Perception

Dialogue ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Odegard

I Shall offer a realist theory of perception which in an important sense is neither direct nor representational nor causal.Let us say that we directly perceive something if perceiving it enables us to know of its existence without having evidence of its existence. In this sense, direct perception allows us to have “direct knowledge” of what we perceive. For example, I see after-images directly, since I can know of their existence without having visual evidence of their existence. I do not have to look at them with my eyes. Granted, I do need evidence in order to know that they are after-images; but not in order to know of their existence as colours or shapes. Also, I do have to see them in order to know that they exist. But this is not a condition of having evidence. It is only a condition of their existence, which in turn is a truth condition of my knowing.

It was surmised by a prominent school of thought in ancient times, it become absorbed into the mechanical philosophy of Newton, and it was at length established by the experiments and reasonings of Dalton and his contemporaries, that matter is not divisible without limit, but is constituted of an aggregate of discrete entities, all alike for the same homogeneous substance, and naturally extremely minute compared with our powers of direct perception. The smallest portion of matter which we can manipulate (at any rate until very recently) consists of a vast assemblage of molecules, of independent self-existing systems which exert dynamical influences on each other. The direct knowledge of matter that mankind can acquire is a knowledge of the average behaviour and relations of the crowd of molecules. The sentient intelligence with perceptions of space and time minute enough to examine the individual molecules, each of them -would probably appear as a cosmos in itself, influencing and influenced by others,—not unlike stars in a firmament. The observed laws of nature are thus laws of averages—are statistical relations. Yet they are for practical purposes exact. To illustrate this in a way that will presently be of use let us imagine a row of urns whose apertures are of different areas, and let us consider how N objects will be distributed at random among them, assuming that the chance of an object getting into an urn is proportional to the area of its aperture, and is otherwise indifferent as regards them all. If the number of objects is not very large in comparison with the number of urns, no direct law of numbers emerges in this random distribution: though by the doctrine of probabilities we may calculate definitely the relative numbers of times that the various distributions will occur in a vast total number of cases, and this will represent the chances of recurrence of these distributions, the most likely arrangements are those ranging close around the equable distribution, in which the contents of the urns are proportional to their apertures. Those far removed therefrom are much less likely. "When the number N is very great, a relatively small deviation from the equable distribution has an almost negligible chance of occurring. Equable distribution then assumes the aspect of a rigid law; nevertheless occasionally in an soon it will he widely departed from. The abstract laws governing the extent and distribution of the various kinds of deviations from the mean distribution constitute an important part of the theory of statistics, first explored and developed by J. Bernoulli.


Author(s):  
M.A. Bandurin

This epistemological essay addresses the issue of representational content’s existence in the case of true direct knowledge. Contrary answers to it are considered as a basis for the distinction between representationalism and relationalism. The first part of the essay contains a critical analysis of the fundamental features of German Idealism as a kind of representationalism, which determined the main epistemological trend of continental philosophy in the form of post-Kantian representationalism. In the second part, after a brief excursion into certain contemporary continental issues, the current discussion between representationalism and relationalism in analytical philosophy is considered. It is concluded that relationalism, while correctly recognizing the nature of direct perception as being without representational content, is incapable of ensuring the unity of direct perception and a perceptual judgment, and a solution is proposed that could lead out of this epistemological impasse.


1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (03) ◽  
pp. 107-110
Author(s):  
M. Pääkkönen ◽  
S. Aukee ◽  
K. Korhonen ◽  
A. Pääkkönen ◽  
E. Länsimies ◽  
...  

SummaryIn this work the duodenogastric reflux was quantified as the amount of radioactivity entering the stomach after an i.v. administration of 99mmTc-HIDA in ulcer patients and in patients who had undergone BI gastrectomy. The results were compared with visual evidence of gastric activity in the gamma camera images and biochemical determination of gastric bile reflux. The method is useful in quantifying the reflux if the activity is above the background activity. It allows the determination of an upper limit for the reflux when the reflux is evident visually. Only two or three images are needed for the quantitation. No correlation was found between biochemical measurement of fasting bile reflux in the stomach and radioisotopic quantification.


Author(s):  
R. R. Palmer

This chapter considers the prevailing notion in the eighteenth century that nobility was a necessary bulwark of political freedom. Whether in the interest of a more open nobility or of a more closed and impenetrable nobility, the view was the same. Nobility as such, nobility as an institution, was necessary to the maintenance of a free constitution. There was also a general consensus that parliaments or ruling councils were autonomous, self-empowered, or empowered by history, heredity, social utility, or God; that they were in an important sense irresponsible, free to oppose the King (where there was one), and certainly owing no accounting to the “people.” The remainder of the chapter deals with the uses and abuses of social rank and the problems of administration, recruitment, taxation, and class consciousness.


Author(s):  
Susanne Schmetkamp

Narrative Empathie liegt dann vor, wenn der empathische Nachvollzugsprozess der (emotionalen, epistemischen) Situationen anderer Personen oder fiktiver Figuren durch ein Narrativ, das heißt eine sinnzusammenhängende Erzählung, ausgelöst und strukturiert wird. Der Aufsatz knüpft an den phänomenologischen Ansatz von Empathie als direkte Wahrnehmung an, vertritt aber die These, dass gerade bei Narrativen die Imagination und die Perspektiveneinnahme hinzukommen müssen, damit retrospektiv, prospektiv oder gegenwärtig die Situation des Anderen und seiner individuellen Perspektive vergegenwärtigt und verstanden werden kann. Der narrativen Empathie wird ein indirekter ethischer Wert zugeschrieben: Durch das empathisch anschauliche Anteilnehmen am Narrativ des Anderen und einen damit verbundenen Perspektivwechsel können auch unsere eigenen Perspektiven erweitert werden; dies kann zu besserem Verständnis ungewohnter Sichtweisen führen und moralische Gefühle und Handlungen motivieren. Narrative empathy is the complex re-presentation of an (emotional, epistemic) situation of another person or a fictional character by means of a narrative, which is a structured and perspectively colored context of meaning. The paper sympathizes with the phenomenological approach of empathy as direct perception though at the same time arguing that in cases of (literary, filmic, dramatic) narratives imagination and perspective-taking is also needed in order to be able to comprehend and to understand the other’s situation retrospectively, prospectively or at present. According to the author, narrative empathy has an indirect moral value: the vivid empathetic participation in the other’s narrative and the process of perspective-taking can help to broaden one’s horizons; this can lead to a better understanding of unfamiliar and other worldviews and motivate moral emotions and actions.


Transfers ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ueli Haefeli ◽  
Fritz Kobi ◽  
Ulrich Seewer

Based on analysis of two case studies in the Canton of Bern, this article examines the question of knowledge transfer from history to transport policy and planning in the recent past in Switzerland. It shows that for several reasons, direct knowledge transfer did not occur. In particular, historians have seldom become actively involved in transport planning and policy discourses, probably partly because the academic system offers no incentive to do so. However, historical knowledge has certainly influenced decision-making processes indirectly, via personal reflection of the actors in the world of practice or through Switzerland's strongly developed modes of political participation. Because the potential for knowledge transfer to contribute to better policy solutions has not been fully utilized, we recommend strengthening the role of existing interfaces between science and policy.


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