[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] I clarify the nature of relational egalitarianism, a theory in political philosophy that concerns equality. Relational egalitarians understand equality as a relationship between equals. Roughly, when people relate as equals, they are free from objectionable forms of authority (e.g., plutocracy) and stigmatizing social status (e.g., racist and sexist stereotypes). Relational egalitarians hold that we have duties of justice to promote this understanding of equality. Much work remains, however, in developing the best version of relational egalitarianism. To this end, I examine three prominent versions of relational egalitarianism, one by Elizabeth Anderson, another by Samuel Scheffler, and the third by Martin O'Neill. Each version, I argue, makes a mistake that sheds light on the best version of relational egalitarianism. In particular, I argue that relational egalitarians should endorse the following claims: (1) relational egalitarianism specifies many, but not all, duties of justice to promote equality, (2) relational egalitarianism is actually a version of distributive egalitarianism (its main rival), and (3) egalitarian relationships are morally bad when they make everyone's life go worse.
