Reflective equilibrium and justice as political

1996 ◽  
pp. 144-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bridget Pratt

AbstractTo promote social justice and equity, global health research should meaningfully engage communities throughout projects: from setting agendas onwards. But communities, especially those that are considered disadvantaged or marginalised, rarely have a say in the priorities of the research projects that aim to help them. So far, there remains limited ethical guidance and resources on how to share power with communities in health research priority-setting. This paper presents an “ethical toolkit” for academic researchers and their community partners to use to design priority-setting processes that meaningfully include the communities impacted by their projects. An empirical reflective equilibrium approach was employed to develop the toolkit. Conceptual work articulated ethical considerations related to sharing power in g0l0o0bal health research priority-setting, developed guidance on how to address them, and created an initial version of the toolkit. Empirical work (51 in-depth interviews, 1 focus group, 2 case studies in India and the Philippines) conducted in 2018 and 2019 then tested those findings against information from global health research practice. The final ethical toolkit is a reflective project planning aid. It consists of 4 worksheets (Worksheet 1- Selecting Partners; Worksheet 2- Deciding to Partner; Worksheet 3- Deciding to Engage with the Wider Community; Worksheet 4- Designing Priority-setting) and a Companion Document detailing how to use them. Reflecting on and discussing the questions in Worksheets 1 to 4 before priority-setting will help deliver priority-setting processes that share power with communities and projects with research topics and questions that more accurately reflect their healthcare and system needs.


Author(s):  
José Juan Moreso ◽  
Chiara Valentini

AbstractThis article addresses the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. We draw on the ideas of wide reflective equilibrium and public reason in order to defend an engagement model of comparative adjudication. According to this model, the judicial use of foreign law is justified if it proceeds by testing and mutually adjusting the principles and rulings of our constitutional doctrines against reasonable alternatives, as represented by the principles and rulings of other reasonable doctrines. By this, a court points to a wide reflective equilibrium, justifying its own interpretations with reasonable arguments, i.e. arguments that are acceptable from the perspectives defined by other constitutional doctrines, as endorsed by other courts. The point of a judicial engagement of this sort is to work out an overlap between different, reasonable, doctrines in the judicial forum, as part of a liberal forum of public reason. Here, the exercise of public reason filters out the premises of comprehensive doctrines so as to leave us in the region of an overlapping consensus: a region of mid-level principles that can be shared, notwithstanding the fact of legal pluralism.


1996 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Schüssler Fiorenza

When I was completing my book on foundational theology, I presented a paper on the concept of broad reflective equilibrium and foundational theology to a group of colleagues at a conference sponsored by the Association of Theological Schools. This paper summarized the book's concluding section, which dealt with the relationship between contemporary criticisms of foundationalism and a foundational theology employing the method of broad reflective equilibrium. It advanced a systematic and historical argument. Systematically, the section argued that the method of broad reflective equilibrium offered a vision of foundational theology that avoided the pitfalls of foundationalism, overcoming the foundationalism of fundamental theology. It appealed to current discussions about methodology, specifically, the discussions on reflective equilibrium in the philosophy of science and in political ethics. The historical argument appealed to Schleiermacher by relating Schleiermacher's stance on the relationship between systematic and philosophical theology to the conception of a nonfoundationalist foundational theology, employing the method of broad reflective equilibrium.


Author(s):  
Ndjodi Ndeunyema

This article evaluates the existence of a freestanding, general human right to water under each of the three principal sources of international law: treaty, customary international law, and the general principles of law. To date, the right to water has been derived from treaty law, most prominently as part of the right to an adequate standard of living in article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (as implied by General Comment 15 to the ICESCR). The potential importance of a non-treaty based right to water––as a matter of customary international law or a general principle of law––is that it would bind all states, including states that are not parties to treaties with right to water provisions. Therefore, this article evaluates the state practice and opinio juris elements of custom supporting a right to water. Recognizing the disputed nature of how these two elements generally interact to crystallize into a customary norm, the article considers the problem using two distinct methodological approaches: the sliding scale approach and the reflective equilibrium approach. Finally, the paper considers whether a right to water is supported by the general principles of law. Although the right to water is not directly created by the general principles of law, the principles can nevertheless be applied to develop states’ positive and negative obligations for water provision.


2020 ◽  
pp. 49-65
Author(s):  
Grethe Netland

The focus of this chapter is the potential conflicts between the values that are basic in the work of Norwegian child protection service. Such values are expressed in principles that serve as guidelines for judgement and decisions in the field. ‘The best interest of the child’ principle is held to be grounding. The ‘mildest intervention’ principle and the ‘biological’ principle are normally held to be at the core of how the best interest of the child is to be understood. Important in child protection work, is to interpret the principles, weigh them, and consider what implications they should have in specific cases. I argue that if, for some reason, one principle is ascribed too much weigh on the cost of others, the solution for the child might not be in its best interest. I highlight the importance of not only weighing the principles against each other, but also creating a coherent balance between the principles, people’s moral intuitions and the actual practices of the service. To this end, I suggest that John Rawls’s model called reflective equilibrium might be workable.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tristram McPherson

G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsistency with alleged certainties, like the existence of his own hands. Recently, some philosophers have offered analogous arguments against revisionary views about ethics such as metaethical error theory. These arguments appeal to the inconsistency of error theory with seemingly obvious moral claims like “it is wrong to torture an innocent child just for fun.” It might seem that such ‘Moorean’ arguments in ethics will stand or fall with Moore’s own arguments in metaphysics and epistemology, in virtue of their shared structure. I argue that this is not so. I suggest that the epistemic force of the canonical Moorean arguments can best be understood to rest on asymmetries in indirect evidence. I then argue that this explanation suggests that Moorean arguments are less promising in ethics than they are against Moore’s own targets. I conclude by examining the competing attempt to vindicate Moorean arguments by appealing to Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium.


Inquiry ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 443-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sem de Maagt

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