THE DEFENCE OF ILLEGALITY IN TORT LAW: BEYOND JUDICIAL REDEMPTION?

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-16
Author(s):  
James Goudkamp ◽  
Mimi Zou
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Immigration Laws ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Satisfactory State ◽  
Law Commission

IN Hounga v Allen [2014] UKSC 47; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 2889, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a claim in the statutory tort of discrimination by a woman who had been dismissed from her employment. The fact that the woman had been working in breach of immigration laws did not enliven the illegality defence. Hounga is one of several recent cases in which the illegality defence has been examined at the ultimate appellate level, the other decisions being Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] UKHL 33; [2009] 1 A.C. 1339, Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] A.C. 1391, and Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2014] UKSC 55; [2014] 3 W.L.R. 1257. The fact that the defence has been considered so frequently as of late at the apex level seems to confirm that the Law Commission was wrong in its prediction, made shortly after Gray and Moore Stephens were decided, that the defence would be brought into a satisfactory state if responsibility for reforming it was left to the courts (The Illegality Defence (Law Com 320, 2010), at [3.37]–[3.41]). We are not alone in holding this view. Writing extra-judicially, Lord Mance and Lord Sumption have called for the Law Commission to re-examine the defence (J. Mance, “Ex Turpi Causa – When Latin Avoids Liability” (2014) 18 Edinburgh Law Review 175, 192; J. Sumption, “Reflections on the Law of Illegality” (2012) 20 Restitution Law Review 1, 8–12). We argue here that Hounga perpetuates (and possibly aggravates) the difficulties from which this area of law suffers.

scholarly journals The Law of Contribution – An Equitable Doctrine or Part of the Law of Unjust Enrichment?

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 471
Author(s):  
Victoria Stace
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Enrichment Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Significant Change

This article looks at the changes made to the equitable doctrine of contribution by the New Zealand Supreme Court in a 2016 decision, Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd. The approach now favoured by the Supreme Court is that to establish a claim for contribution by one defendant against another, there is no need to find any greater degree of coordination between the liabilities other than that the plaintiff could pursue either defendant for its loss and either would be liable for it, in whole or in part. The underlying rationale is that by paying the plaintiff, the defendant who was pursued not only discharges itself but also discharges the other defendant's liability. If mutual discharge is established, the court then determines the amount of contribution based on what is just and reasonable in the circumstances. The Supreme Court's approach to the doctrine of equitable contribution, which is a significant change to previous law, bears similarities to the approach proposed in the leading text on unjust enrichment, raising the issue of whether a future claim for contribution could be approached using an unjust enrichment analysis.

scholarly journals Establishment by virtue of the law of land easement with the content corresponding to transmission easement in the light of the resolution of the Supreme Court of June 5, 2018, in case III CZP 50/17

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 227-236
Author(s):  
Anna Maria Barańska
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Owned Company

The subject of this article is the resolution of the enlarged composition of the Supreme Court of June 5, 2018, which resolves the issue of acquiring by land easement with the content corresponding to transmission easement together with the acquisition by a state-owned company of transmission facilities developed on State Treasury properties. As a result of granting property rights to state-owned companies of state property in the early 1990s, the ownership of the transmission infrastructure and the property on which they were situated were separated.In the judicature, divergent concepts emerged regarding the solution of the issue of  further use of this land by transmission companies. According to the first one, the transfer of property rights was accompanied by the creation by law of a land easement with the content corresponding to a transmission easement. On the other hand, according to the second concept, obtaining a legal title for further use of the property was possible only through contractual acquisition or prescription of transmission easement. Powstanie z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu w świetle uchwały Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 5 czerwca 2018 roku, sygn. akt III CZP 50/17 Tematem artykułu jest uchwała powiększonego składu Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 5 czerwca 2018 roku, która rozstrzyga kwestię nabycia z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu wraz z nabyciem przez przedsiębiorstwo państwowe własności urządzeń przesyłowych posadowionych na nieruchomościach Skarbu Państwa. W wyniku uwłaszczenia mienia państwowego na początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych ubiegłego wieku doszło do rozdzielenia własności infrastruktury przesyłowej oraz nieruchomości, na której były one posadowione. W judykaturze pojawiły się rozbieżne koncepcje odnośnie do rozwiązania kwestii dalszego korzystania przez przedsiębiorstwa przesyłowe z tych gruntów. Zgodnie z pierwszą z nich przeniesieniu prawa własności towarzyszyło powstanie z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu. Na podstawie drugiej — uzyskanie tytułu prawnego do dalszego korzystania z nieruchomości było możliwe wyłącznie w drodze umownego nabycia albo zasiedzenia służebności przesyłu.

scholarly journals Legitimação ativa da defensoria pública no mandado de injunção coletivo

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-95
Author(s):  
Olavo Augusto Vianna Alves Ferreira ◽  
Guilherme De Siqueira Castro
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Defender ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law

