Power in international trade politics: is ISDS a solution in search of a problem?

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 738-757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Reddie
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Endogenous Factors ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Transatlantic Trade ◽  
Trade Politics ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Trade And Investment

AbstractThis article examines the controversial investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in recent mega-free trade agreement. Below, I examine the origins of the ISDS concept and outline the controversy surrounding its use in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Then, I provide a theoretical discussion that outlines both the exogenous and endogenous factors that contribute to the inclusion of ISDS provisions in international trade agreements. Focusing on the latter endogenous factors, I then argue that not all international trade agreements are the same and that, as such, it is possible to develop a typology of international trade agreement across two variables (the number of parties and relative power) that impact the appropriateness of including an ISDS provision. I test this typology against the empirical record. Finally, I discuss potential innovations to the ISDS provisions and market-based mechanisms that address the dual challenges of discrimination and expropriation that ISDS is designed to address.1

Intellectual Property and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Cottier
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
Transatlantic Trade ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Innovation And Technology ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Partnership Agreement ◽  
Trade And Investment

The chapter assesses recent developments in intellectual property protection in the EU–Canadian Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, and extrapolates results of these negotiations to the pending EU–US negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It discusses the likely implications of ever-increasing protection of IPRs on international trade, innovation, and technology transfer. Given the complex interaction of TRIPs and WIPO Agreements with the newly emerging agreements, the chapter finally examines the structure and operation of dispute settlement and how existing fragmentation could be overcome. Intellectual property, it is submitted, offers an important case to extend the jurisdiction of WTO dispute settlement to preferential trade agreements.

Who Settles Disputes? Treaty Design and Trade Attitudes Toward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyeonho Hahm ◽  
Thomas König ◽  
Moritz Osnabrügge ◽  
Elena Frech
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
Transatlantic Trade ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Trade And Investment

AbstractWhat type of trade agreement is the public willing to accept? Instead of focusing on individual concerns about market access and trade barriers, we argue that specific treaty design and, in particular, the characteristics of the dispute settlement mechanism, play a critical role in shaping public support for trade agreements. To examine this theoretical expectation, we conduct a conjoint experiment that varies diverse treaty-design elements and estimate preferences over multiple dimensions of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) based on a nationally representative sample in Germany. We find that compared to other alternatives, private arbitration, known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), generates strong opposition to the trade agreement. As the single most important factor, this effect of dispute settlement characteristic is strikingly large and consistent across individuals’ key attributes, including skill levels, information, and national sentiment, among others.

The challenges of federalism to Canada’s international trade relations: The Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

2017 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-119
Author(s):  
Ali Tejpar
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Implementation Processes ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
International Model ◽  
Canadian Federalism ◽  
Canadian Context

As one of the first “second-generation” free trade agreements that address indirect and non-tariff barriers, the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is likely to serve as an international model. CETA, however, highlights significant challenges for Canadian federalism in both the negotiation and implementation processes of this and any such future trade agreements. While the inclusion of sub-federal governments allows for provinces/territories to help shape the provisions that fall within their jurisdictions, this paper argues that subsequent challenges arise in conveying a unified Canadian commitment to implement the agreement. Overall, the CETA negotiations demonstrated the significant institutional weaknesses of current federal–provincial/territorial relations with respect to international trade agreements. In the Canadian context, this suggests a need for “summit federalism” to ensure that all federal–provincial/territorial governments align their terms and interests and convey a unified commitment to fulfilling Canada’s current and future international trade agreements.

Book Reviews

2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 552-553
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Public Affairs ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreement ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Princeton University

Pravin Krishna of Johns Hopkins University reviews, “Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements” by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the role of domestic politics in governments' decisions to enter trade pacts. Discusses a political economy theory of international trade agreements; systemic influences on preferential trade agreement formation; regime type, veto players, and preferential trade agreement formation; and auxiliary hypotheses about domestic politics and trade agreements. Mansfield is Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Milner is B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at Princeton University.”

Trading Arguments: Opinion Updating in the Context of International Trade Agreements

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 929-938
Author(s):  
Gabriele Spilker ◽  
Quynh Nguyen ◽  
Thomas Bernauer
Keyword(s):  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Proposal ◽  
The Public ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Transatlantic Trade ◽  
New Information ◽  
Prior Opinion ◽  
Hearts And Minds ◽  
Trade And Investment

Abstract Public opinion can often become a key challenge to international cooperation efforts. In their attempt to garner support for their position, stakeholders fight for the hearts and minds of the public based on arguments about the consequences of different policy options. But to what extent do individuals’ preferences change when exposed to such information? And how does this depend on the information being congruent or contradictory to pre-existing preferences? We address these questions in the context of the negotiations on the potentially largest regional trade agreement in history: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Based on a two-waves-panel-survey-experiment fielded in Germany and the United States, we examine how individuals’ prior opinion influences the way they process new information. We argue that individuals’ existing priors about how they generally think about economic openness interact with new information to inform their opinion about the specific policy proposal at hand. Our experimental results show that while prior opinion constrains opinion updating to some degree, overall, citizens update their existing beliefs in line with new information. This updating process can even result in respondents changing their opinion, although only in one direction: namely to turn from a TTIP supporter to a TTIP opponent.

scholarly journals L'élaboration et le fonctionnement des mécanismes d'arbitrage au sein de I'ALE et de FALENA, du GATT et de l'OMC

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-478
Author(s):  
Frédéric Bastien
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Great Part ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Do So

The increasing importance of international trade explains in great part the role that dispute resolution plays in trade agreement. Diversification, government's intervention in the economy, readiness of interest groups to defend their cause, all these elements make trade negotiations a much more difficult task today thon it used to be fifty years ago. Quarrels and dispute over international trade are therefore more likely to arise and it's impossible today to negotiate international trade agreements without dispute resolution mecanism. Success or failure of different type of arbitration lies in the definition of the substantive rules of trade agreements. For binding arbitration to work properly, such rules must be clear and precise. But this solution implies that independant countries renounce in part to their sovereignty. To do so, Canada and the United States decided to keep their own trade laws and accepted to submit them to binding arbitration. The same thing was done when free trade was extended to Mexico. At multilateral level, this type of arrangement would be much more difficult to implement.

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