Qu'est-ce qu'un constructiviste peut dire sur la question animale — ou toute autre question normative, d'ailleurs ?

Dialogue ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Guillaume Soucy
Keyword(s):  
Christine Korsgaard

Résumé Dans Fellow creatures, Christine Korsgaard soutient que les êtres humains auraient l'obligation morale de traiter les animaux sensibles comme des fins en soi. Cependant, cet article tente de démontrer que la méthode korsgaardienne dépasse ce que permet une théorie constructiviste conséquente et soutient que nous devrions opter pour une version humienne plutôt que kantienne du constructivisme. Selon moi, une telle conception permet tout à fait de soutenir des positions éthiques substantielles sur la question animale sans avoir à compromettre ses engagements ontologiques.

Kantian indifference about moral reason

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam J. Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reason ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Philosophical Assumption

Abstract The pessimistic arguments May challenges depend on an anti-Kantian philosophical assumption. That assumption is that what I call philosophical optimists about moral reason are also committed to empirical optimism, or what May calls “optimistic rationalism.” I place May's book in the literature by explaining how that assumption is resisted by Christine Korsgaard, one of May's examples of a contemporary Kantian.

Williams on Practical Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Internalist Account

Bernard Williams’s controversial view about reasons for action is the topic of this essay. The essay explains Williams’s internalist account of reasons for action as an improvement on Donald Davidson’s account. It then corrects Williams’s criticism of externalist accounts of reasons for action by conceding that such accounts are viable as long as they do not imply that the reasons a person has for doing an action can explain his or her doing it. The concession follows from acknowledging the very different program of studying reasons in ethics exemplified in the work of Kurt Baier. Once the correction is made to Williams’s criticism, the essay offers a defense of his view against the criticisms of T. M. Scanlon and Christine Korsgaard.

Being True to Works of Music

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Dodd
Keyword(s):  
Work Performance ◽  
Classical Music ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Historical Authenticity ◽  
Constitutive Norm ◽  
Western Classical Music

This book argues that the so-called ‘authenticity debate’ about the performance of works of Western classical music has tended to focus on a side issue. While much has been written about the desirability (or otherwise) of historical authenticity—roughly, performing works as they would have been performed, under ideal conditions, in the era in which they were composed—the most fundamental norm governing our practice of work performance is, in fact, another kind of kind of authenticity altogether. This is interpretive authenticity: being faithful to the performed work by virtue of evincing a profound, far-reaching, or sophisticated understanding of it. While, in contrast to other performance values, both score compliance authenticity (being true to the work by obeying its score) and interpretive authenticity are valued for their own sake in performance, only the latter is a constitutive norm of the practice in the sense introduced by Christine Korsgaard. This has implications for cases in which the demands of these two kinds of authenticity conflict with each other. In cases of genuine such conflict, performers should sacrifice a little score compliance for the sake of making their performance more interpretively authentic.

Korsgaard's Kantian Arguments for the Value of Humanity

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel J. Kerstein
Keyword(s):  
New Model ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Own Name

In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard affirms that Enlightenment morality is true: humanity is valuable. To many of us few claims seem more obvious. Yet Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant do not limit themselves to affirming that humanity is valuable. They appeal to reason in an effort to establish it. They try to show that, in some sense, we are rationally compelled to recognize the value of humanity. Korsgaard joins in this effort. She champions the claim that unless we take humanity to be valuable, we condemn ourselves to complete practical skepticism, i.e., to the view that we have no reason to do anything at all.Korsgaard discusses two arguments that, she believes, support this claim. The first she attributes directly to Kant in a series of influential papers on his ethics. The second argument, which she calls a ‘fancy new model’ of the first, she constructs under her own name in The Sources of Normativity. I will defend the view that neither of these arguments succeeds. In doing so, I will not be trying to show that we are mistaken in believing humanity to be valuable.

scholarly journals The Concept of Moral Obligation: Anscombe contra Korsgaard

Philosophy ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Alvarez ◽  
Aaron Ridley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Secular Age ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Divine Law

A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been taken seriously by those wishing to defend the conception of obligation under attack. This is regrettable. Anscombe's essay is powerful and direct, and it makes a forthright case for the claim that, in the absence of a divine law conception of ethics, any specifically moral concept of obligation must be redundant, and that the best that can be hoped for in a secular age is some sort of neo-Aristotelianism. Anscombe is right about this, we think. And, among those who disagree, one of the very few to have taken her on at all explicitly is Christine Korsgaard, whose Kantianism of course commits her to the view that the concept of moral obligation is central, with or without God. Here, we try to show that Korsgaard loses the argument.

