A Bargaining Theory of Coalition Formation

1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric C. Browne ◽  
Peter Rice

Central both to formal theories of coalition formation and many, actual, collective decision-making processes is the distribution of some reward, or payoff as it is commonly called, among those participants able to control a decision. The payoff constitutes an object of value for the players, or the stakes of the game, the disposition of which becomes a primary focus of bargaining among them. It is usual to assume that participants in coalition-forming contexts are rational actors, and this is often interpreted to mean that they pursue strategies intended to maximize their individual shares of the available payoff. Theories based upon this general structure have furnished a variety of important propositions, focusing mostly upon the composition of winning coalitions.

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Krakowski

The paper examines conditions under which communities threatened by armed groups amid the Colombian civil war are most likely to resist displacement. Using a game-theoretic framework and quantitative data, the paper shows that the threatened communities which expect rescue from an armed actor are more likely to resist displacement than those communities which expect no help. Community cohesion has a dual effect on displacement. The amount of peer support among community members reduces their chances to resist displacement, but the extent to which community members are involved in collective decision-making processes makes them less likely to displace. These findings reveal that both displaced communities and those that resisted displacement possess crucial social resources for their post-conflict recovery and development, such as cohesion and strong bonds of solidarity. The paper stresses the importance of local-level organisation coordinating collective decision-making to guarantee the most efficient use of these resources.


Author(s):  
Eva Thelisson

The research problem being investigated in this article is how to develop governance mechanisms and collective decision-making processes at a global level for Artificial Intelligence systems (AI) and Autonomous systems (AS), which would enhance confidence in AI and AS.


2010 ◽  
Vol 278 (1712) ◽  
pp. 1697-1704 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Sueur ◽  
J. L. Deneubourg ◽  
O. Petit

Mechanisms related to collective decision making have recently been found in almost all animal reigns from amoebae to worms, insects and vertebrates, including human beings. Decision-making mechanisms related to collective movements—including pre-departure and joining—have already been studied at different steps of the movement process, but these studies were always carried out separately. We therefore have no understanding of how these different processes are related when they underlie the same collective decision-making event. Here, we consider the whole departure process of two groups of Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ), using a stochastic model. When several exclusive choices are proposed, macaques vote and choose the majority. Individuals then join the movement according to a mimetism based on affiliative relationships. The pre-departure quorum and the joining mimetic mechanism are probably linked, but we have not yet identified which transition mechanism is used. This study shows that decision-making related to macaque group movements is governed by a quorum rule combined with a selective mimetism at departure. This is the first time that transition mechanisms have been described in mammals, which consequently helps understand how a voting process leads to social amplification. Our study also provides the first complete proof that there is continuity in the decision-making processes underlying collective movements in mammals from the first intention movement right through to the last joiner.


Author(s):  
Jérôme Lang

Most solution concepts in collective decision making are defined assuming complete knowledge of individuals' preferences and of the mechanism used for aggregating them. This is often unpractical or unrealistic. Under incomplete knowledge, a solution advocated by many consists in quanrtifying over all completions of the incomplete preference profile (or all instantiations of the incompletely specified mechanism). Voting rules can be `modalized' this way (leading to the notions of possible and necessary winners), and also efficiency and fairness notions in fair division, stability concepts in coalition formation, and more. I give here a survey of works along this line.


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