Moral reasons not to breastfeed: a response to Woollard and Porter

Woollard and Porter argue that mothers have no moral duty to breastfeed their babies. Rather, mothers simply have moral reason(s) to breastfeed, stemming from the benefits of breast feeding for babies. According to Woollard and Porter, doing what one has moral reason to do is often supererogatory, not obligatory. I agree that mothers have no moral duty to breastfeed. However, it is misleading to suggest that mothers in general have moral reason to breastfeed and to liken not breastfeeding to not performing some supererogatory action. I will suggest mothers in general have pro tanto, but not all-things-considered, moral reason to breastfeed. Moreover, I suggest many mothers also have pro tanto moral reasons not to breastfeed. Breastfeeding is not always supererogatory; indeed, sometimes not breastfeeding is morally better. This is important because it contradicts dangerous assumptions in public discourse. One way of characterising popular consensus about breastfeeding is as Woollard and Porter do: mothers have a duty to breastfeed. But we might also characterise popular consensus differently: all moral reasons for/against breastfeeding are on the ‘pro’ breastfeeding side of the issue, whereas if there are any (good) reasons not to breastfeed these are non-moral (prudential). Woollard and Porter’s argument is important and correct in concluding that mothers have no duty to breastfeed, but it leaves this other false and dangerous idea intact and even subtly reinforces it.

Supererogation

Etymologically, the term “supererogation” refers to paying more than is due. Philosophically, it relates to the category of actions that lie beyond the call of duty. Historically, the concept was formed in Roman Catholic theology in the times of the Church Fathers but, following the fierce attacks on it by theologians of the Reformation, has almost become out of use. It was revived by J. O. Urmson in his article “On Saints and Heroes” (see Urmson 1958, cited under the Deontic Structure) and since then has played a major role in (nonreligious) ethical theory. Supererogation serves as a significant challenge to major ethical theories: Can utilitarians accept that obligatory action may be suboptimal (and that the very best action possible for an agent may often be supererogatory)? Can deontologists acknowledge the privileged moral value of actions that are not part of one’s duty but rather lie beyond it? Can virtue ethicists relate supererogatory action to a particular character disposition? Adherents to strict versions of these traditional ethical theories typically indeed deny the very possibility of supererogatory action (as did the Lutheran Reformers). Supporters of the idea of supererogation hold that ethical guidance to action has a double-tier structure: what one must do (the obligatory) and what one can only be encouraged to do (the supererogatory), the latter being concerned with nonobligatory yet (often highly) valuable action. Possible justifications of this two-tier structure lie within a wide spectrum of arguments and distinctions: what can or cannot be expected of average moral agents (on the basis of the “ought-implies-can” principle), accepting omissions of optimal action in terms of excuse, the value of leaving some space in moral action to free personal choice to go beyond given norms, basic conditions of social cooperation versus personal expressions of sympathy and solidarity, the moral as distinct from the rational, maximizing in contrast with satisficing, enforceable as against nonenforceable norms, universalizable norms versus self-imposed ideals, and the general gap between duty and (moral) value. The contested category of supererogation is often discussed through typical examples such as heroic actions, self-sacrifice, volunteering, forgiveness and pardon, and gifts and charity, as well as favors. The discussion of these examples exposes the two levels of the debate about the concept of supererogation: the first, which is mostly conceptual (although informed by normative concerns), relates to the issue of whether we need such a concept at all; the second, which is straightforwardly moral, focuses on the disputed demarcation line between the obligatory and the supererogatory.

Can Virtue Ethics Account for Supererogation?

