scholarly journals Why we write (nuclear) history

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
David K. Hecht
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Atomic Bomb ◽  
First Century ◽  
Natural Phenomenon ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Early Twenty ◽  
Nuclear History ◽  
The Cold War

Nuclear history always compels. Scholars (and readers) can immerse themselves in the existential threat posed by the atomic bomb and its successor weapons, the tantalizing prospect of carbon-free energy, or the study of a natural phenomenon deeply at odds with our everyday experience of the world. There is thus always something profound at stake when we write nuclear history – be it physical, economic or intellectual. And while it may seem that the end of the Cold War should have diminished the academic attention accorded to the subject, it actually just allowed the historiography to evolve. To the wealth of technical and political studies that once dominated nuclear history, we can now add a host of excellent cultural, environmental, literary and transnational studies. Those of us who entered the field shortly after the break-up of the Soviet Union have been able to follow these developments first-hand, from the initial uncertainty of where nuclear history would go without its original raison d’être to seeing the possibilities opened up in a post-Cold War world. The books under review here provide important and timely additions to this historiography. Luis A. Campos's Radium and the Secret Life provides a rigorous and compelling account of the uses of radium in early twentieth-century biology; Timothy J. Jorgensen's Strange Glow: The Story of Radiation offers an accessible and illuminating analysis of the benefits and risks of radiation. The books also make for a fascinating juxtaposition. They complement each other well, but also contain some intriguing differences that allow us to reflect on the nature of nuclear history in the early twenty-first century.

scholarly journals EXPLORING AND EXPLAINING THE ECONOMIC POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE SECOND PAHLAVI ERA EMPHASIZING THE SYSTEM THEORY

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimia Zare ◽  
Habibollah Saeeidinia
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International System ◽  
World War ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War

Iran and Russia have common interests, especially in political terms, because of the common borders and territorial neighborhood. This has led to a specific sensitivity to how the two countries are approaching each other. Despite the importance of the two countries' relations, it is observed that in the history of the relations between Iran and Russia, various issues and issues have always been hindered by the close relations between the two countries. The beginning of Iran-Soviet relations during the Second Pahlavi era was accompanied by issues such as World War II and subsequent events. The relations between the two countries were influenced by the factors and system variables of the international system, such as the Cold War, the US-Soviet rivalry, the Second World War and the entry of the Allies into Iran, the deconstruction of the relations between the two post-Cold War superpowers, and so on.The main question of the current research is that the political relations between Iran and Russia influenced by the second Pahlavi period?To answer this question, the hypothesis was that Iran's political economic relations were fluctuating in the second Pahlavi era and influenced by the changing system theory of the international system with the Soviet Union. The findings suggest that various variables such as the structure of the international system and international events, including World War II, the arrival of controversial forces in Iran, the Cold War, the post-Cold War, the US and Soviet policies, and the variables such as the issue of oil Azerbaijan's autonomy, Tudeh's actions in Iran, the issue of fisheries and borders. Also, the policies adopted by Iranian politicians, including negative balance policy, positive nationalism and independent national policy, have affected Iran-Soviet relations. In a general conclusion, from 1320 (1942) to 1357 (1979), the relationship between Iran and Russia has been an upward trend towards peaceful coexistence. But expansion of further relations in the economic, technical and cultural fields has been political rather than political.

The United States and the Soviet Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 138-152
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The United States ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Global Peace ◽  
Otto Von Bismarck ◽  
The Cold War

Otto von Bismarck famously said that “God has special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.” Divine providence may not have hurt, but it was America’s domestic political institutions that transformed a smattering of British colonies in North America into, first, an independent nation and, then, a global superpower with a network of allies and partners spanning six continents. The United States faced off against the Soviet Union for a half century during the Cold War. But Washington possessed the better institutions, and the stress of the competition caused Moscow’s political system to collapse altogether. In the post–Cold War period that followed, Washington deepened and expanded the Pax Americana, and spread unprecedented levels of global peace, prosperity, and freedom. For the first time since Ancient Rome, a single superpower so overawed any potential competitors that great power rivalry itself came to a temporary halt.

Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War

2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis J. Gavin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
History Of ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
Nuclear History ◽  
The Cold War

A widely held and largely unchallenged view among many scholars and policymakers is that nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat facing the United States today, that it is more dangerous than ever, and that few meaningful lessons can be drawn from the nuclear history of a supposed simpler and more predictable period, the Cold War. This view, labeled “nuclear alarmism,” is based on four myths about the history of the nuclear age. First, today's nuclear threats are new and more dangerous than those of the past. Second, unlike today, nuclear weapons stabilized international politics during the Cold War, when in fact the record was mixed. The third myth conflates the history of the nuclear arms race with the geopolitical and ideological competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, creating an oversimplified and misguided portrayal of the Cold War. The final myth is that the Cold War bipolar military rivalry was the only force driving nuclear proliferation. A better understanding of this history, and, in particular, of how and why the international community escaped calamity during a far more dangerous time against ruthless and powerful adversaries, can produce more effective U.S. policies than those proposed by the nuclear alarmists.

The United States at the End of the Cold War, 1989–1993

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Graham Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
The Persian Gulf ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Military Campaign

The Cold War may have ended on the evening of November 9, 1989, when East German border guards opened up checkpoints and allowed their fellow citizens to stream into West Berlin; it certainly was over by January 28, 1992, when U.S. president George H. W. Bush delivered his annual State of the Union Address one month after President Mikhail Gorbachev had announced his resignation and the end of the Soviet Union. After the Berlin Wall came down, Bush and Gorbachev spoke of the Cold War in the past tense in person and on the telephone. The reunification of Germany and U.S. military campaign in the Persian Gulf confirmed that reality. In January 1991, polls indicated that, for the first time, a majority of Americans believed that the Cold War was over. However, the poll results obscured the substantial foreign and domestic crises, challenges, and opportunities created by the end of the Cold War that occupied President Bush and his national-security team between November 1989 and Bush’s defeat in the 1992 presidential inauguration and the inauguration of William Jefferson Clinton as America’s first post–Cold War president in January 1993.

After the Cold War: Wilsonianism Resurgent?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Smith
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Approach ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines the United States's Wilsonianism in the post-Cold War era, first under George H. W. Bush and then under Bill Clinton. It considers how Bush, who became president as the Soviet Union was disintegrating and its leaders were looking for a new framework of understanding with the West, used Wilsonianism to address the question of establishing a world order favorable to American national security. It also discusses various Bush initiatives that were designed to establish a new world order after the cold war, Clinton's selective approach to liberal democratic internationalism, the effects of liberal economic practices on American national security, and the link between nationalism and liberal democracy. Finally, it assesses some of the challenges involved in the United States' efforts to bring about stable constitutional governance in many parts of the world.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 240-254
Author(s):  
Edward M. Geist
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civil Defense ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Historical Evolution ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

This conclusion describes some general findings about the historical evolution of civil defense in the two superpowers over the course of the Cold War. Neither U.S. nor Soviet officials regarded their civil defense efforts as successful, but the shortcomings of the programs appear to have resulted from domestic political obstacles rather than technical, strategic, and budgetary considerations. In the United States, Congressional opponents blocked large-scale funding for civil defense before its unpopularity with the general public became a crippling obstacle. In the Soviet Union, ideological strictures simultaneously impelled the development of civil defense yet undermined its plausibility. This chapter also makes some observations about post-Cold War developments in U.S. and Russian civil defense and their possible policy implications.

