The Independence of moral from Religious Discourse in the Believer's Use of Language

1975 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry K. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Religious Discourse ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Contingent Truth ◽  
Conceptual Clarification ◽  
Will Of God

In the continuing debate over the question of the independence of morality and religion there is a set of issues pertaining to the relation of moral obligation and the expressed will of God which would benefit from some further conceptual clarification. Most often the debate amounts to a defense of one form or another of the following alternatives: either it is true by definition that whatever God wills ought to be obeyed because an expression like “ought to be obeyed” means “willed or commanded by God” (in which case morality is entirely dependent on religion) or it is only a contingent truth that whatever God wills ought to be obeyed because an antecedent moral judgment as to the goodness of God's will is required for its assertion (in which case morality is entirely independent of religion). It is my contention, however, that so long as the debate is carried on in these limited terms we will necessarily be dissatisfied with whichever way the argument goes, for neither alternative can be made fully to harmonize either with our common moral and religious sensibilities or with the facts of our moral and religious usage.

Davenant on the Will of God and the Divine Decrees

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-160
Author(s):  
Michael J. Lynch
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Extended Treatment ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
God's Love ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Will Of God

This chapter discusses another important doctrine relative to John Davenant’s hypothetical universalism: the divine will. Observing that the doctrine of God’s will in early modern scholastic theology, including among Reformed theologians, involved a plethora of scholastic distinctions, the chapter shows that Davenant’s theology of the divine will was heavily influenced by these distinctions, which were themselves ways of making sense of apparent contradictory claims in Scripture. Davenant’s employment of these medieval distinctions, such as between God’s love of simple complacency and his absolute will, are given extended treatment. This chapter also gives attention to the difference between a divine conditional and an absolute will. Finally, tying all these distinctions together, this chapter explains how Davenant employs them to buttress his hypothetical universalism.

scholarly journals Pandangan Al Zamakhshshari Tentang Ayat-Ayat Pluralisme Dalam Tafsir Al-KasshaF

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-60
Author(s):  
Achmad Zainul Arifin ◽  
Wina Valestin Valestin
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Religious Diversity ◽  
God's Will ◽  
The World ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Of God

Pluralism is the most beautiful gift and sunnatullah that must be accepted in this life. In reality a country must have diversity in terms of ethnicity, culture, and even religion and Indonesia is a country with the highest application of pluralism in the world. That the country of Indonesia is a country formed from cultural, ethnic and diverse religious diversity not only one culture or one religion. Creating plurality or diversity is one of God's will, so God also creates various kinds of concepts so that plurality itself does not collide with each other even if there is a clash, then it can be resolved properly. Even in the Qur'an the plurality is highly valued, in the Qur'an there are also many verses that explain plurality. Starting from how pluralism is created, then recognizing the existence of something diferent from what is belived to appreciate any differences that exist. In the Qur'an there are guidelines in living a good life therefore Muslims are encouraged to learn and apply what is in it. Especially in understanding differences that in essence is the will of God. One of Al Zamakhsha>ri>'s opinions in his book, Al Kasyaf's interpretation, says that Allah creates a difference in this life so that people can know each other and not get caught up in their own stupidity then compete in terms of goodness.

The verbalization of the concept faith in the religious discourse by Josyf Slipyj

2021 ◽  
pp. 50-83
Author(s):  
S. M. Mostova
Keyword(s):  
Catholic Church ◽  
Religious Discourse ◽  
Deep Foundation ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Holy Trinity ◽  
Relevant Today ◽  
National Values ◽  
Church Unity ◽  
The World ◽  
Universal Category

Nowadays, in linguistics, the interest in the field of religion and communication within it has increased and the study of the religious discourse is becoming very popular. It contributes to the understanding of the religious picture of the world and the concept as a representative of the values, ideas, feelings, and associations. The article is based on the testament, sermons and speeches by Josyf Slipyj who was a Major Archbishop and a Cardinal of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Previously he, as a public figure was banned and the issue of religious mentality was on the periphery, in particular, due to ideological considerations. Josyf Slipyj always tried to organize a church space in Ukraine, which remains relevant today, because of the events and the religious context in our country. However, the issue of the discursive and linguo-conceptual analysis of the concept FAITH is unresolved. It is shown that this concept belongs to the deep foundation, one of the most important personal values. The purpose of the research is to study the verbalization of the concept FAITH in the religious discourse by Josyf Slipyj, which is the basis for the krainian linguistic picture of the world, universal category, the foundation of national consciousness, and at the same time the unique concept. Realization of the set purpose provides solving necessary tasks: to trace the worldview of Josyf Slipyj and determine the place of the concept FAITH. The concept FAITH is considered from two aspects that are equally necessary for Christianity: understanding faith, which is trust and faith in someone or something through the recognition of truth and value (faith in the Holy Trinity, in the church). The religious heritage of Josyf Slipyj represents two mentioned aspects: Patriarch trusts and believes in Jesus Christ, eternal God, God’s will, God’s providence, God’s help, Liturgy, Church, unity, Ukraine, power of prayer, love, science, holidays. So, in conceptual terms, the concept of religious discourse often includes different aspects of constants that affirm the Patriarch`s faith and transmit the essence of universal and national values, including ethical and religious categories.

