Jacob Bronowski: a humanist intellectual for an atomic age, 1946–1956

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 573-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
RALPH DESMARAIS

AbstractJacob (‘Bruno’) Bronowski (1908–1974), on the basis of having examined the effects of the atomic bombing of Japan in late 1945, became one of Britain's most vocal and best-known scientific intellectuals engaged in the cultural politics of the early atomic era. Witnessing Hiroshima helped transform him from pure mathematician–poet to scientific administrator; from obscurity to fame on the BBC airwaves and in print; and, crucially, from literary intellectual who promoted the superior truthfulness of poetry and poets to scientific humanist insisting that science and scientists were the standard-bearers of truth. A cornerstone of Bronowski's humanist ideology was that Hiroshima and the bomb had become symbols of the public's distrust of science, whereas, in reality, science was merely a scapegoat for society's loss of moral compass; more correctly, he stressed, science and scientists epitomized positive moral values. When discussing atomic energy, especially after 1949, Bronowski not only downplayed the bomb's significance but was deliberately vague regarding Britain's atomic weapon development programme; this lack of candour was compounded by Bronowski's evasiveness regarding his own prior involvement with wartime bombing. The net effect was a substantial contribution to British scientific intellectuals' influential yet frequently misleading accounts of the relations between science and war in the early atomic era.

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 492-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Rothschild

The U.S. military first sponsored ecological research during World War II to monitor the release of radioactive effluent into waterways from plutonium production. The Atomic Energy Commission later expanded these investigations to include studies of radioactive fallout at the Nevada and Marshall Island test sites, particularly after the Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) accident in 1954. The public outcry against nuclear testing from this accident, which contaminated nearby inhabited islands with radioactive fallout, resulted in a considerable influx of funding for environmental science at the Atomic Energy Commission. Many biologists who conducted these studies on nuclear fallout and waste for the Atomic Energy Commission began to develop concerns about radioactive pollution in the environment from the long-term, cumulative effects of nuclear waste disposal, the use of atomic bombs for construction projects, and the potential ecological devastation wrought by nuclear war. Their new environmental awareness prompted many Atomic Energy Commission ecologists to try to draw congressional attention to the dangers that nuclear technology posed to the environment. It also spurred reforms in the education and training of ecologists to meet the challenges of the atomic age through the new subfield of “radioecology” as well as research into problems of environmental pollution more broadly.


Nature ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 228 (5277) ◽  
pp. 1132-1132
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 709-715
Author(s):  
Bartosz Płotka ◽  
Cristina Iulia Ghenu ◽  
Kamila Rezmer

In What Money Can’t Buy and Justice – What’s the Right Thing to Do Michael Sandel argued that nowadays we face the loss of our collective moral compass caused by the increasing role of markets in our lives. In his view, when market and moral values compete, some aspects of everyday life become corrupted. One of the author’s examples is the case of surrogacy, presented as a service which corrupts parenthood. In this article we follow Sandel’s argument and argue, step by step, that its logic cannot be fully applied to surrogacy and, there where it can, it is utterly wrong. That is because in fact Sandel’s argumentation is not strictly economic but personalistic, as we demonstrate in the article. Our conclusion is that Sandel’s personalistic approach to surrogacy cannot be generalized over all cases and cultures, and even where it is used, it is offending and discriminating against both women who want to be surrogates and the intended parents.


2020 ◽  
pp. 100-111
Author(s):  
Huw Dylan ◽  
David V. Gioe ◽  
Michael S. Goodman

This chapter is concerned with analysing the Soviet strategic threat. It opens with a discussion of how technological innovations creating relatively small movable weapons ensured that modern warfare had forever changed. Atomic intelligence became a matter of the highest priority, as did spying on the aircraft and missiles that would deliver these weapons. US intelligence underestimated the speed at which the USSR could develop and test an atomic weapon and overestimated the number of bombers capable of delivering such weapons. Developing better intelligence became a principal national priority. Document: AQUATONE Briefing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff RE Guided Missiles, Atomic Energy, and Long Range Bombers.


1949 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clinton L. Rossiter

How shall we be governed in an atomic war? Who will make the decisions for defense and survival, and what compulsions will support their peremptory execution? What will be the measure of our cherished liberties? In all the vast literature of atomic energy and the atomic bomb there appear no clear answers to these distressing questions.Several authorities have meditated wisely upon the particular problems of domestic government in the atomic age. Robert E. Cushman has pictured the challenge of atomic energy to our traditional concepts of civil liberty; Arthur Bromage has admonished state and local public administrators to decentralize or die, and Senator Wiley has done the same for the national government; Bernard Brodie and Hanson Baldwin have warned of the inadequacy for atomic warfare of our present defense and mobilization plans. Yet no one seems to have outlined the over-all pattern that the American government would assume in the event of atomic war or indicated the workable adjustments that we might undertake now to prepare our constitutional system for this dreadful contingency. This neglect may well be just another symptom of our apparent decision (arrived at through indecision) to ignore the bomb and, like Mr. Lincoln, “confess plainly” that events control us. Since we refuse to contemplate the horrors of atomic war, we likewise refuse to imagine the sort of government that such a war would force us to adopt.


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