Russell and the Communist-Aligned Peace Movement in the Mid-1950s

2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew G. Bone
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Atomic Bomb ◽  
Peace Movement ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Critical Juncture ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Domestic Policies ◽  
The Cold War

<p>The Soviet Union's successful test of an atomic bomb in 1949 altered Russell's outlook on international politics. But there was a considerable delay between this critical juncture of the Cold War and any perceptible softening of Russell's anti-Communism. Even after a muted optimism about the possibility of improvement in the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Union entered Russell's writing, he remained apprehensive about campaigning for peace alongside western Communists and fellow-travellers. He disliked the central thrust of pro-Soviet peace propaganda but regarded ideological diversity as a vital prerequisite for meaningful peace work. Russell also understood that such an approach carried with it a risk that his efforts might be tarnished by association with the Communist-aligned peace movement. His dilemma was eased not by a shift in his own tactics, but by external factors: a crisis within western Communism and the emergence of broadly based movements for peace that could not easily be tainted by their critics as "pro-Soviet".</p>

scholarly journals Bellicose Peace: China’s Peace Signature Campaign and Discourses about “Peace” in the Early 1950s

Modern China ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-280
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Forster
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Atomic Bomb ◽  
Korean War ◽  
World Peace ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cold War

In the early 1950s, China engaged in several military actions, most notably in the Korean War. Nevertheless, the World Peace Council, an international organization sponsored by the Soviet Union, praised the country as a “fortress for the protection of world peace” in 1954. This hinged upon a very specific, bellicose understanding of “peacefulness,” which did not mean the rejection of war, but war against the “right” enemy. I discuss this understanding, its function within the international community, its embeddedness in international political thinking, and its promulgation among the Chinese population, using the example of a campaign in 1950 to collect signatures on a World Peace Council–authored appeal against the atomic bomb. Self-promotion as a peaceful nation in the bellicose sense served a variety of purposes for the young People’s Republic of China (PRC), most importantly the goal to instill bloc thinking in the PRC’s population and to gain prestige within the new international order of the Cold War.

scholarly journals The Baloch nationalism in Pakistan: Articulation of the ethnic separatism after the end of the Cold War

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-85
Author(s):  
Hoshang Noraiee
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Drug Trafficking ◽  
Community Organizations ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Radical Nationalism

The tribal structures of the society in Balochistan has strongly influenced Baloch nationalism in Pakistan. The Baloch nationalism has been shaped in the process of widespread politico-tribal rivalry, in the context of a week state in Pakistan interacted with the post-cold war conditions marked by the absence of the Soviet Union hegemonic power, and the processes of globalization. In this framework, the attitudes, scope, and directions of the Baloch nationalism, in this area, have shifted. The radical nationalism predominantly has become more aggressive, more exclusionary, more puritan, and more ethnically oriented. It has become more relaxed in using unethical and deceitful means such as indiscriminate killing, kidnapping, ransom; arm trafficking, and sometimes some of the nationalists, if not directly, gaining benefit from the drug trafficking, and banditry to achieve their objectives. Considering the geopolitical conditions in the whole region, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan; and the strength of tribal- sardari values associated with inter and intra rivalries, it is not surprising to find a peculiar situation in Balochistan. This research is mainly based on literature review, but also some limited conversations with a few anonymous informants and contacts with some of the Baloch political and community organizations and activists.

Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Diplomatic History ◽  
German Reunification ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

Did the United States promise the Soviet Union during the 1990 negotiations on German reunification that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe? Since the end of the Cold War, an array of Soviet/Russian policymakers have charged that NATO expansion violates a U.S. pledge advanced in 1990; in contrast, Western scholars and political leaders dispute that the United States made any such commitment. Recently declassified U.S. government documents provide evidence supporting the Soviet/Russian position. Although no non-expansion pledge was ever codified, U.S. policymakers presented their Soviet counterparts with implicit and informal assurances in 1990 strongly suggesting that NATO would not expand in post–Cold War Europe if the Soviet Union consented to German reunification. The documents also show, however, that the United States used the reunification negotiations to exploit Soviet weaknesses by depicting a mutually acceptable post–Cold War security environment, while actually seeking a system dominated by the United States and opening the door to NATO's eastward expansion. The results of this analysis carry implications for international relations theory, diplomatic history, and current U.S.-Russian relations.

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