two day exercise on February 21–22, 2007 to test the full range of the State'S Dispersant capability. It was the largest exercise ever conducted in Hawaii, and arguably the largest in United States history. The exercise was the culmination of 14 years of program development by the Clean Islands Council, the State of Hawaii and the United States Coast Guard. The exercise instilled a tremendous appreciation in all players involved of the complexity of dispersant operations, and the importance of ensuring efficient command and control processes, support and communications. All elements of Dispersant application were tested: decision making processes, laboratory pre-testing, on-scene test application, on-scene application, on-scene monitoring and real time data transmission to effect quick decision making from jurisdictional agencies. Additionally, the latest state of the art equipment was used during all phases. This paper discusses the results of the exercise and shares critical lessons learned that will greatly advance the preparedness knowledge of all dispersant users internationally. The authors of this paper have over 50 years of collective spill response experience and were personally involved in the exercise design and execution.

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