scholarly journals Does concealing familiarity evoke other processes than concealing untrustworthiness? – Different forms of concealed information modulate P3 effects

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Koeckritz ◽  
André Beauducel ◽  
Johanna Hundhausen ◽  
Anika Redolfi ◽  
Anja Leue

Abstract It was investigated whether concealing learned stimulus attributes (i.e., trustworthiness vs. untrustworthiness) has similar effects on the P3 amplitude than concealing stimulus familiarity. According to salience hypothesis, known, deceptive stimuli (probe) are (perceived) more relevant than truthful, unknown stimuli (irrelevant) evoking a more positive probe P3 amplitude. When all stimuli are known, concealing information is more cognitively demanding than non-concealing information evoking a less positive P3 amplitude according to the mental effort account. Ninety-seven participants concealed knowledge of previously learned faces in the familiarity condition (probe vs. irrelevant stimuli). In the trustworthiness condition, participants concealed untrustworthiness to previously learned faces and responded truthfully to previously learned trustworthy and untrustworthy faces (known, concealed vs. known, truthful stimuli). The parietal mean P3 amplitude was more positive for probe stimuli than for irrelevant stimuli in the familiarity condition providing evidence for the salience hypothesis. In the trustworthiness condition, concealing untrustworthiness showed the smallest parietal mean P3 amplitude suggesting evidence for the mental effort hypothesis. Individual differences of perpetrator’s sensitivity to injustice modulated the P3 amplitude in the trustworthiness condition.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Leue ◽  
André Beauducel

In deception tasks the parietal P3 amplitude of the event-related potential indicates either recognition of salient stimuli (larger P3 following salient information) or mental effort (negative or smaller P3 following demanding information). This meta-analysis (k = 77) investigated both cognitive processes by means of conceptual and methodological a-priori moderators (study design, pre-task scenario, context of deception tasks, and P3 quantification). Within-subjects designs show evidence of the underlying cognitive processes, between-subjects designs allow for comparisons of cognitive processes in culprits vs. innocents. Deception in legal contexts results in almost twice as large population effect sizes (delta) than deception in social contexts. Deception in legal contexts supports the salience hypothesis (largest delta), deception in social contexts suggests a combination of salience recognition and mental effort (smaller delta), and active lying requires more mental effort (negative delta). Counter-measure techniques in 3-stimulus protocols reduce the discriminability of concealed vs. truthful P3 amplitudes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
William Morrison ◽  
Dmitry Taubinsky

Abstract This paper tests costly attention models of consumers’ misreaction to opaque taxes. We report an online shopping experiment that involves shrouded sales taxes that are exogenously varied within consumer over time. Some consumers systematically underreact to sales taxes while others systematically overreact, but higher stakes decrease both under- and overreaction. This is consistent with consumers using heterogeneous rules of thumb to compute the opaque tax when the stakes are low, but using costly mental effort at higher stakes. The results allow us to differentiate between various theories of limited attention. We also develop novel econometric techniques for quantifying individual differences.


Author(s):  
George Visu-Petra ◽  
Mircea Miclea ◽  
Ioan Bus ◽  
Laura Visu-Petra

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Perfors ◽  
Evan Kidd

Humans have the ability to learn surprisingly complicated statistical information in avariety of modalities and situations, often based on relatively little input. These statistical learning (SL) skills appear to underlie many kinds of learning, but despite their ubiquity, we still do not fully understand precisely what SL is and what individual differences on SL tasks reflect. Here we present experimental work suggesting that at least some individual differences arise from variation in perceptual fluency — the ability to rapidly or efficiently code and remember the stimuli that statistical learning occurs over – and that perceptual fluency is driven at least in part by stimulus familiarity: performance on a standard SL task varies substantially within the same (visual) modality as a function of whether the stimuli involved are familiar or not, independent of stimulus complexity. Moreover, we find that test-retest correlations of performance in a statistical learning task using stimuli of the same level of familiarity (but distinct items) are stronger than correlations across the same task with stimuli of different levels of familiarity. Finally, we demonstrate that statistical learning performance is predicted by an independent measure of stimulus-specific perceptual fluency that contains no statistical learning component at all. Our results suggest that a key component of statistical learning performance may be related to stimulus-specific perceptual processing and familiarity.


Intelligence ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald E. Larson ◽  
Richard J. Haier ◽  
Lori LaCasse ◽  
Kay Hazen

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