To Link or Not to Link? Agenda Change in International Bargaining

2014 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Elko Mckibben

Agendas shape the strategies states adopt in international bargaining and, therefore, the substantive nature of the resulting outcomes. They are also a dynamic feature of the process, as states add and subtract issues in order to shift the bargaining outcome in their favor. This article analyzes when and why states will use these different ‘issue-linkage’ strategies. Focusing on the effects of a successful agreement and the costs of failure, it highlights conditions under which states are likely to add or subtract issues from the bargaining agenda. It tests these arguments using an original dataset of the bargaining strategies states have adopted in climate-change negotiations. It concludes by highlighting the implications the argument has for understanding the outcomes of international negotiations.

2001 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Ward ◽  
Frank Grundig ◽  
Ethan R. Zorick

We model international negotiations on climate change. Leaders such as the European Union and the US can make proposals and influence veto players, including other countries and domestic lobbies, who must choose whether to accept or reject proposals. We explain why policy change has been minimal in this issue area, which veto-players receive the greatest and least attention and why leader actors wishing to see less progress are in such a strong bargaining position.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 22-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Downie

Different theoretical perspectives ask different questions about state behavior in international negotiations. For example, are governments moved by domestic political pressures? Are transnational networks influencing state behavior? Or do international regimes affect state decisions? However, these questions are almost always considered in the context of an individual negotiation outcome. Indeed, very little work has been undertaken on how these factors vary over time (the temporal dimension of international negotiations). This article addresses the temporal dimension by considering the role of the US across almost a decade of the international climate change negotiations. Drawing on an empirical data set based on elite interviews, this article suggests three factors that need to be taken into account by existing theoretical frameworks in order to capture the observed fluctuations in the behavior of state actors in a prolonged international negotiation, and explains why they matter.


Author(s):  
Mareike Well ◽  
Barbara Saerbeck ◽  
Helge Jörgens ◽  
Nina Kolleck

Abstract International public administrations (IPA s) play a significant role for the success of multilateral negotiations. As the bureaucratic bodies of international organizations, they are deeply involved in international negotiations, but receive little credit for their outcomes. By studying the administrative styles of the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), this article arrives at an understanding of how this IPA aims at contributing to the outcome of multilateral climate change negotiations. Administrative styles can be conceived of, ideal typically, as being entrepreneurial or servant-like. The article observes that, despite a prohibitively strict mandate as a technocratic facilitator, the UNFCCC Secretariat adopts an entrepreneurial style at the policy initiation stage and a cautiously entrepreneurial style during the policy formulation phase. It has acquired a distinctive actor quality in the climate regime, motivated by a strong commitment to furthering meaningful cooperation and driving the UNFCCC process toward ambitious climate policies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corneliu Bjola

Drawing on the literature of technical analysis in financial markets, this article introduces an original framework and methodology for explaining and forecasting the outcome of international negotiations based on two concepts: the relative strength negotiation index (rsni) and the negotiation contextual conduciveness index (ncci). By comparing the parties’ levels of interest in the negotiations,rsniserves as a powerful indicator of the direction and intensity of the momentum accompanying international negotiations.ncci, on the other hand, helps to explain why certain potential breakthroughs may fail to materialize. These insights are being asessed empirically in the case of climate change negotiations, first, by testing retrospectively the viability of the model to explain the outcomes of past climate meetings and, second, by forecasting the likelihood that a breakthrough will be achieved in the next rounds of climate talks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-95
Author(s):  
Feiyue Li

Abstract The idea of ‘fairness’ may be viewed as fundamental to a nation’s participation in the development of the international legal system governing climate change. As the second-largest economy and the largest Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitter in the world, China’s actions on climate change are critical to the global response. Indeed, international cooperation on climate change is unlikely to succeed without China’s active engagement. Therefore, China’s perception of the fairness of responsibility allocation will significantly influence its attitudes toward its international climate responsibilities. However, limited work has been done to date to concretely examine China’s perspective of the fairness of responsibility allocation and to understand its fairness discourses and practices of climate responsibility in a dynamically evolved process. This article aims to fill that gap in the literature by elucidating how China perceives the fair allocation of climate responsibility and how its fairness discourses and practices have evolved over the course of the three phases of international climate change negotiations. It will be shown that China has perceived the factors of historically accumulated emissions, per capita emissions and capability to lie at the very core of its understanding of fairness.


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