The Cominform: Tito's International?

1992 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Swain

AbstractAlthough it is now recognized that the Stalin-Tito dispute was sparked off by Tito's desire to intervene decisively in the Greek civil war, the ideological context of that decision has never been fully explored. This article suggests that, since the early days of the Second World War, Tito had been committed to establishing a popular front ‘from below’, i.e. under clear communist control. He did this not only in Yugoslavia, but used his position in the war-time Comintern to persuade other communist parties to do the same. As a result he was dissatisfied with the all-party coalition governments established with Stalin's consent throughout Europe in 1945. Tito favoured a communist offensive, while Stalin, aware of the international position of the Soviet Union, favoured a more cautious approach. When Stalin summoned the first meeting of the Cominform in September 1947 and made Tito its de Facto leader, Tito mistakenly assumed he was to head a new international committed to a revolutionary offensive not only in Eastern Europe but in Greece and even Italy and France.

Author(s):  
Antony Polonsky

This chapter explores how the outbreak of the Second World War initiated a new and tragic period in the history of the Jews of north-eastern Europe. The Polish defeat by Nazi Germany in the unequal campaign that began in September of 1939 led to a new partition of the country by Germany and the Soviet Union. Though Hitler had been relatively slow to put the more extreme aspects of Nazi antisemitism into practice, by the time the war broke out, the Nazi regime was set in its deep-seated hatred of the Jews. Following the brutal violence of Kristallnacht on November 9–10, 1938, when up to a hundred Jews were murdered in Germany and Austria and over 400 synagogues burnt down, Hitler, disconcerted by the domestic and foreign unease which this provoked, decided to entrust policy on the Jews to the ideologues of the SS. They were determined at this stage to enforce a ‘total separation’ between Jews and Germans, but wanted to do so in an ‘orderly and disciplined’ manner, perhaps by compelling most Jews to emigrate. The Nazis did not act immediately on the genocidal threat of ‘the annihilation of the Jews as a race in Europe’, but during the first months of the war, a dual process took place: the barbarization of Nazi policy generally and a hardening of policy towards Jews.


2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-491
Author(s):  
Patricia Kennedy Grimsted

The following list is limited narrowly to post-1991 Russian legal instruments relating to cultural valuables of foreign provenance seized and transported to the Soviet Union from Germany and Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War, or in the immediate postwar period. Widely known in Russia as the “trophy” valuables, officially those cultural objects (art, books, and archives) are usually referred to in Russia more euphemistically as “cultural valuables displaced [or relocated] to the USSR,” although most frequently translated in a European context as “displaced cultural valuables.” The term “displaced” is used here, and may include some cultural property and archives that came to the USSR during the war itself, as well as those removed from Germany and Eastern Europe by Soviet authorities at the end of or immediately after the war. Many items involved were actually twice captured, or “twice saved,” as the saying goes in Russia, having been first captured by the Nazis, mostly from “enemies of the regime,” and then captured a second time and “safeguarded” by the Soviets.


2021 ◽  
pp. 62-83
Author(s):  
Marlene Laruelle

This chapter argues that the perception of Russia as an antifascist power has been reinforced by memory wars that have reshaped the relationship between Russia and its Central and Eastern European neighbors. It examines how the emergence and gradual visibility gained by the narrative of the Soviet Union as an occupier with a totalitarian ideology shocked the Russian elite and public opinion. Given the context of memory wars, the chapter focuses on the issue of defining who was fascist and who colluded with Nazism — the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941 or the collaborationist forces in Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter then presents Russia's response to the new memories articulated by Central and Eastern European countries on two fronts: legal and historiographical. Ultimately, the chapter highlights how the Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that memories have been instrumental in “real” wars, as all parties claim that their martyrdom and heroism during the Second World War entitle them to some recognition today.


Author(s):  
Antony Polonsky

This chapter studies the situation of the Jews from the end of the Second World War to the collapse of the communist system. The Second World War left the world of east European Jewry devastated. Although the Nazis had been defeated, they had succeeded in murdering a large proportion of the Jews of eastern Europe. The end of the wartime Grand Alliance and the increasingly repressive character of the regimes in the Soviet Union and in Poland form the background against which attempts were made to rebuild the war-torn societies of eastern Europe and to recreate Jewish life. The Nazi occupation left a landscape laid waste by the effort to impose a racially structured New Order and the violent and often fratricidal resistance that it elicited. The departure of the Germans did not lead to the end of hostilities, and guerrilla war against the communist authorities continued in Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania.


2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucian N. Leustean

The presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and the reshaping of Europe's internal borders sped up the separation between the Eastern and Western blocs in the first years after the end of the Second World War. In countries where communism had been declared illegal or lacked the support of the electorate before 1944, the accession of communist leaders to governmental structures had been advanced by the politics of the Soviet Union, based on systematised political intimidation, institutionalised violence, and blackmail. The communist authorities then legitimised their political positions in relation to the historical past of their countries and according to the development of their societies after the Second World War.


