The challenges of federalism to Canada’s international trade relations: The Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

2017 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-119
Author(s):  
Ali Tejpar

As one of the first “second-generation” free trade agreements that address indirect and non-tariff barriers, the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is likely to serve as an international model. CETA, however, highlights significant challenges for Canadian federalism in both the negotiation and implementation processes of this and any such future trade agreements. While the inclusion of sub-federal governments allows for provinces/territories to help shape the provisions that fall within their jurisdictions, this paper argues that subsequent challenges arise in conveying a unified Canadian commitment to implement the agreement. Overall, the CETA negotiations demonstrated the significant institutional weaknesses of current federal–provincial/territorial relations with respect to international trade agreements. In the Canadian context, this suggests a need for “summit federalism” to ensure that all federal–provincial/territorial governments align their terms and interests and convey a unified commitment to fulfilling Canada’s current and future international trade agreements.

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 738-757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Reddie

AbstractThis article examines the controversial investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in recent mega-free trade agreement. Below, I examine the origins of the ISDS concept and outline the controversy surrounding its use in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Then, I provide a theoretical discussion that outlines both the exogenous and endogenous factors that contribute to the inclusion of ISDS provisions in international trade agreements. Focusing on the latter endogenous factors, I then argue that not all international trade agreements are the same and that, as such, it is possible to develop a typology of international trade agreement across two variables (the number of parties and relative power) that impact the appropriateness of including an ISDS provision. I test this typology against the empirical record. Finally, I discuss potential innovations to the ISDS provisions and market-based mechanisms that address the dual challenges of discrimination and expropriation that ISDS is designed to address.1


2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 552-553

Pravin Krishna of Johns Hopkins University reviews, “Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements” by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the role of domestic politics in governments' decisions to enter trade pacts. Discusses a political economy theory of international trade agreements; systemic influences on preferential trade agreement formation; regime type, veto players, and preferential trade agreement formation; and auxiliary hypotheses about domestic politics and trade agreements. Mansfield is Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Milner is B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at Princeton University.”


2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-478
Author(s):  
Frédéric Bastien

The increasing importance of international trade explains in great part the role that dispute resolution plays in trade agreement. Diversification, government's intervention in the economy, readiness of interest groups to defend their cause, all these elements make trade negotiations a much more difficult task today thon it used to be fifty years ago. Quarrels and dispute over international trade are therefore more likely to arise and it's impossible today to negotiate international trade agreements without dispute resolution mecanism. Success or failure of different type of arbitration lies in the definition of the substantive rules of trade agreements. For binding arbitration to work properly, such rules must be clear and precise. But this solution implies that independant countries renounce in part to their sovereignty. To do so, Canada and the United States decided to keep their own trade laws and accepted to submit them to binding arbitration. The same thing was done when free trade was extended to Mexico. At multilateral level, this type of arrangement would be much more difficult to implement.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-121
Author(s):  
Giovanni Gruni

The European Union (eu) includes clauses on labor rights in free trade agreements with partner countries. One of these clauses was added to the Free Trade Agreement between the eu and South Korea. This article looks at the clause as an attempt of the eu to include labor rights in international trade law. The argument of the article is that the labor clause does include several innovative features which entrench the presence of labor law in international trade agreements. However, the clause remains mainly about political cooperation and struggles to define enforceable legal obligations on states. This is so because of the exceptions in the first part of the clause, the vagueness of the labor rights obligations and the lack of an enforcement mechanism.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 146-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paola Conconi ◽  
Giovanni Facchini ◽  
Maurizio Zanardi

We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model. (JEL D72, F12, F13)


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-73
Author(s):  
Meredith B. Lilly

Purpose Labour mobility is increasingly recognized as an important component of a globalized international trading system. This paper aims to examine the role of temporary entry commitments in international trade agreements toward facilitating global labour mobility. Design/methodology/approach This paper traces three decades of temporary entry provisions in international trade agreements signed by the USA and Canada, beginning with their bilateral Canada–US Free Trade Agreement and culminating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Findings The paper finds that while many countries have continued to liberalize their temporary entry commitments in various trade agreements, the USA has reversed course in the previous decade, hampering international progress. Meanwhile, Canada has pursued ever greater labour mobility provisions with most of its trading partners. Practical implications The unique roles played by the USA, Canada and other trading partners in advancing a coherent international labour mobility agenda are considered. To continue to advance labour mobility in trade agreements moving forward, policy alternatives to the “all” or “nothing” approaches pursued by Canada and the USA are suggested. Originality/value To the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to formally evaluate labour mobility in the TPP and the only paper to outline the evolution of temporary entry in the US vs Canadian trade agreements over three decades.


Author(s):  
Kyung-Bok Son

Abstracts Objectives Recent international trade agreements require member countries a prolonged statutory exclusivity for biologics, and domestic legislation guarantees various forms of exclusivity for specific drugs, indications, or studies. This study notes prolonged exclusivity provisions for biologics in the United States and international trade agreements. We aim to review various exclusivity systems, including chemical entities, in selected high-income countries and to suggest implications for establishing the system specifically relevant for biologics in low- and middle-income countries. Methods We conducted a review of a comprehensive range of literature to develop the framework. Then, a comparative legal analysis was conducted to analyze the deviations among the systems in the European Union, Canada, South Korea, Australia, and the United States. Results There is constructive ambiguity in international trade agreements, specifically for provisions regarding biologics. Furthermore, the selected countries operate different statutory exclusivity systems in terms of eligibility for statutory exclusivity, specific measures for exclusivity, and other elements of exclusivity. In addition, market exclusivity, which is distinguished from data exclusivity, is not available in Korea and Australia. There are also various forms of statutory exclusivity for specific drugs, indications, or studies requested by the marketing authority. Conclusions Given constructive ambiguities in international agreements and variations in the manner of implementations of the systems in selected countries, statutory exclusivity for biologics could be established with cautions to mediate the harms. In this study, we suggest several solutions and alternatives for low- and middle-income countries.


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