scholarly journals Developments in The EU-German Judicial Love Story: The Right To Be Forgotten II

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 31-39
Author(s):  
Ana Bobić

AbstractThe relationship between the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht is perhaps one of the most explored relationships in all of EU’s legal history. In attempting to understand and operationalize the uncertainty surrounding the positioning between EU and national constitutional orders, they have in some respects followed the footsteps of a typical life-long love story: in the early years of European integration, both courts appeared to be in denial of any romance, and entered into a conflict over the question of the final arbiter; they subsequently turned to flirting by moving away from an institutionally based conflict towards finding a common substantive ground; which resulted in finally abandoning the competition for domination, but rather embracing mutual respect and a heterarchical relationship. This brief piece follows these developments in fundamental rights review that for now end with the second German decision concerning the right to be forgotten.

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-317
Author(s):  
Niall O’Connor

Abstract Just how significant is the freedom of contract found in Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights for the regulation of the employment relationship? For the first half of its existence, few could have foreseen that Article 16 would soon be at the centre of debates surrounding the place of business freedoms within EU employment law. This has changed in the wake of a number of controversial decisions in which the Court of Justice of the EU relied on Article 16 to undermine the effectiveness of employee-protective legislation. The article begins by setting out the nature of freedom of contract in EU law and its effects in the employment context. This is followed by a consideration of the relationship between the general principles and the Charter. Critical Legal Studies is relied on to show that existing arguments as to the use of Article 16 as a radical tool in the employment context have been both exaggerated and underplayed. Finally, potential counterweights to freedom of contract are examined, notably the right to work as both a general principle and Charter right.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-448
Author(s):  
Maria Antonia Panascì

This case note examines the judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union delivered in Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn on 6 November 2018. It engages with the noteworthy aspects of the ruling, such as the horizontal direct effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), the relationship between primary and secondary law in the European Union legal order and the scope of application of the Charter.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Giubboni

Critical-contextual analysis of case law of the European Court of Justice on employers’ contractual freedom – Fundamental right to be immunised against the alleged disproportional protection enjoyed by employees – Progressive ideological overthrow of the original constitutional assumptions of the founding treaties – Prominent example of ‘displacement of social Europe’ – Court of Justice’s case law on the relationship between freedom to conduct a business and labour law – Neoliberal understanding of the freedom of enterprise – Alternative interpretation of Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Marta De Bazelaire De Ruppierre

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF LEGAL PERSONS DURING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S INSPECTIONSThe paper aims to discuss the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the EU institutions in competition law proceedings, showing as an example the respect for the right to privacy of undertakings during the inspections carried out by the European Commission. Although exercising the control powers of the Commission potentially collides with a number of fundamental rights expressed in the Charter, it is the analysis of Art. 7 CFR that allows to depict the evolution of the EU’s approach to privacy of legal persons, showing the accompanying judicial dialogue, or lack thereof, between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU. The article short-defines the dawn raids, examines the application of Article 7 CFR to legal persons, highlighting the aspects of protection of domicile and secrecy of correspondence, compares the standards provided by ECHR and EU law, pondering also on how the CFR guarantees can be provided and effectively controlled. It also reflects on the issue whether the Court of Justice has a forerunner role in promoting fundamental rights of undertakings in matters of competition law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-67
Author(s):  
Hanneke van Eijken

Abstract What was the added value of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU for the development of EU citizenship? And how does that affect the national level? In this contribution the case of Ruiz Zambrano and the subsequent case law of the Court of Justice and the Dutch courts is assessed to reveal its impact on EU citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights. The contribution shows that Ruiz Zambrano could be called a revolution, in the sense that irrespective of the exercise of free movement, nationals of the Member States can invoke their status of being an EU citizen. That has consequences for family reunification, and the right to reside as a family in the EU. However, the line of case law is still very limited and can be restricted on grounds of public policy and security (and public health; so far there is no case law on restriction on public health and Article 20 TFEU, but in the context of Covid-19 that might be different in the near future). Moreover, the fundamental rights narrative in the cases on Article 20 TFEU became more prominent. However, the implementation of this line of case law lies at the national level and the Dutch case law on Article 20 TFEU is therefore analysed as an example.


Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter

The right to be forgotten is an emerging legal concept allowing individuals control over their online identities by demanding that Internet search engines remove certain results. The right has been supported by the European Court of Justice, some judges in Argentina, and data-protection regulators in several European countries, among others. The right is primarily grounded in notions of privacy and data protection but also relates to intellectual property, reputation, and right of publicity. Scholars and courts cite, as an intellectual if not legal root for the right to be forgotten, the legal principle that convicted criminals whose sentences are completed should not continually be publicly linked with their crimes. Critics contend that the right to be forgotten stands in conflict with freedom of expression and can lead to revisionist history. Scholars and others in the southern cone of South America, in particular, have decried the right to be forgotten because it could allow perpetrators of mass human rights abuses to cover up or obscure their atrocities. On the other hand, those in favor of the right to be forgotten say that digital technology preserves memory unnaturally and can impede forgiveness and individual progress. The right to be forgotten debate is far from resolved and poses difficult questions about access to, and control of, large amounts of digital information across national borders. Given the global nature of the Internet and the ubiquity of certain powerful search engines, the questions at issue are universal, but solutions thus far have been piecemeal. Although a 2014 decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) garnered much attention, the right to be forgotten has been largely shaped by a 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection. In 2016, the EU adopted a new General Data Protection Regulation that will take effect in 2018 and could have a major impact because it contains an explicit right to be forgotten (also called right to erasure). The new regulation does not focus on the theoretical or philosophical justification for a right to be forgotten, and it appears likely the debate over the right in the EU and beyond will not be resolved even when the new rule takes effect.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 210-246
Author(s):  
Louise HALLESKOV STORGAARD

AbstractThis article offers a perspective on how the objective of a strong and coherent European protection standard pursued by the fundamental rights amendments of the Lisbon Treaty can be achieved, as it proposes a discursive pluralistic framework to understand and guide the relationship between the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. It is argued that this framework – which is suggested as an alternative to the EU law approach to the Strasbourg system applied by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 and its Charter-based case law – has a firm doctrinal, case law and normative basis. The article ends by addressing three of the most pertinent challenges to European fundamental rights protection through the prism of the proposed framework.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Abbt

AbstractThe notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305
Author(s):  
Delia Ferri

Court of Justice – Discrimination on the basis of disability – Article 21 and 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – Employment Equality Directive – Relationship between different sources of law protecting the right of persons with disabilities – Charter as interpretative aid – Charter as a parameter of validity – Scope of application of the Charter – Constitutionalisation of the UN Convention


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