The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda (Neth. Sup. Ct.)

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 811-848
Author(s):  
André Nollkaemper ◽  
Laura Burgers

On December 20, 2019, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands published its judgment in The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda. The judgment is largely a discussion of questions of Dutch law, but contains several conclusions that are relevant from an international law perspective. In particular, the Court held that on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Netherlands has a positive obligation to take measures for the prevention of climate change and that it was required to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 25 percent by the end of 2020, compared with 1990 levels.

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 729-735
Author(s):  
Maiko Meguro

The judgment in State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation marks one of the first successful challenges to climate change policy based on a human rights treaty. In this case, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld the lower court's opinion that the Netherlands has a positive obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to take reasonable and suitable measures for the prevention of climate change. Although the Supreme Court recognized that climate change is a consequence of collective human activities that cannot be solved by one state on its own, it held that the Netherlands is individually responsible for failing to do its part to counter the danger of climate change, which, as the Court affirmed, inhibits enjoyment of ECHR rights. In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court determined the exact level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction that the Netherlands is required to meet to comply with its ECHR obligation, specifically, a 25 percent reduction compared to its 1990 level by the end of 2020.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-494
Author(s):  
Bríd Ní Ghráinne ◽  
Aisling McMahon

AbstractOn 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt) issued its decision on, inter alia, whether Northern Ireland's near-total abortion ban was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This article critically assesses the UKSC's treatment of international law in this case. It argues that the UKSCt was justified in finding that Northern Ireland's ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoit Mayer

AbstractOn 9 October 2018, the Court of Appeal of The Hague (the Netherlands) upheld the District Court’s decision in the case of Urgenda, thus confirming the obligation of the Netherlands to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 25% by 2020 compared with levels in 1990. This case raised some of the thorniest issues in climate law. As the Netherlands is responsible for only a tiny fraction of global GHG emissions, is it right for a court to hold that a national emissions reduction mitigation target is necessary to prevent dangerous climate change and its impact on human rights? If so, how can this target be determined? The District Court and the Court of Appeal of The Hague have provided inspiring responses, although they are perhaps not entirely convincing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 12-35
Author(s):  
Julia Laffranque

Judicial systems often wrestle with whether to sacrifice always presenting thorough judicial reasoning for the sake of an effective leave-to-appeal system. The paper outlines issues of reference to the Luxembourg Court, particularly with regard to Estonian circumstances in light of the ECtHR judgment in Baydar v. the Netherlands. The interplay between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights in this regard is considered first, along with the importance of giving reasons, courts’ authority, the different roles of domestic and European courts, the duty of referring questions to the CJEU and exemption, consequences of non-referral in EU law, the Strasbourg Court’s role in dialogue between national courts and the CJEU, etc. Examined next are such matters as influences on preliminary references in European Union law, summary reasoning and limits to the reasoning duty (especially with regard to the Ullens de Schooten case of the ECtHR), associated division of competencies between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts, and finally the reasoning of the ECtHR itself as good or bad example. The author then considers the Supreme Court of Estonia’s leave-to-appeal system and the national courts’ practice in relation to Baydar, concluding that, while reasoned judgments are important and a right, no right exists for the applicant’s case to be referred by a domestic judge to the Luxembourg Court, though it is vital that summary judgment not be arbitrary / manifestly unreasonable; that Estonian courts have made reasonable use of the preliminary reference procedure before the Luxembourg Court thus far; and that they should articulate well the reasoning for referral/non-referral for litigants. The author proposes that the Estonian Supreme Court explain, exceptionally in one refusal of leave to appeal (cf. the Netherlands), that the general requirements for granting leave to appeal cover also the situation of preliminary questions to the CJEU and C.I.L.F.I.T. arguments of the CJEU. Above all, neither the interplay between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights nor the role of national courts finding their way in complex legal surroundings should be neglected. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-124
Author(s):  
Irene Antonopoulos

The decision of the Dutch Supreme Court in The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation represents a breakthrough and a step forward in addressing the human rights aspects of climate change. The significance of the case has been recognised by commentators and the UN Human Rights Commissioner, who asked for a repeat of Urgenda’s journey in other jurisdictions. Despite the implication that other states have similar obligations to those construed by the Dutch Supreme Court, the influence of the case in other jurisdictions is yet to be seen. This article recognises the significance of the Urgenda case to the definition of state obligations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions as part of their commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, the article discusses the progress made in interpreting Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in clarifying state obligations to take decisive measures to tackle climate change in line with their climate action commitments.


2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 287-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Bakker

In two cases lodged by victims (or their relatives) of the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands has taken a progressive stance on the interpretation of international law on the responsibility of States and international organizations for wrongful acts. The Supreme Court upheld the earlier decisions of The Hague Court of Appeal, confirming that the Netherlands can be held responsible for the death and injuries of these victims, despite the fact that the Dutch troops employed to protect this enclave were part of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force. By accepting the possibility of dual attribution of an internationally wrongful act to both the UN and the troop-sending State, it has departed from the restrictive approach adopted in current judicial practice, in particular by the European Court of Human Rights. In this note, the Supreme Court’s judgments are discussed, focusing on (i) the question of dual attribution of an international wrongful act, and (ii) the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. It concludes that, although the Supreme Court’s reliance on two sets of Draft Articles of the International Law Commission without referring to any State practice is surprising, these judgments should be welcomed as significant precedents, which may contribute to the development of a norm of customary international law. They also constitute an important step towards ensuring access to justice and reparation for the victims of gross human rights violations, such as those committed in Srebrenica.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.


Land Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 593-629
Author(s):  
Chris Bevan

This chapter examines the relationship between land law and human rights. From a distinctly land law perspective, the human rights discourse has given rise to much debate, which continues to fuel much academic commentary including recent examination of the availability of horizontal effect in McDonald v McDonald in the Supreme Court and in the European Court of Human Rights. The chapter focuses chiefly on the two most pertinent provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for land law; namely Art. 1 of the First Protocol and Art. 8 and reflects on the, at times, difficult relationship between land law and human rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-604
Author(s):  
Alex Ruck Keene ◽  
Xinyu Xu

Abstract How (if at all) can the right to liberty of a child under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) be balanced against the rights of parents, enshrined both at common law and under Article 8 ECHR? Is there a limit to the extent to which parents can themselves, or via others, seek to impose restrictions upon their disabled child’s liberty so as to secure their child’s interests? This case considers the answers to these questions given by and the implications of the decision of the Supreme Court in September 2019 in Re D (A Child) [2019] UKSC 42.


Refuge ◽  
2002 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Audrey Macklin

In Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Ahani v. MCI, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that removing a refugee accused of terrorism to a country where he or she would face a substantial risk of torture or similar abuse would virtually always violate the individual’s rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the Court deserves praise for vindicating fundamental human rights over competing claims of national security, coming so close on the heels of September 11, the victory is in certain respects more apparent than real. Given the strong endorsement of judicial deference to the exercise of Ministerial discretion in national security matters, the Court leaves the state wide scope to circumvent the spirit of the judgment while adhering to its letter.


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