Wittgenstein's Humean View of Causation

1994 ◽  
pp. 174-194
Keyword(s):  
Humean View

Science and common sense in the study of international politics

1984 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Roger D. Spegele
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Humean View

The history of recent efforts to establish a science of international politics may be usefully viewed as elaborate glosses on David Hume's powerful philosophical programme for resolving, reconciling or dissolving a variety of perspicuous dualities: the external and the internal, mind and body, reason and experience. Philosophers and historians of ideas still dispute the extent to which Hume succeeded but if one is to judge by the two leading ‘scientific’ research programmes1 for international politics—inductivism and naive falsificationism —these dualities are as unresolved as ever, with fatal consequences for the thesis of the unity of the sciences. For the failure to reconcile or otherwise dissolve such divisions shows that, on the Humean view, there is at least one difference between the physical (or natural) sciences. and the moral (or social) sciences: namely, that while the latter bear on the internal and external, the former are concerned primarily with the external. How much this difference matters and how the issue is avoided by the proponents of inductivism and naïve falsification is the subject matter of this paper.

The Significance for Psychology of Bradley’s Humean View of the Self

1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-44
Author(s):  
Fred Wilson ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Humean View

scholarly journals Triangulating on Thought and Norms

Dialogue ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-206
Author(s):  
KIRK LUDWIG
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Solitary Individual ◽  
Humean View

ABSTRACTThis article raises two questions about Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen's terrific book, Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. The first question, concerning the first part of the book, is whether, starting from the assumption that a solitary individual cannot have thought contents, we can show that adding another individual to the picture cannot resolve the problem. The second question, concerning the second part, is whether a more sophisticated, decision-theoretic, Humean about the pro-attitudes can respond to the objections to the simple Humean view, and whether Davidson was not in fact just such a sophisticated decision-theoretic Humean.

Intentions, Motives, and Causation

Philosophy ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard K. Scheer
Keyword(s):  
Human Actions ◽  
Humean View

I criticize the ‘Humean’ view of reasons for actions, the view that the reasons for an action can be stated in terms of desires and beliefs. I point out that this view must ignore concepts which are central to our understanding of human actions, namely, intention, motivation and associated concepts such as decision. One can then see just how inadequate the Humean view is.

scholarly journals The Soul and Personal Identity. Derek Parfit’s Arguments in the Substance Dualist Perspective

Perichoresis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-23
Author(s):  
Dmytro Sepetyi
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Human Life ◽  
The Body ◽  
Psychological Profile ◽  
Temporal Continuity ◽  
Brain Theory ◽  
Body Theory ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Humean View

AbstractThis paper re-evaluates Derek Parfit’s attack on the commonly held view that personal identity is necessarily determinate and that it is what matters. In the first part we first argue against the Humean view of personal identity; secondly, we classify the remaining alternatives into three kinds: the body theory and the brain theory, the quasi-Humean theory, and the soul theory, and thirdly we deploy Parfit’s arguments and related considerations to the point that none of the materialistic alternatives is consistent with the commonly held view. This leaves us with the alternative: either we accept the radical and highly implausible materialistic view Parfit calls ‘Reductionism’, or we accept the view that we are nonphysical indivisible entities—Cartesian egos, or souls. The second part of the paper discusses Parfit’s objections against the Cartesian view: that there is no reason to believe in the existence of such nonphysical entities; that if such entities exist, there is no evidence that they are enduring (to span a human life); that even if they exist and are enduring, they are irrelevant for the psychological profile and temporal continuity of a person; that experiments with ‘brain-splitted’ patients provide strong evidence against the Cartesian view. We argue that these objections are in part mistaken, and that the remaining (sound) part is not strong enough to make the Cartesian view less plausible than Reductionism.

Laws and Counterfactuals: Defusing an Argument against the Humean View of Laws

Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 751-758
Author(s):  
Kaave Lajevardi
Keyword(s):  
Humean View

Reason, Belief, and the Passions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Owen
Keyword(s):  
Probable Reasoning ◽  
Humean View

Hume said that reason alone cannot motivate and that passions are required to produce volitions and actions. It is argued that the widely, though not universally, held “Humean” view of motivation—that beliefs require desires to motivate actions—does not accurately reflect Hume’s own view. The author argues here that beliefs, especially beliefs about pleasure, do motivate. But beliefs are produced by probable reasoning. And this seems to imply that reason alone does motivate, i.e., produces, via beliefs, volitions and actions. It is argued that the seeming inconsistency that appears to result is only apparent. An interpretation of what Hume means by “reason alone” is provided.

Cooperation, Norms, and Moral Motivation

1993 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Normative Belief ◽  
Conceptual Connection ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Humean View ◽  
Rule Out

AbstractIt has been said that norms can solve collective action problems. To endorse a norm is to hold a normative belief. This article insists that we try to isolate moral motivation - motivation by moral belief - as such, and that its existence cannot be taken for granted. Accepting the Humean view that belief alone cannot motivate, the article rejects the thesis that there is a necessary or conceptual connection between moral belief and motivation; it warns that in looking for motivational powers or effects of normative belief we must take care to rule out the possibility that the motivation is merely derived from existing desires; and it argues that deliberation and evaluation do not produce desires purely out of beliefs. These considerations are among the necessary preliminaries to getting clear about the role of ‘social capital’ in solving collective action problems.

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