Arguments for the Existence of God

Author(s):  
Brandon C. Look

This chapter critically discusses Leibniz’s arguments for the existence of God. It explores Leibniz’s improvements on the traditional ontological arguments of Anselm and Descartes, as well as his version of the cosmological argument and his argument from eternal truths. It is suggested that, while Leibniz’s arguments are unlikely to move a hardened atheist, they do offer important insights about the status of the existence predicate, the nature of modality, and the nature of mathematical knowledge.

2008 ◽  
pp. 110-134
Author(s):  
Pavlo Yuriyovych Pavlenko

The cornerstone of any religion is its anthropological concept, which seeks to determine the essential orientations of man, to outline the ideological framework of its existence, to represent the idea of ​​its essence, purpose in earthly life. The main task of the religious system is the act of involving and subordinating man to the spiritual divine realm as the realm of the transcendental existence of God. Belief in the real presence of the latter implies a new understanding of oneself, which ultimately leads the religious individual to the desire to be involved in this transcendental existence, to have intimate relations with him, to have a consciousness inherent in God. Note that in this context, all human being is interpreted as a certain arena for this realization. Therefore, the religious life of the individual acquires the status of religious activity.


2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.


Author(s):  
Martin Bell

This chapter is about Hume’s critiques of the cosmological, ontological, and design arguments for the existence of God, as proposed by Samuel Clarke and other Newtonian theologians. Clarke regarded the cosmological argument (in a form that incorporates the ontological argument) as essential to prove the uniqueness, eternity, infinity, and omnipresence of God and the design argument as essential to prove the wisdom and foresight of God. The criticisms Hume makes all depend on his empiricist theory of ideas and his revolutionary theories of causation and causal reasoning. Most of the chapter discusses these themes. The concluding section draws attention to recent research that shows two things. One is how central to Hume’s whole philosophical enterprise is his rejection of theological ideas and doctrines. The other is how this relates to his rejection of certain parts of Newtonian metaphysics.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Knappik

AbstractI propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of theScience of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts of facts about finite reality can be given.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 133-148
Author(s):  
Saja Parvizian ◽  

Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skep­tical arguments of al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazālī does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazālī’s than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention em­ployed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
Uwe Meixner

The paper presents a new version of the "Cosmological Argument" – considered to be an ontological argument, since it exclusively uses ontological concepts and principles. It employs famous results of modern physics, and distinguishes between event-causation and agent-causation. Due to these features, the argument manages to avoid the objection of infinite regress. It remains true, however, that the conclusion of the argument (just like the conclusion of Thomas Aquinas’s causal argument) is too unspecific to be unambiguously considered an argument for the existence of God.


2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 15-33
Author(s):  
Predrag Milidrag

The article analyzes the status of the principle of non-contradiction as an eternal truth in Descartes' metaphysics, and tries to answer the question is it caused. After making the difference between created and uncreated eternal truths, the reached conclusion is that the principle of non-contradiction is created eternal truth. As such, it could be applied even to God but only if we understand him as the most perfect being. The very essence of God, that is absolute power i.e. causa sui is beyond the range of this principle, because absolute power as the essence of God is the realm of absolute identity between His essence and His existence. Since man can think only in accordance with the principle of non-contradiction, even God's infinite power he must understand with regard to that principle. Nevertheless, since the principle of non-contradiction is not applicable on God's absolute identity, its absence man understands as its negation, and because of that, that identity appears to him as self-contradictory. In the end, it is shown a (partial) lack of ground of Lebniz's critique of Descartes concerning ontological argument.


Author(s):  
Yujin Nagasawa

This chapter provides a precise definition of perfect being theism and compares it with alternatives such as atheism, polytheism, pantheism, and panentheism. The chapter then considers the historical and cognitive roots of perfect being theism. It argues, contrary to what is widely believed, that perfect being theism is not Anselm’s invention or an unnatural, scholarly artefact. The chapter then explains the philosophical merits of holding perfect being theism and considers the relationship between perfect being theism and prominent arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument and the design argument. It concludes with a discussion of three types of arguments against perfect being theism.


Author(s):  
Dan Arbib

Among the most original of the features of Cartesian thought is the thesis of the “creation of eternal truths”. From the outset this thesis confronts a paradox: although Descartes’s immediate successors considered it fundamental, historians of philosophy have long ignored it, and it was not until the works of Alquié and Rodis-Lewis, and then Marion, that this thesis was given the importance it deserves. In fact—and Descartes’s immediate successors were not deceived—if this thesis is crucial, it is because it points to the heart of Cartesian thought, so the whole of Descartes’s thought can be evaluated in its light. The challenge it poses is the relation between the infinite (God) and the finite (human reason), and it concerns the status of truths and rationality, the question of the equivocity or analogy of being and knowledge, and therefore the status of the possible in the face of divine omnipotence. In order to appreciate the theoretical breadth of this thesis, this chapter attempts to put it in its historical context: among Descartes’s predecessors we find possible opposition to this doctrine as well as anticipations of it, even if these are only partial. Finally, it considers the reception of the doctrine among post-Cartesians.


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