Soul as Subject in Aristotle's DeAnima

1988 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher shields
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  

In the largely historical and aporetic first book of theDe Anima (DA), Aristotle makes what appear to be some rather disturbing remarks about the soul's status as a subject of mental states. Most notably, in a curious passage which has aroused the interest of commentators, he seems to suggest that there is something wrong with regarding the soul as a subject of mental states:Thus, saying that the soul is angry is the same as if one were to say that the soul builds houses and weaves: for it is perhaps better to say not that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does [these things] with his soul. (DA408bll–15)

2019 ◽  
pp. 263-266
Author(s):  
Alexander Sarch

The conclusion of Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don’t provides an overview of the main takeaways from the book. At its broadest, this is a book about a common legal fiction: the criminal law’s practice of pretending we know what we don’t. Maybe one instinctively feels scandalized by legal fictions. It’s natural to want the law to be honest and accurate. Nonetheless, this book has tried to give reasons not to be so worried and actually get on board with the kind of legal fiction at issue here. The book has argued that equal culpability imputation involves a justified fiction that promotes valuable aims. At least when properly constrained, it is justified for the law to treat you as if you had certain culpability-relevant mental states (like knowledge of inculpatory facts or awareness of risks) that you didn’t literally possess. What justifies it? The same purposes the criminal law generally serves: protecting our core interests, rights, and values.


1999 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 137-138

In 1864 the biologist George Lewes wrote (p. viii) ‘Numerous and exhaustive as are the works devoted to Aristotle’s moral and metaphysical writings, there is not one which attempts to display, with any fullness, his scientific researches . . . Although Aristotle mainly represents the science of twenty centuries, his scientific writings are almost unknown in England. Casual citations, mostly at second hand, and vague eulogies, often betraying great misconception, are abundant; but rare indeed is the indication of any accurate appreciation extending beyond two works, the De Anima, and the History of Animals. The absence of translations is at once a cause and a sign of this neglect.’Things have improved, a bit, in the intervening 135 years. Cohen and Drabkin brought together a large and diverse selection of English translations of ancient scientific works in 1948. Every year for the last 25 years, on average, there has been a new edition or notification of the discovery of a new scientific text. Galen has been the focus of a recent scholarly project whose proportions reflect his corpus. Nevertheless, despite the 9,000 printed pages of that vast corpus already published, there are still unedited and untranslated treatises surviving in full in Arabic, and two-thirds of the corpus still awaits an English translation. The state of editions and translations of ancient scientific works as a whole remains scandalous by comparison with the torrent of modern works on anything unscientific – about 100 papers per year on Homer, for example. And an embarrassingly large number of classicists are as (if not more) ignorant of Greek scientific works as their predecessors were in 1864.


Classics ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Gregoric

It is somewhat anachronistic to speak of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind, since he does not operate with our concept of mind and does not share our focus on questions concerning consciousness and characteristics of mental states. Instead, Aristotle operates with a concept of the soul (psuchē), which only partially overlaps with our concept of mind. The soul is the animating principle that accounts for all manifestations of life. It is evoked to explain processes and states that modern thinkers regard as purely physiological, such as nutrition, growth, reproduction, respiration, sleep, and waking. However, to the extent that the soul also accounts for mental states and processes, a study of soul overlaps with a study of mind and inevitably touches upon issues of consciousness and characteristics of mental states, which makes it legitimate to speak of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind. Aristotle provides an account of the soul in the relatively short treatise De anima, which has been one of his most widely read and commented writings. There are also whole treatises in Aristotle’s biological corpus, and many passages elsewhere, dedicated to various phenomena that Aristotle explains with reference to the soul and that are consequently informative of his views on it. Over the past fifty years philosophers have approached Aristotle as a possible source of fresh ideas concerning mental phenomena and their relation to physical states, followed by ever more conceptually sophisticated and historically sensitive scholarship.


Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Defeasible reasons are normally thought of as mental states of some kind. In the verbal tradition, at least, reputable philosophers sometimes react to this fact as if the whole idea of a defeasible reason is based on some kind of conceptual confusion or category mistake. Their idea, basically, is that the English word ‘reason’ already has a meaning which rules out mental states as part of its extension. For this reason they see the idea of mental states as reasons as itself utter confusion. This chapter does four things. It lays out an orthodox position on reasons and defeaters. Then it argues that the position just sketched is mistaken about ‘undercutting’ defeaters. Then it explains an unpublished thought experiment by Dorothy Edgington. And then it uses that thought experiment to ground a new approach to undercutting defeaters.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 425-448
Author(s):  
Gabriel Levy

AbstractAccording to Deborah Tollefsen, from the analytic perspective called “interpretivism”, there is a reasonable way in which groups can be said to have mental states. She bases her argument on the every-day use of language, where people speak as if groups have states such as intentions, desires and wishes. Such propositional attitudes form the basis of any account of truth-conditional semantics, the rules by which people grasp the conditions under which an utterance is true. If groups (abstract units of people) have mental states, perhaps superhuman agents have them too. One argument that may contradict this premise is one that says that, whereas groups exist, superhuman agents do not. However, if groups exist on the basis of normative narratives about them and the institutionalized actions they carry out in the world, the same can be said for superhuman agents. They are like legal fictions: fictional but real. Superhuman agents are fictional and real in a similar sense as groups.1


Author(s):  
Alexander Sarch

Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don’t is about the legal fiction that we know what we don’t. If you bury your head in the sand rather than learn you’re committing a crime, you can be punished as if you knew. How can that be justified? This book offers a framework to explain why it’s not as puzzling as it seems. When remaining ignorant of the facts is sufficiently culpable, the interests and values protected by the criminal law are served by punishing you as though you knew those facts. This idea—imputing mental states based on equal culpability—is what this book seeks to justify (at least within limits). The resulting theory shows that some legal fictions—like the willful ignorance doctrine—require reform. At the same time, it shows why we also need more legal fictions of this kind. Moreover, they should be extended to impose further accountability on corporations. Still, equal culpability imputation can be taken too far. We need to determine its limits to avoid injustice. Thus, the book seeks to place equal culpability imputation on a solid normative foundation, while demarcating its proper boundaries. The resulting theory of when and why the criminal law can pretend we know what we don’t has far-reaching implications for legal practice and reveals the pressing need for reform.


Author(s):  
G. D. Gagne ◽  
M. F. Miller

We recently described an artificial substrate system which could be used to optimize labeling parameters in EM immunocytochemistry (ICC). The system utilizes blocks of glutaraldehyde polymerized bovine serum albumin (BSA) into which an antigen is incorporated by a soaking procedure. The resulting antigen impregnated blocks can then be fixed and embedded as if they are pieces of tissue and the effects of fixation, embedding and other parameters on the ability of incorporated antigen to be immunocyto-chemically labeled can then be assessed. In developing this system further, we discovered that the BSA substrate can also be dried and then sectioned for immunolabeling with or without prior chemical fixation and without exposing the antigen to embedding reagents. The effects of fixation and embedding protocols can thus be evaluated separately.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.


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