Undercutting Defeat and Edgington’s Burglar

Defeasible reasons are normally thought of as mental states of some kind. In the verbal tradition, at least, reputable philosophers sometimes react to this fact as if the whole idea of a defeasible reason is based on some kind of conceptual confusion or category mistake. Their idea, basically, is that the English word ‘reason’ already has a meaning which rules out mental states as part of its extension. For this reason they see the idea of mental states as reasons as itself utter confusion. This chapter does four things. It lays out an orthodox position on reasons and defeaters. Then it argues that the position just sketched is mistaken about ‘undercutting’ defeaters. Then it explains an unpublished thought experiment by Dorothy Edgington. And then it uses that thought experiment to ground a new approach to undercutting defeaters.

Minds, Brains, and Capacities: Situated Cognition and Neo-Aristotelianism

This article compares situated cognition to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian approaches to the mind. The article distinguishes two components in this paradigm: an Aristotelian essentialism which is alien to situated cognition and a Wittgensteinian “capacity approach” to the mind which is not just congenial to it but provides important conceptual and argumentative resources in defending social cognition against orthodox cognitive (neuro-)science. It focuses on a central tenet of that orthodoxy. According to what I call “encephalocentrism,” cognition is primarily or even exclusively a computational process occurring inside the brain. Neo-Aristotelians accuse this claim of committing a “homuncular” (Kenny) or “mereological fallacy” (Bennett and Hacker). The article explains why the label “fallacy” is misleading, reconstructs the argument to the effect that encephalocentric applications of psychological predicates to the brain and its parts amount to a category mistake, and defends this argument against objections by Dennett, Searle, and Figdor. At the same time it criticizes the Neo-Aristotelian denial that the brain is the organ of cognition. It ends by suggesting ways in which the capacity approach and situated cognition might be combined to provide a realistic and ecologically sound picture of cognition as a suite of powers that flesh-and-blood animals exercise within their physical and social environments.

Plus Ça Change: The Persistence of ‘Skill Talk’ in Competency Discourse

Robin Barrow has critiqued the use of the concept of “skill” for a wide range of human attributes that are not skills in the precise sense he articulated, namely: “a capacity that is discrete and can be perfected through practice and exercise.” Skill talk has persisted, though today commonly under the guise of “competency discourse.” In recent years, the British Columbia Ministry of Education has implemented a new K-12 curriculum that relies heavily on “communication competency,” “thinking competency” and “personal and social competency.” Based on Barrow’s work, I critique the tendency to refer to a wide range of human qualities as “competencies.” In addition, I argue that competency discourse commits a category mistake, especially with respect to moral qualities in the “personal and social competency” domain. After taking a closer look at the area of “personal and social competency” in BC’s new curriculum, I discuss the concept of friendship as an example of an area of significance to human life that cannot be reduced to competency. I close the paper by discussing why it matters that competency discourse commits a category mistake, and why philosophers of education should resist competency discourse.

Against Analogy

This article asks whether the analogy between state and firm is a promising strategy for promoting workplace democracy and provides a negative answer, explaining why analogical arguments are not a good strategy for justifying workplace democracy. The article contends that the state-firm analogy is misguided for at least three reasons: (1) it is structurally inconclusive, (2) it is based on a category mistake, and (3) it leads us away from the central question we should ask, which is: What would concretely imply, and what is required, in order to democratize the workplace? I begin by offering an interpretation of the state-firm analogy which shows that use of the analogical argument in Dahl’s justification of workplace democracy engenders excessive and unnecessary theoretical costs which bear negatively on his conclusion. I then proceed to examine more recent contributions to the debate and show that supporters and critics of the state-firm analogy alike do not advance our understanding of the analogical argument. In the last part of the article I provide a general theoretical explanation of why arguments based on the state-firm analogy are not good candidates for defending workplace democracy.

1 Corinthians 15.28 and the Grammar of Paul's Christology

1 Cor 15.28 is often regarded as problematic for ‘divine Christology’ in Paul, because the Son's final submission to the Father is held to tell against his ontological equality with the Father. The current article argues that this conclusion involves a category mistake. The ‘grammar’ of Paul's Christology requires that we distinguish between what Paul says of and on the basis of Christ's divinity, and what Paul says of and on the basis of Christ's humanity, a strategy sometimes called ‘partitive exegesis’. The article evaluates recent solutions to this problem, warrants partitive exegesis from within 1 Corinthians, and offers a partitive reading of 1 Cor 15.28: the Son submits to the Father as the final act of an office he holds as a human, in order to perfect the human vocation of vicegerency over creation.

Use and misuse of neuroscience in the philosophy of religion

The article elucidates in what way neuroscience and in particular neuroimaging can contribute to the clarification and empirical underpinning of theories in the philosophy of mind and the anthropology of religion. Its initial hypothesis is that there are two principal ways in which neuroscientific data are relevant to philosophy, exhibiting the unconscious processes in the generation of phenomenal and intentional consciousness, and complementing semantic and phenomenological approaches in the analysis of complex mental phenomena. Whereas the first kind of relevance is widely recognised, contributions of neuroscientific data to the analysis of complex mental phenomena are often rejected as involving a kind of "category mistake." The article argues that imaging studies can in fact contribute to a better understanding of the nature of certain complex mental states and processes and exemplifies this by recent brain imaging studies on religious experience. Finally, theories like those of Andrew Newberg are taken to task for misrepresenting "neurotheology" as a new form of theology.

A response to critics: weakening the ethical distinction between euthanasia, palliative opioid use and palliative sedation

My essay ‘Weakening the ethical distinction between euthanasia, palliative opioid use and palliative sedation’ has recently generated some critique which I will attempt to address in this response. Regarding the empirical question of whether palliative opioid and sedative use shorten survival time, Schofield et al raise the three concerns that my literature review contains a cherry-picking bias through focusing solely on the palliative care population, that continuous deep palliative sedation falls beyond the scope of routine palliative care, and that my research may contribute to opiophobia and be harmful to palliative care provision globally. Materstvedt argues that euthanasia ‘ends’ rather than ‘relieves’ suffering and is not a treatment, and that the arguments in my essay are therefore predicated on a ‘category mistake’ and are a non-starter. Symons and Giebel both raise the concern that my Kantian and Millian interpretation of the Doctrine of Double Effect is anachronistic, and that when interpreted from the contemporaneous perspective of Aquinas it is a sound ethical principle. Giebel also argues that palliative opioid and sedative use do meet the Doctrine of Double Effect’s four criteria on this Thomistic account, and that it does not contradict the Doctrine of the Sanctity of Human Life. In this response I will explore and defend against most of these claims, in doing so clarifying my original argument that the empirical and ethical differences between palliative opioid/sedative use and euthanasia may not be as significant as often believed, thereby advancing the case for euthanasia.