Rawls' Theory of Justice

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Macleod
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Utilitarian Theory ◽  
The Way

Rawls' main aim in A Theory of Justice is to provide a viable alternative to the utilitarianism which has dominated so much modern moral philosophy. Although philosophers have long recognised the difficulties in the way of acceptance of a utilitarian account of judgments of justice, they have often responded by seeking merely to reformulate the principle of utility. Other philosophers, with a juster appreciation of the seriousness of these difficulties, have been prepared to reject utilitarianism in all its guises, but they have failed (in Rawl's opinion) “to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it”. What is needed, beyond a powerful reaffirmation of the familiar objections to utilitarian accounts of justice, is the careful elaboration of a radically non-utilitarian theory of justice. It is this need which Rawls sets out to meet in his book.

Taking Utilitarianism Seriously

Utilitas ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-355
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Significant Challenge ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
Important Sense ◽  
Utilitarian Theory ◽  
The Way

With a book as wide ranging and insightful as Barry's Justice as Impartiality, it is perhaps a little churlish to criticize it for paying insufficient attention to one's own particular interests. That said, in what follows I am going to do just that and claim that in an important sense Barry does not take utilitarianism seriously. Utilitarianism does receive some discussion in Barry's book, and in an important section which I will discuss he even appears to concede that utilitarianism provides a rival though ultimately inadequate theory of justice. Nevertheless, utilitarianism is not considered a rival to ‘justice as impartiality’ in the way that ‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as reciprocity’ are. One response, and perhaps the only adequate response, would be to construct a rival utilitarian theory. I cannot provide such a theory in this paper, and I certainly would be very cautious about claiming that I could provide such a theory elsewhere. What I want to suggest is that utilitarianism is a genuine third theory to contrast with ‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as impartiality’ – ‘justice as reciprocity’ being merely a hybrid of ‘justice as mutual advantage’, at least as Barry presents it (pp. 46–51). I also want to argue that it poses a more significant challenge to a contractualist theory such as Barry's than his discussion of utilitarianism reveals.

Maximin Justice, Sacrifice, and the Reciprocity Argument: A Pragmatic Reassessment of the Rawls/Nozick Debate

Utilitas ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen W. Ball
Keyword(s):  
Economic Justice ◽  
Individual Liberty ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Ethical Concerns ◽  
Utilitarian Theory ◽  
The Way

Theories of economic justice are characteristically based on abstract ethical concerns often unrelated to practical distributive results. Two decades ago, Rawls's theory of justice began as a reaction against the alleged ‘sacrifices’ condoned by utilitarian theory. One variant of this objection is that utilitarianism permits gross inequalities, severe deprivations of individual liberty, or even the enslavement of society's least well-off individuals. There are, however, more subtle forms of the objection. In Rawls, it is often waged without any claim that utilitarianism does in fact imply such gross deprivations in actual realworld circumstances. A second variant hinges, rather, on the milder claim that utilitarianism could condone such deprivations or sacrifices in some possible world—the objection being that utilitarianism improperly makes justice contingent, or uncertain, in this way. A third, still more abstract, variant would be that utilitarianism is flawed—not because of any practical distributive result, actual or hypothetical, but in theory—due to the way it treats individuals' interests, or the ‘concept of persons’ it presupposes.

Stupid Goodness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Paradise Lost ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Way

In Paradise Lost, Satan’s first sight of Eve in Eden renders him “Stupidly good”: his state is one of admirable yet inarticulate responsiveness to reasons. Turning from fiction to real life, this chapter argues that stupid goodness is an important moral phenomenon, but one that has limits. The chapter examines three questions about the relation between having a reason and saying what it is—between normativity and articulacy. Is it possible to have and respond to morally relevant reasons without being able to articulate them? Can moral inarticulacy be good, and if so, what is the value of moral articulacy? And, thirdly, can moral philosophy help us to be good? The chapter argues that morality has an inarticulacy-accepting part, an articulacy-encouraging part, an articulacy-surpassing part, and an articulacy-discouraging part. Along the way, an account is proposed of what it is to respond to the reasons that make up the substance of morality.

scholarly journals Interfering Busybody or Public-Minded Citizen? The Actio Popularis as a Model for Reform of the Rules of Standing in Constitutional Cases in Australia