O presente artigo tem o objetivo de examinar a legitimidade ativa da Defensoria Pública no mandado de injunção coletivo. Para a consecução desta finalidade, o tema será abordado tanto do ponto de vista constitucional como do ponto de vista processual. Será estudado o vício de constitucionalidade formal da Lei 13.300/2016 no que tange a legitimidade ativa da Defensoria Pública no mandado de injunção coletivo. A necessidade de pertinência temática para a impetração e o tipo de interesse transindividual tutelado são questões que envolvem um profícuo debate constitucional que já foi objeto de exame pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. Por derradeiro, abordaremos a possibilidade de litisconsórcio ativo no mandado de injunção envolvendo a Defensoria Pública e os demais legitimados extraordinários previsto na lei de regência da ação injuncional.   Abstract This article aims to examine the active legitimacy of the Office of the Public Defender in the collective writ of injunction. To achieve this purpose, the subject will be addressed both from a constitutional point of view and from a procedural point of view. This paper will study the formal constitutional vice of Law 13.300 / 2016 regarding the active legitimacy of the Office of the Public Defender in the collective writ of injunction. The need for thematic relevance to the filing and type of ward transindividual interest are issues involving a fruitful constitutional debate that has been the subject of examination by the Supreme Court. For last, we discuss the possibility of active joinder in the writ of injunction involving the Office of the Public Defender and the other extraordinary legitimated under the law of Regency injuncional action.

Consideraţii critice referitoare la Decizia nr. 12/2020, pronunţată de Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie – Completul pentru soluţionarea recursului în interesul legii

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (2020) ◽  
pp. 38-53
Author(s):  
Claudia ROȘU ◽  
◽  
Alin SPERIUSI-VLAD ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
The Other ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Bad Faith ◽  
Lower Court ◽  
Civil Action ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

"The authors analyzed the decision of the Supreme Court by an appeal in the interest of the law, regarding the possibility of the party fined according to art. 187 parag. (1) pt. 1 let. a) Code of Civil Procedure, for the introduction, in bad faith, of a civil action, accessory, additional or incidental requests, as well as for the exercise of some appeals, obviously unfounded, by the same decision by which these requests were solved, to submit in the appeal filed to the superior court, criticisms concerning the judicial fine. In the opinion of the authors, the correct interpretation is that these criticisms can be formulated in the appeal filed to the superior court, together with all the other criticisms regarding the solution of the lower court, when the fine was applied by the same decision by which those requests were solved."

Much Ado about Nothing: Steele v Serepisos and a Notice Requirement for Contingent Conditions

2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
Sarah Leslie
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Much Ado About Nothing ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Contingent Condition ◽  
The Law

In the 2006 case of Steele v Serepisos, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the law on contingent conditions. The issue was whether a party seeking to cancel a contract for its failure to fulfil a contingent condition first had to give notice to the other party. The purpose of the notice would be to give the other party an opportunity to fulfil the condition. A majority held, correctly in the author's view, that such a notice was not required. However, the majority went to some lengths to distinguish Cooke J's judgment in the 1978 case of Hunt v Wilson. This paper revisits Hunt v Wilson and argues that Cooke J's judgment was wrong. It further argues that the majority's failure to recognise this, coupled with general judicial confusion with respect to contingent conditions, made a simple issue much more difficult than it need have been.

scholarly journals Constitutional Court in Indonesia

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 387
Author(s):  
Satya Arinanto
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
State Structure ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

This idea is a reflection of the aspiration of the lndonesian people to build up a democratic and justice society. The problem is where is the position of this institution in our state structure? The author express the alternative outlook that place "Pengadilan Tata Negara" (as the translation of Constitutional Court) under the Supreme Court and paralel with the four courts sub-system; not separate from the Supreme Court which is used the term "Mahkamah Konstitusi" as the other translation of the word Constitutional Court. To make this idea come true, the House of People's Representative (DPR) must use their right to amendment the Law No. 14/1970, especially the article on the structure of Indonesian court.

scholarly journals COMPROMISE, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND ECONOMIC DURESS Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 2011 (4) SA 500 (GNP)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
CJ Pretorius ◽  
R Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Note ◽  
The Other ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Sound Judgment

The matter of Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk (2011 (4) SA 500 (GNP)) alludes to two rather problematic aspects of the law of contract: on the one hand it demonstrates that practically speaking the question of what constitutes an enforceable agreement of compromise is still no easy matter, and despite the sound judgment delivered recently by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing CC v Kingtex Marketing (Pty) Ltd (2008 (3) SA 327 (SCA)), it seems that the judiciary’s interpretation as to when an offer of compromise exists remains difficult to predict. On the other hand the Gerolomou decision deals with improperly obtained consensus by way of undue influence, whereas the facts actually fit more comfortably into the niche of so-called economic duress, a form of procedural impropriety that has yet to be recognized as an independent ground for setting aside a contract in our law. This case note examines these issues against the backdrop of the manner in which the case was pleaded.

scholarly journals The Tortious Liability of Directors and Officers to Third Parties in Common Law Canada

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon O'Byrne ◽  
Yemi Philip ◽  
Katherine Fraser
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Directors And Officers ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The law regarding the tortious liability of corporate directors and officers to third parties remains conflicted. One line of authority, adopted in Alberta, provides that liability is rare in the context of torts committed in a corporate capacity, and it largely closes the door on liability for ordinary negligence. A competing line of authority, however, contends that tortious liability is common. Signalling a different approach, Justice Slatter of the Alberta Court of Appeal provides a policy-based stance that accounts for the importance of both tort law and corporate law principles to the question of liability for ordinary negligence. Beyond offering balance, Justice Slatter’s approach has the benefit of aligning with pronouncements from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding directors’ and officers’ liability in negligence to third parties. This article outlines the current authorities in the area, concluding that Justice Slatter’s judgment provides a clear and principled way forward.

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