Author(s):  
Mark Edele

This chapter turns to the present and explains the implications of the current study for the ongoing debate about the Soviet Union in the Second World War and in particular about the role of loyalty and disloyalty in the Soviet war effort. It argues that this study strengthens those who argue for a middle position: the majority of Soviet citizens were neither unquestioningly loyal to the Stalinist regime nor convinced resisters. The majority, instead, saw their interests as distinct from both the German and the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, ideology remains important if we want to understand why in the Soviet Union more resisted or collaborated than elsewhere in Europe and Asia.


2021 ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Boris Martynov

The article deals with the evolution of views of the Brazilian authors on the role, played by the Soviet Union in the WWII and its contribution to the victory of the anti-Hitlerian coalition. It contains a historiographical review of the works, written by the Brazilian authors on the theme, beginning from 2004. One follows the process of their growing interest towards clarifying the real contribution of the Soviet part to the common victory, along with the rise of the international authority of Brazil and strengthening of the Russo – Brazilian ties. One reveals the modern attitude of Brazilian authors towards such dubious or scarcely known themes as the Molotov – Ribbentrop pact, the battles for Smolensk and Rhzev, town–bound fights in Stalingrad, liberation of the Baltic republics, the Soviet war with Japan, etc. The author comes to conclusion, that in spite of the Western efforts to infuse the people`s conscience with the elements of the “post – truth” in this respect, the correct treatment of those events acquires priority even in such a far off from Russia state, as Brazil.


2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Marcinkiewicz-Kaczmarczyk

This article explores the establishment of the Polish Women’s Auxiliary Service (was) as part of the complex story of the formation of a Polish army in exile. In 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Polish Army in the Soviet Union was established. The Women’s Auxiliary Service was formed at the same time as a means to enable Polish women to serve their country and also as a way for Polish women to escape the Soviet Union. The women of the was followed the Polish Army combat trail from Buzuluk to London, accompanying their male peers first to the Middle East and then Italy. The women of the was served as nurses, clerks, cooks and drivers. This article examines the recruitment, organization and daily life of the women who served their country as exiles on the battlefront of the Second World War.


Author(s):  
Konrad Kuczara

Relations between the Ukrainian Church and Constantinople were difficult. This goes back as far as 988, when the Christianisation of the Rus created a strong alliance between Kiev and the Byzantine Empire. There were times when Constantinople had no influence over the Kiev Metropolis. During the Mongolian invasion in 1240, the Ukranian region was broken up and Kiev lost its power. The headquarters of the Kiev Metropolis were first moved to Wlodzimierz nad Klazma in 1299 and then to Moscow in1325. In 1458 the Metropolis of Kiev was divided into two; Kiev and Moscow, but Kiev still remained under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since that time, the orthodox hierarchs of Moscow no longer adhered to the title Bishop of Kiev and the whole of Rus and in 1588 the Patriarchate of Moscow was founded. In 1596 when  the Union of Brest was formed,  the orthodox church of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth was not liquidated. Instead it was formally revived in 1620 and in 1632 it was officially recognized by king Wladyslaw Waza. In 1686 the Metropolis of Kiev which until that time was under the Patriarchate of Constantinople was handed over to the jurisdiction of Moscow. It was tsarist diplomats that bribed the Ottoman Sultan of the time to force the Patriarchate to issue a decree giving Moscow jurisdiction over the Metropolis of Kiev. In the beginning of the 19th century, Kiev lost its Metropolitan status and became a regular diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. Only in the beginning of the 20thcentury, during the time of the Ukrainian revolution were efforts made to create an independent Church of Ukraine. In 1919 the autocephaly was announced, but the Patriarchate of Constantinople did not recognize it. . The structure of this Church was soon to be liquidated and it was restored again after the second world war at the time when Hitler occupied the Ukraine. In 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Ukraine gained its independence, the Metropolitan of Kiev requested that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine becomes autocephalous but his request was rejected by the Patriarchate of Moscow. Until 2018 the Patriarchate of Kiev and the autocephalous Church remained unrecognized and thus considered schismatic. In 2018 the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople looked  into the matter and on 5thJanuary 2019, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine received it’s tomos of autocephaly from Constantinople. The Patriarchate of Moscow opposed the decision of Constantinople and as a result refused to perform a common Eucharist with the new Church of Ukraine and with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.


1970 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 256-276
Author(s):  
Dariusz Miszewski

During the Second World War, the national camp preached the idea of imperialism in Central Europe. Built peacefully, the Polish empire was supposed to protect the independence and security of countries in Central Europe against Germany and the Soviet Union, and thus went by the name of “the Great Poland”. As part of the empire, nation-states were retained. The national camp was opposed to the idea of the federation as promoted by the government-in-exile. The “national camp” saw the idea of federation on the regional, European and global level as obsolete. Post-war international cooperation was based on nation states and their alliances.


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