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 62
Author(s):  
Bede Xavier Harris ◽  
Elizabeth Pearl Harris
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Current Approach ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Legal Action ◽  
Personal Interest ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
Taking Action ◽  
The Ideal ◽  
The Way

The interpretation given by the courts to the word ‘matter’ in sections 75 and 76 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, and the restrictive approach taken by the courts to what amounts to a sufficient interest in a matter, have led to the consequence that only litigants who can demonstrate a personal interest can bring an action to challenge a breach of the Constitution. This provides insufficient protection for constitutionalism because it means that the enforcement of the Constitution is contingent on there being a self-interested applicant who will bring an action – and, conversely, creates the risk that breaches of the Constitution will be allowed to stand in cases where those who do have standing find it in their political interests to refrain from taking action. With its focus on personal interest, the current approach excludes the altruistic applicant and runs counter to the theory that all citizens have a right to ensure that the Constitution is complied with. This paper examines the way in which the actio popularis of Roman law served the ideal of the engaged citizen by enabling citizens to initiate legal action to enforce public duties, and how modern equivalents of the actio in a number of jurisdictions achieve the same purpose. The paper draws on John Rawls’ theory of justice in arguing for reform of the law on standing in Australia so as to confer open standing in constitutional cases.

Utilitarian Strategies in Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Careful Scrutiny ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The argument of this paper is part of a general defence of the claim that Bentham's moral theory embodies a utilitarian theory of distributive justice, which is developed in his Civil Law writings. Whereas it is a commonplace of recent revisionist scholarship to argue that J. S. Mill had a developed utilitarian theory of justice, few scholars regard Bentham as having a theory of justice, let alone one that rivals in sophistication that of Mill. Indeed, Gerald J. Postema in his bookBentham and the Common Law Tradition, argues that Bentham had no substantial concern with the concept of justice, and that what analysis of the concept there is in Bentham's thought is unlike the utilitarian theory of justice to be found in chapter five of J. S. Mill'sUtilitarianismAlthough Postema's interpretation is not the only one that will be addressed in this paper, it serves as an important starting point for any rival interpretation of Bentham's ethical theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of Bentham's utilitarian theory, drawing as it does on a wide variety of published and unpublished materials written throughout Bentham's career. Secondly, it is interesting in this particular context because the contrast that Postema draws between Bentham's and Mill's theories of justice depends upon a particular reading of Mill's theory of justice and utility which is derived from recent scholarship and which is by no means uncontroversial. As part of the defence of the claim that Bentham had a sophisticated theory of distributive justice, it will be argued in this paper that the contrast drawn between Bentham and Mill does not stand up to careful scrutiny, for insofar as Mill's theory of justice can be consistently defended it is not significantly different from the utilitarian strategy that Bentham employed for incorporating considerations of distributive justice within his theory. This is not to claim that there are not significant differences between the theories of justice of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but it is to claim that whatever technical differences exist between their theories, both writers saw the need to incorporate the concept of justice within utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than showing that Mill is an interesting thinker to the extent that he abandons his early Benthamism, by demonstrating how close Mill's theory of utility and justice is to that of Bentham, it will be possible to argue that Bentham employed a sophisticated and subtle utilitarian theory that was responsive to the sort of problems which occupied Mill a generation later.

Elizabeth Anscombe versus the World

2021 ◽  
pp. 135-170
Author(s):  
Benjamin J.B. Lipscomb
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Original Work ◽  
Early Career ◽  
Honorary Degree ◽  
The World ◽  
Harry Truman ◽  
Radio Broadcast ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

This chapter chronicles the philosophical development of the abrasive, brilliant Elizabeth Anscombe and her contribution to her friends’ implicit project of reshaping mid-century ethics: her all-out attack against “Oxford Moral Philosophy” epitomized by R.M. Hare, and her publication of the influential “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Anscombe was Wittgenstein’s apprentice and translator for much of her early career, rarely publishing original work. She was, nonetheless, a fearsome adversary of anyone she saw as glib or insufficiently serious, including C.S. Lewis and J.L. Austin. Anscombe’s real engagement with ethics began with her attempt to stop Oxford from bestowing an honorary degree on Harry Truman; she abhorred his decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. She was invited to give a radio broadcast, “Oxford Moral Philosophy: Does It Corrupt the Youth?”—the opening salvo in a fight with R.M. Hare, which resulted in her influential essay “Modern Moral Philosophy.”

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