The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES L. GIBSON ◽  
GREGORY A. CALDEIRA ◽  
LESTER KENYATTA SPENCE

The conventional wisdom about the US Supreme Court and the 2000 presidential election is that the Court wounded itself by participating in such a partisan dispute. By ‘wounded’ people mean that the institution lost some of its legitimacy. Evidence from our survey, conducted in early 2001, suggests little if any diminution of the Court’s legitimacy in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore, even among African Americans. We observe a relationship between evaluations of the opinion and institutional legitimacy, but the bulk of the causality seems to flow from loyalty to evaluations of the case, not vice versa. We argue that legitimacy frames perceptions of the Court opinion. Furthermore, increased awareness of the activities of the Court tends to reinforce legitimacy by exposing people to the powerful symbols of law. In 2000, legitimacy did indeed seem to provide a reservoir of good will that allowed the Court to weather the storm created by its involvement in Florida’s presidential election.

Non-Being ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 139-164
Author(s):  
Roberto Casati ◽  
Achille C. Varzi

The US Presidential Election of 2000 was crucially decided in Florida. And, in Florida, the election might have been decided crucially by the question: is a dimple a hole? “Yes, it is”, so dimpled ballots are valid and ought to be counted. “No it isn’t”, and dimpled ballots must be rejected as invalid. If only one knew the answer! Where were the hole experts when we needed them? Eventually the manual recount was stopped by the Supreme Court. But we did learn something. We learned that even the destiny of a Presidential Election, if not more, might ultimately depend on one’s criteria for identifying holes—not their material surroundings, which everyone could detect, but the holes themselves.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias Iaryczower ◽  
Matthew Shum

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K10)


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Liz Heffernan

The admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal proceedings has generated controversy throughout the common law world. In the United States, there has been renewed debate in recent years over the propriety of the judicially-created exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. When defining the scope and purpose of the rule, the US Supreme Court has placed ever increasing emphasis on the likely deterrent effect which suppressing evidence will exert on law enforcement. This article explores the consequent restriction of the exclusionary rule evinced in the contemporary case law including United States v Herring in which the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the so-called "good faith" exception. In conclusion it offers reflection from the perspective of another common law country, Ireland, where the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence has been the subject of debate.


Author(s):  
Justin Grimmer

This paper continues an analysis, begun in the December 2004 issue, that employed panel data to estimate the effects of awareness and political partisanship on post-convention candidate evaluations. The derivation of a theoretical framework was discussed in Part 1 [1]. Empirical results using data from the US presidential election of 2000 are discussed in the present article. We find that partisans of the opposite party were more resistant to the convention message of Bush than Gore, that awareness played a greater role in determining a predicted post-convention change for Gore, and that Gore’s message was received and accepted at a higher rate than Bush’s message.


Significance President Donald Trump nominated Gorsuch to fill the Supreme Court seat left vacant by Justice Antonin Scalia’s death last year. Congressional Republicans blocked former President Barack Obama’s nominee to fill the vacancy, Judge Merrick Garland, enabling Trump to name a conservative justice to set the balance of the Court after winning the presidential election. At least one Democratic senator has threatened to block Gorsuch’s appointment via upper house procedure. Impacts Future Democratic presidential candidates from the current Senate may suffer in primaries if they allow Gorsuch’s appointment. Gorsuch will help the White House and Congress severely cut back federal regulatory powers. Congressional Republicans are more likely to defy Trump on personnel and policy as his personal influence wanes ahead of the 2020 elections.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin B. Kaheny ◽  
John J. Szmer ◽  
Tammy A. Sarver

Abstract. Recent work by Szmer, Sarver, and Kaheny (2010) exploring US Supreme Court decision making has suggested that lawyer gender might play a role in influencing judicial voting behaviour. Specifically, while women lawyers were not revealed to have a more difficult time winning cases before the US Supreme Court, the study did suggest they face a tougher challenge in gaining support from the more conservative justices on that bench. Here, we test whether women lawyers face similar challenges before the SCC. Our findings do not reveal any disadvantage for litigation teams with larger proportions of women and, in most instances, such teams have an advantage. Specifically, in our model of civil rights and liberties votes, litigation team gender had no bearing on individual SCC justice decisions. However, in a pooled model of all issues combined and in separate models of criminal and economic votes, SCC justices were more likely to side with litigation teams with larger proportions of women lawyers.Résumé. Une étude récente de Szmer, Sarver et Kaheny (2010) explore la manière dont la Cour suprême des États-Unis prend ses décisions, suggérant que le sexe des avocats pourrait avoir une influence sur le comportement décisionnel des juges. Plus spécifiquement, bien que les avocates n'aient pas plus de difficulté que leurs collègues masculins à gagner leurs procès à la Cour suprême des États-Unis, l'étude suggère que leur plus grand défi est d'obtenir le soutien des juges plus traditionnels de cette cour. Dans le présent article, nous cherchons à déterminer si les avocates canadiennes font face à un défi semblable à la Cour suprême du Canada. Les résultats de notre étude ne révèlent aucun désavantage pour les équipes d'avocats comprenant plus de femmes et dans la plupart des cas, ces équipes bénéficient même d'un avantage. Plus précisement, dans notre modèle décisionnel en matière de droits et libertés civiles, le sexe des membres des équipes d'avocats n'avait aucune incidence sur les décisions individuelles des juges de la Cour suprême du Canada. Cependant, dans un modèle commun réunissant tous les types de dossiers et dans des modèles séparés pour les décisions sur des dossiers criminels et financiers, les juges de la Cour suprême du Canada étaient plus enclins à prendre parti pour des équipes comportant une plus grande proportion d'avocates.


1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hodder-Williams

Six different notions of ‘political’ are commonly used in discussions of the US Supreme Court. All six are familiar, but the distinctions among them are seldom carefully drawn. The six are: (1) purely definitional, in the sense that the Supreme Court, as an appellate court of last resort inevitably authoritatively allocates values; (2) empirical, in the sense that litigants use the Court to try to achieve their political purposes; (3) influence seeking, in the sense that the justices have a natural desire to prevail in arguments within the court; (4) prudential, in the sense that the justices frequently consider the probable consequences of their decisions; (5) policy-oriented, in the – usually pejorative – sense that justices are said to use the Court and the law as a cover for pursuing their own policy and other goals; and (6) systemic, in the sense that the Court's decisions frequently, as a matter of fact, have consequences for other parts of the American political system. These six notions are considered in the context of recent abortion decisions.


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