KNOWING WHAT'S NOT UP THE ROAD BY SEEING WHAT'S RIGHT IN FRONT OF YOU: EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM'S FAKE BARN PROBLEM

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-412
Author(s):  
Michael Veber
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
The Road ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
Fake Barn

ABSTRACTEpistemological Disjunctivism (ED) is the view that rational support for paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge that P comes from seeing that P – a state that is both factive and reflectively accessible. ED has the consequence that if I see that there is a barn before me, I can thereby be in a position to know that I am not in fake barn country. It is argued that this is a problem. The problem is distinct from familiar complaints about Neo-Mooreanism and easy knowledge. Potential ways of avoiding this problem are proposed. It is argued that they do not succeed. There is a way out of ED's fake barn problem but many will likely find it inhospitable.

Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-166
Author(s):  
Peter J. Graham ◽  
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

scholarly journals ON ENVATTMENT - DISJUNCTIVISM, SKEPTICAL SCENARIOS AND RATIONALITY

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (134) ◽  
pp. 525-544
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Clinical Cases

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, it is intended to articulate theses that are often assessed independently, thus showing that a strong version of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge implies a transformative conception of rationality. This entails that individuals in skeptical scenarios could not entertain rational thoughts about their environment, for they would fail to have perceptual states. The secondary aim is to show that this consequence is not a sufficient reason to abandon the variety of disjunctivism presented. The argument for this claim depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to subjects in plausible cases of illusion and some clinical cases of hallucination.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM: NEO-WITTGENSTEINIAN AND MODERATE NEO-MOOREAN

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-457
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Epistemic Modesty ◽  
Rational Evaluation

ABSTRACTDuncan Pritchard proposes a biscopic solution to the problem of radical skepticism, which consists in epistemological disjunctivism and a theory about the limits of rational evaluation inspired by Wittgenstein's On Certainty. According to the latter theory, we cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, a consequence that Pritchard finds attractive insofar as he thinks that claims to know the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses are epistemically immodest. I argue that there is room for a neo-Moorean to dispute Pritchard's argument for the Wittgensteinian proposal and I raise some doubts about its underlying motivation. Finally, I put forward an alternative, which I call “moderate neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivism.” While this theory contends that we possess rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge, it also allows for a degree of epistemic modesty, by conceding that perceptual knowledge never amounts to knowledge that is absolutely certain.

Epistemological disjunctivism and easy knowledge

Synthese ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 192 (8) ◽  
pp. 2647-2665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik
Keyword(s):  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Direct Application ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Skeptical Paradox

This chapter demonstrates that epistemological disjunctivism represents a viable theoretical option when it comes to our understanding of perceptual knowledge. It also shows that this proposal has direct application to the underdeterminationRK-based radical skeptical paradox. In particular, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the new evil demon intuition and the insularity of reasons thesis that underlies it, and hence is in a position to deny one of the claims that makes up this paradox. Moreover, epistemological disjunctivism can also lay claim to being an undercutting anti-skeptical proposal. Finally, the chapter discusses how epistemological disjunctivism is able to trade on the general epistemological distinction that has been drawn between favoring and discriminating epistemic support.

Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-205
Author(s):  
Tommaso Piazza
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Principle ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
The One ◽  
Promising Line ◽  
Line Of Resistance

It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (ed) that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ed—which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this paper is to show that Zalabardo’s criticism of this solution fails. To begin with, I show that it is based on excessively demanding epistemic principles. Moreover, I argue that on a more plausible epistemic principle Zalabardo’s conclusion doesn’t go through.

Introduction

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
The Face ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
The One ◽  
Rational Evaluation

This introductory chapter argues that integrating epistemological disjunctivism with Wittgenstein's radical account of the structure of rational evaluation can solve the problem of radical skepticism. On the face of it, these proposals look very different; indeed, they look antithetical and competing. Whereas the one proposal emphasizes the locality of rational evaluation, and hence rational support, the other emphasizes the strength of the rational support available to us in paradigm conditions, in that it is factive. But these differences are superficial, the chapter asserts. In fact, these proposals work very well with each other, in that they are not only compatible, but also mutually supporting and philosophically in the same spirit.

scholarly journals AN EXPLANATORY CHALLENGE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Boult
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Number Of Authors

ABSTRACTEpistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard's way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don't think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms of an “explanatory challenge”. The explanatory challenge is a simple, yet powerful and illuminating challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is illuminating in the sense that it shows us why Epistemological Disjunctivism must take on certain internalistically problematic commitments. A secondary aim of this paper is to examine whether the recently much-discussed distinction between justifications and excuses in epistemology can support an adequate response. I will argue that it cannot.

Seeking to uncover biology's chemical roots

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 435-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Addy Pross
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Changes ◽  
Biological Systems ◽  
Significant Development ◽  
The Road ◽  
Physical Chemical ◽  
Systems Chemistry ◽  
Biological World ◽  
Inanimate Matter ◽  
The Origin Of Life ◽  
Opening Up

Despite the considerable advances in molecular biology over the past several decades, the nature of the physical–chemical process by which inanimate matter become transformed into simplest life remains elusive. In this review, we describe recent advances in a relatively new area of chemistry, systems chemistry, which attempts to uncover the physical–chemical principles underlying that remarkable transformation. A significant development has been the discovery that within the space of chemical potentiality there exists a largely unexplored kinetic domain which could be termed dynamic kinetic chemistry. Our analysis suggests that all biological systems and associated sub-systems belong to this distinct domain, thereby facilitating the placement of biological systems within a coherent physical/chemical framework. That discovery offers new insights into the origin of life process, as well as opening the door toward the preparation of active materials able to self-heal, adapt to environmental changes, even communicate, mimicking what transpires routinely in the biological world. The road to simplest proto-life appears to be opening up.

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