Dr Livingstone, I Presume?
Abstract Presumption is often discussed in law, less often in epistemology. Is it an attitude? If so where can we locate it within the taxonomy of epistemic attitudes? Is it a kind of belief, a judgment, an assumption or a supposition? Or is it a species of inference? There are two basic models of presumption: judgmental, as a kind of judgment, and legal, taken from the use of presumptions in law. The legal model suggests that presumption is a practical inference, whereas the judgmental model suggests that presumption is an epistemic attitude. I argue that presumption is neither a practical inference nor a merely epistemic attitude: it involves both, within the category of what we may call the inquiring attitudes.
1986 ◽
Vol 18
(52)
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pp. 41-59
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2020 ◽
Vol 2020
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pp. 140-147
2019 ◽
Vol 33
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pp. 5676-5683
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2006 ◽
Vol 45
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pp. 240-245
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1992 ◽
Vol 19
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pp. 389-413
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