Aristotle on Scientific Explanation

Dialogue ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burleigh T. Wilkins

The problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide a general discussion of Aristotle's views on scientific explanation, by which I mean a discussion of Aristotle's treatment of scientific explanation, its structure and its principles, as distinct from Aristotle's own principles of explanation. By means of this distinction I hope to be excused from a discussion of Aristotle on form and matter, potentiality and actuality, and the four causes, and to avoid so far as possible the controversy among commentators concerning the respective merits of Aristotlequanaturalist and Aristotlequapre-Thomist Thomist. I wish to be excused from treating these problems in order to approach directly Aristotle's formal treatment of scientific explanation as given in thePosterior Analytics, but if I were to be accused of introducing a distinction between parts of the Aristotelian corpus for which there is insufficient warrant, if I were told that I am making an illegitimate abstraction from the whole of which thePosterior Analyticsis but a part, I should plead not guilty.

Phronesis ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Nathanael Stein

Abstract Aristotle presents four causes in Posterior Analytics 2.11, but where we expect matter we find instead the confusing formula, ‘what things being the case, necessarily this is the case’, and an equally confusing example. Some commentators infer that Aristotle is not referring to matter, others that he is but in a non-standard way. I argue that APo. 94a20-34 presents not matter, but determination by general features or facts, including facts about something’s genus. The closest connection to matter is Aristotle’s view that the relation between genus and species is analogous to that between matter and a hylomorphic compound.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 204-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie Lacot ◽  
Mohammad H. Afzali ◽  
Stéphane Vautier

Abstract. Test validation based on usual statistical analyses is paradoxical, as, from a falsificationist perspective, they do not test that test data are ordinal measurements, and, from the ethical perspective, they do not justify the use of test scores. This paper (i) proposes some basic definitions, where measurement is a special case of scientific explanation; starting from the examples of memory accuracy and suicidality as scored by two widely used clinical tests/questionnaires. Moreover, it shows (ii) how to elicit the logic of the observable test events underlying the test scores, and (iii) how the measurability of the target theoretical quantities – memory accuracy and suicidality – can and should be tested at the respondent scale as opposed to the scale of aggregates of respondents. (iv) Criterion-related validity is revisited to stress that invoking the explanative power of test data should draw attention on counterexamples instead of statistical summarization. (v) Finally, it is argued that the justification of the use of test scores in specific settings should be part of the test validation task, because, as tests specialists, psychologists are responsible for proposing their tests for social uses.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Barrantes ◽  
Juan M. Durán

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the (common sense) idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's ( Cobb 2010 ) and Benbaji's ( Benbaji 2003 ) interpretations of Reid's views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-87
Author(s):  
Petru TĂRCHILĂ

Judicial psychology is the science that analyzes and tries to understand the criminal phenomenon in general and its determinant factor in particular, by the complexity of factors that generate it and by the diversity of its forms of manifestation. Although the determining factor of criminal behavior is always subjective being generated by the psychic of the offender, this aspect must be correlated with the context in which it manifests itself: social, economic, cultural context etc. Judicial psychology investigates the behavior of the individual in all its aspects, seeking a scientific explanation of the mechanisms and factors enhancing criminal favors, thus enabling the identification of the preventive measures to be taken to reduce the categories of offenses. It studies the psycho-behavioral profile of the offender, identifying the causes that determined its behavior in order to take preventive measures.The domain of judicial psychology is mainly deviance, conduct that departs from the moral or legal norms that are dominant in a given culture. The object of judicial psychology is the criminal act, correlated with the psychosocial characteristics of the participants in the judicial action (offender, victim, witness, investigator, magistrate, lawyer, civil party, educator, etc.). The science of judicial psychology also analyzes how these characteristics appear and manifest themselves in concrete and special conditions of their interaction in three phases of the criminal act: the pre-criminal phase, the actual criminal phase and the post-criminal phase.


Author(s):  
S. A. Syurin ◽  
S. A. Gorbanev

In 2007-2017, 22 occupational diseases were diagnosed for the first time in 18 workers engaged in aluminium production in the Arctic. A marked decrease in occupational morbidity in 2010-2017 was found, which was not associated with changes in working conditions and therefore requires an appropriate scientific explanation.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Hennig
Keyword(s):  

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