scholarly journals Analisis Pertanyaan Retorika dalam Ayub 40:1-28

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Kalis Stevanus
Keyword(s):  
Spiritual Experience ◽  
Rhetorical Question ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
Physical Presence ◽  
Practical Implications ◽  
Will Of God

Abstract. The purpose of the analysis of the rhetorical question in Job 40: 1-28 is to look at theological and practical implications. Theologically: 1) Everything under God's control. Including Job with all the agonizing suffering he experienced remained under God's control; 2) Keep believing in God even if you do not feel His physical presence; 3) Behind the suffering of the righteous man is the divine will of God. God never allows anything to happen to believers, without God's purpose in it. In suffering there is God's gracious will, in God's will, there is His grace. So believers can reach His great purpose and plan. Practically: 1) God is big, strong and we are small, weak. Let believers  keep giving thanks to God even in suffering, then pray (ask) to God for strengthening us when we face the tests of faith; 2) Live honestly and humbly. Do not despise or judge a person for not having the spiritual experience that Ayub once experienced. For the Lord opposes the proud and the pity of the humble; 3) Rely completely on God. In both temptation and suffering, there is nothing better that believers can do than always depend entirely on God.Abstrak. Tujuan analisis pertanyaan retorika dalam Ayub 40:1-28 ini adalah untuk melihat implikasi teologis dan praktis. Secara teologis: 1) Segala sesuatu di bawah penguasaan dan kendali Tuhan. Termasuk juga Ayub dengan segala penderitaan berat yang dialaminya tetap berada di bawah penguasaan dan kendali Tuhan; 2) Tetaplah percaya pada Tuhan walau tidak merasakan kehadiran-Nya secara fisik ; 3) Di balik penderitaan orang saleh terkandung kehendak Allah yang rahmani. Tuhan tidak pernah mengizinkan sesuatu menimpa orang percaya, tanpa maksud Tuhan di dalamnya. Di  dalam penderitaan ada kehendak Tuhan yang rahmani, di dalam kehendak Tuhan ada anugerah-Nya, sehingga orang percaya bisa mencapai maksud dan rencana-Nya yang agung. Secara praktis: 1) Tuhan itu besar, kuat dan manusia kecil, lemah. Hendaklah orang percaya tetap bersyukur kepada Tuhan sekalipun dalam penderitaan dan berdoalah (mintalah) kepada Tuhan agar Ia menguatkan saat-saat menghadapi ujian-ujian iman; 2) Hiduplah jujur dan rendah hati. Janganlah memandang rendah atau menghakimi seseorang karena tidak memiliki pengalaman rohani seperti yang dialaminya. Sebab Tuhan menentang orang sombong dan mengasihani orang yang rendah hati; 3) Bergantunglah sepenuhnya kepada Allah. Dalam pencobaan maupun penderitaan, tidak ada yang lebih baik yang dapat dilakukan orang percaya selain bergantung sepenuhnya kepada Allah.

Sacrifice in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Weddle
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Religious Discourse ◽  
Animal Sacrifice ◽  
Islamic World ◽  
Common Features ◽  
Human Conduct ◽  
Religious Ideal ◽  
Transcendent Ideal ◽  
The Cost

Sacrifice is the cost of religion, paid in many ways, including donations, ascetic self-denial, prayer, fasting, mystical ecstasy, imitative suffering, ritual offerings, and martyrdom. Common religious discourse uses “sacrifice” to describe a wide array of events and actions that exhibit common features, such as reference to transcendence, conditionality of the offering, and an element of self-giving. For Judaism, Christianity, and Islam a guiding example of sacrifice is the Hebrew patriarch Abraham, who was willing to offer his son to God as a burnt offering. Each tradition appropriates the story in different ways, but they all uphold sacrifice as a means of relating to the sacred and as an ideal of human conduct. Most theories of sacrifice locate its function in the formation of social order, but this book focuses on sacrifice as the exchange of concrete natural and human goods for abstract spiritual benefits. As such, sacrifice both signifies a transcendent ideal of individual or communal fulfilment and poses a moral danger of sanctioning the imposition of that ideal on others. In Judaism and Christianity, animal sacrifice is displaced by acts of devotion to God and charity toward others; in Islam, animal sacrifice remains a religious duty during pilgrimage to Mecca but is understood as an expression of gratitude to God and a donation to those in need throughout the Islamic world. Thus, each tradition interprets sacrifice as both religious ideal and moral obligation.