A Critique of the Practical Contradiction Procedure for Testing Maxims

2005 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 112-127
Author(s):  
Shawn D. Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Distinct Advantage ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Consistent Model ◽  
Textual Support

Emerging from the growing swell of recent literature concerning Kant's practical philosophy, one interpretation of his procedure for testing maxims has crested above others. The influential interpretation to which I refer believes that the categorical imperative guides a procedure that finds maxims impermissible when they cannot be universalized without producing a 'practical' contradiction. As a major proponent of the practical contradiction interpretation, Christine Korsgaard claims that, while there is textual support for this point of view, she is more concerned with developing a defensible interpretation of maxim testing for a ‘Kantian’ system of morality. Accordingly, one cannot simply attempt to evaluate such a theory solely by considering its various incongruities with Kant's specific claims and arguments. Instead, my evaluation of the practical contradiction interpretation will examine: (a) whether it is a procedure that is applicable to a full range of maxims; (b) whether it maintains a distinct advantage over the alternative readings; and (c) whether it is an internally coherent and consistent model for testing maxims. I propose, here, that regardless of the practical contradiction test's many advantages, it fails with regard to all three of these questions.

scholarly journals Julio De Zan contra el realismo moral. Una reconstrucción conceptual de sus proximidades con Christine Korsgaard y Ronald Dworkin

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-77
Author(s):  
Guillermo Lariguet
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Christine Korsgaard

En el presente trabajo de homenaje al Profesor Julio De Zan, me concentro en su crítica al realismo moral. En su libro, La ética, los derechos y la justicia, Julio De Zan niega que existan en el ámbito moral propiedades naturales o metafísicas. Para comprender su crítica, propongo una reconstrucción conceptual de los presupuestos filosóficos que existen para su rechazo del realismo moral. Con este propósito, mi propuesta de reconstrucción conceptual consiste en complementar la ética del discurso defendida por Julio De Zan, relacionando su propuesta con dos complementos filosóficos: por un lado, con el rechazo hacia el realismo moral realizado por Ronald Dworkin en su libro Justicia para erizos; por otro lado, con el rechazo hacia el realismo moral dirigido por Christine Korsgaard en su libro Las Fuentes de la Normatividad. Aunque los tres filósofos mantienen diferencias relevantes, mantienen también un rechazo al realismo moral basado en ciertos parecidos de familia.

Integrity and Supererogation in Ethical Communities

1998 ◽  
pp. 161-167
Author(s):  
Eugene V. Torisky
Keyword(s):  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Moral Integrity ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The Social ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Supererogatory Action

This paper explores the connection between supererogation and the integrity of ethical agents. It argues two theses: (1) there is a generally unrecognized but crucial social dimension to the moral integrity of individuals which challenges individual ideals and encourages supererogation; (2) the social dimension of integrity, however, must have limits that preserve the individuals's integrity. The concept of integrity is explored through recent works by Christine Korsgaard, Charles Taylor, and Susan Babbitt. A life of integrity is in part a life whereby one 'lives up to' one's own deeply held values. Yet, as one seeks to transcend the realm of the morally customary or the dutiful, one must check one's progress not only against one's own ideals but against the ideals and behavior of the ethical community. To answer affirmatively to one's own ideals is to hear the call of integrity both from within oneself and from without. However, by being free to hear, the freedom to close one's ears inevitably will arise. Only actions displaying such freedom can be actions of moral integrity. Since supererogatory actions are always left to an agent's discretion-that is, are fully optional-they show in paradigmatic fashion the integrity of moral agents. While an ethic of integrity and supererogation provides challenges to members of an ethical community by encouraging them continually to reevaluate their actions and character in reference to postulated ideals, it also leads us to be quite wary of judging individual's moral motives from the outside. A passage by Jonathan Kozol is cited that suggests our society routinely demands supererogatory action from its poorest members. This is illegitimate since they live in conditions that alienate rather than integrate them both with themselves and with the rest of the community.

scholarly journals Les arguments transcendantaux et le problème de la justification de la normativité morale

2002 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stélios Virvidakis
Keyword(s):  
Christine Korsgaard

La théorie de la connaissance des années 60 et 70 a été marquée par l'emploi des arguments transcendantaux de toutes sortes. Ces arguments pourraient servir à défendre l'applicabilité de nos concepts fondamentaux qui font l'objet d'une variété d'attaques sceptiques. Malheureusement, la prise de conscience des difficultés mettant en cause l'efficacité ou même la validité des arguments transcendantaux a progressivement conduit à leur abandon, quoique certains philosophes n'aient jamais cessé de les utiliser. Mon analyse s'inspire du renouveau récent de l'intérêt pour l'argumentation transcendantale dans le domaine de la raison pratique, et en particulier de l'élaboration d'un modèle de ce genre d'argumentation par A. W. Moore. Je procède à l'examen d'un argument de forme transcendantale développé par Christine Korsgaard afin de justifier l'autorité des normes morales. Je tente d'évaluer l'efficacité de cet argument et du modèle général auquel il se conforme, de le comparer à des approches alternatives et d'étudier les rapports de ses prémisses et de sa conclusion avec des prises de position réalistes et anti-réalistes en métaéthique.

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