In his classical article, ‘Saints and Heroes’, James Urmson single-handedly revived the idea of supererogation from it astonishingly long post-Reformation slumber. During the first two decades after its publication, Urmson's challenge was taken up almost exclusively by either utilitarians or deontologists of some sort. On the face of it, neither classical utilitarianism nor Kant's categorical imperative makes room for action which is better than the maximizing requirement, on the one hand, or beyond the requirement of duty, on the other. Nevertheless, both utilitarians and Kantians, as well as deontic logicians, offered more flexible and sophisticated versions of their respective theories which could accommodate supererogatory action. In my 1982 book on supererogation I tried to address the question whether virtue ethics could capture that new category of actions which are praiseworthy though not strictly required. But the focus of my discussion was mostly Aristotle (and Seneca) and accordingly more interpretive in nature. However, that was just before the tremendous surge of interest in virtue ethics and the vast literature debating the merits of agent-based vs. action-based approaches in moral theory. It turned out that fitting supererogation into virtue-based moral theory proved to be a more difficult task than doing so in consequentialist and deontological theories. Some argued that supererogation could nevertheless be accounted for in aretaic terms; others held that it could not and that this fact attested to either a theoretical weakness – even if not a refutation – of virtue-based ethics, or to the incoherence of the concept of supererogation.

Good but Not Required?—Assessing the Demands of Kantian Ethics

There seems to be a strong sentiment in pre-philosophical moral thought that actions can be morally valuable without at the same time being morally required. Yet Kant, who takes great pride in developing an ethical system .rmly grounded in common moral thought, makes no provision for any such extraordinary acts of virtue. Rather, he supports a classi.cation of actions as either obligatory, permissible or prohibited, which in the eyes of his critics makes it totally inadequate to the facts of morality. The related idea of uncommonly grand and noble deeds is frequently dismissed by Kant as high-.own emotional nonsense. Such considerations give rise to the fear that actions intuitively classed as morally commendable but not required must be re-classi.ed as commands of duty by Kant, making his ethical theory as unbearably demanding as direct utilitarianism. The paper divides into three sections: (1) an examination of the nature of moral goodness from a meta-ethical angle that introduces some passages from Kant's writings presenting strong theoretical evidence against the case for supererogatory action; (2) a critique of Thomas Hill's suggestion that within the category of wide duty we can accommodate some of the main features of actions classi.ed as supererogatory in other ethical systems; concluding that,contraHill, there are no actions of wide duty that can be so characterized in any signi.cant sense; and (3) a .nal discussion of the problem of how demanding the requirements of Kantian ethical theory really are.

Integrity and Supererogation in Ethical Communities

This paper explores the connection between supererogation and the integrity of ethical agents. It argues two theses: (1) there is a generally unrecognized but crucial social dimension to the moral integrity of individuals which challenges individual ideals and encourages supererogation; (2) the social dimension of integrity, however, must have limits that preserve the individuals's integrity. The concept of integrity is explored through recent works by Christine Korsgaard, Charles Taylor, and Susan Babbitt. A life of integrity is in part a life whereby one 'lives up to' one's own deeply held values. Yet, as one seeks to transcend the realm of the morally customary or the dutiful, one must check one's progress not only against one's own ideals but against the ideals and behavior of the ethical community. To answer affirmatively to one's own ideals is to hear the call of integrity both from within oneself and from without. However, by being free to hear, the freedom to close one's ears inevitably will arise. Only actions displaying such freedom can be actions of moral integrity. Since supererogatory actions are always left to an agent's discretion-that is, are fully optional-they show in paradigmatic fashion the integrity of moral agents. While an ethic of integrity and supererogation provides challenges to members of an ethical community by encouraging them continually to reevaluate their actions and character in reference to postulated ideals, it also leads us to be quite wary of judging individual's moral motives from the outside. A passage by Jonathan Kozol is cited that suggests our society routinely demands supererogatory action from its poorest members. This is illegitimate since they live in conditions that alienate rather than integrate them both with themselves and with the rest of the community.

Obligation, Supererogation and Self-sacrifice

Can an action cease to be required of a moral agent solely because it comes too costly? Can self-sacrifice or risk of self-sacrifice serve as a limit on our moral obligations? Two recent articles in Philosophy, concerned primarily with the possibility of supererogatory action, suggest very different answers to these questions.