Right and Good: the Contradiction of Morality

Philosophy ◽  
1930 ◽  
Vol 5 (20) ◽  
pp. 582-593
Author(s):  
W. G. de Burgh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Concrete Situation ◽  
The Right

We were led, at the close of the last paper, to the conclusion that the moral judgment lays claim to a knowledge of what is unknowable. It is not merely that our volition is imperfect, that the act of necessity falls short of what we know to be right. This seems bad enough; but the plight in which we actually find ourselves is even worse. The paradox is that we never know, and never can know, in any particular situation, what it is really right to do. We know indeed that it is always right, really and absolutely right, to do what we believe to be right. For a man to act “against his conscience,” after all possible thought has been taken for its enlightenment, we know to be morally wrong. But this knowledge is purely formal and gives no clue to the matter of moral obligation. It tells us what is common alike to any and every case of moral duty; it does not tell us what we ought to do. For the right that we will cannot be merely the rightness of willing it. What I ought to do cannot be merely that I ought to do it. Now our beliefs and judgments as to material rightness, i.e. as to what it is right to do in a concrete situation, are notoriously liable to error. So we seek for a criterion by which to test our variable and fallible judgments, a criterion of what is really right. But the search is doomed to failure; we can only test beliefs by beliefs, our former beliefs by our later, the beliefs of one man or society or age by those of others.

I. Fact and Value

1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-139
Author(s):  
W. D. Hudson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Factual Belief ◽  
Moral Philosophers

What connexion is there between factual statements concerning God or man and moral judgments? That is the question which occasions this paper. Not long ago moral philosophers were wont to say that there is a logical gap between the two sorts of utterance to which I have just referred: that nothing follows in terms of moral value from a statement of fact, no ‘ought’ from any ‘is’. They recognised only one restriction on what may be said in terms of ‘ought’ by what has been said in terms of ‘is’, namely that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. It is manifest nonsense to say that anyone ought to do what he cannot do. But, this apart, they thought it possible without contradiction or anomaly to hold any conceivable factual belief and at the same time subscribe to any conceivable moral judgment. They would have held that it makes perfectly good sense to say, for example, ‘This is God’s will but it ought not to be done’ or ‘Men are not pigs but a good man will live like a pig’. Bizarre such judgments may be, they would have said, but nonsensical they are not. They conceived it to be their main business, as moral philosophers, to erect warning notices along the edge of the is-ought gap so that contemporary moralists would not fall headlong into it as so many of their predecessors, in less enlightened ages, had done.

Biel, Gabriel (before 1425–95)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Farthing
Keyword(s):  
Active Role ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
Human Situation ◽  
Moral Freedom ◽  
Radical Freedom ◽  
Theology And Philosophy ◽  
Will Of God

Biel was the last great systematizer of scholastic theology and philosophy. Not noted for originality, he sought to produce a synthesis of the work of his predecessors. His thought is pervasively religious; a profound sense of the freedom of God’s will is basic to his perspective. He followed Ockham and Duns Scotus in emphasizing the sheer contingency of things. Nature, morality and salvation depend entirely on God’s will, and God could have determined otherwise. Such a view places sharp limits on the ability of reason to discover the truth about the nature and will of God; Biel subordinates reason to faith (although he is a master in the use of reason to defend revealed truth). The radical freedom of God coexists with significant moral freedom in humanity, since it is decreed by God that humans should be free to play an active role in determining their own destiny. Implied in this view of the human situation is an activist, pragmatic tendency, an interest in concrete applications of theoretical insights rather than in abstract speculation for its own sake.

On ‘doing what is right’ and ‘doing the will of God’

1967 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 289-299
Author(s):  
Dorothy Emmet
Keyword(s):  
Practical Situation ◽  
God's Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Of God

‘Doing the will of God’, or seeking to do it, is a notion close to the centre of at any rate Christian, Jewish, and Moslem religion. So too is the notion of ‘accepting’ something as God's will: Fiat voluntas tua. In the former case, the notion of ‘doing the will of God’ is invoked in connection with what would be right to do in a practical situation; in the latter in connection with happenings and circumstances outside our control and as something to be accepted rather than accomplished. I shall be concerned here with the notion of the will of God as something to be accomplished, asking what, if anything, to say that an action is in accordance with the will of God adds to saying that it is right. I shall also look at ways in which we think of relations between our wills and those of other people when we say that one person is doing the will of another person, and ask whether these help us at all in trying to see what might be meant by ‘doing the will of God’.

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