BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE, 1919–1939 Neville Chamberlain and appeasement. By R. Caputi. London: Susquehanna University Press, 2000. Pp. 271. ISBN 1-57591-027-6. £35.00. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: peace without victory? Edited by M. Dockrill and J. Fisher. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. xvi+97. ISBN 0-333-77630-5. £40.00. British foreign policy, 1919–1939. By P. W. Doerr. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. Pp. xi+291. ISBN 0-7190-4672-6. £14.99. Neville Chamberlain. By D. Dutton. London: Edward Arnold, 2001. Pp. xii+245. ISBN 0-340-70627-9. £12.99. Austen Chamberlain and the commitment to Europe: British foreign policy, 1924–1929. By R. S. Grayson. London: Frank Cass, 1997. Pp. xviii+318. ISBN 0-7146-4758-6. £37.50. Lloyd George and the lost peace: from Versailles to Hitler, 1919–1940. By A. Lentin. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. xvii+182. ISBN 0-333-91961-0. £40.00. Peacemakers: the Paris Conference of 1919 and its attempt to end war. By M. Macmillan. London: John Murray, 2001. Pp. xii+574. ISBN 0-7195-5939-1. £25.00. ‘The Times’ and appeasement: the journals of A. L. Kennedy, 1932–1939. Edited by G. Martel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Royal Historical Society, Camden Fifth Series. Pp. xvii+312. ISBN 0-521-79354-8. £40.00. Britain and the Ruhr crisis. By E. Y. O'Riordan. London: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. x+237. ISBN 0-333-76483-8. £40.00. The Neville Chamberlain diary letters,I: The making of a politician, 1915–1920. Edited by R. Self. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. Pp. ix+423. ISBN 1-84014-691-5. £75.00. The Neville Chamberlain diary letters, II: The reform years, 1921–1927. Edited by R. Self. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. Pp. x+461. ISBN 1-84014-692-3. £75.00.

2003 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 479-492
Author(s):  
GAYNOR JOHNSON

In the last eighty years, an enormous amount of scholarly attention has been devoted to explaining why Europe was at the centre of two cataclysmic conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century. The books considered here represent part of a resurgence of interest in British foreign policy in the interwar period and are primarily concerned with the policy of reconciliation towards the former Central Powers after the First World War, especially the appeasement of Germany. They offer a further opportunity to challenge the still-held misapprehension that appeasement was a strand of British policy that only appeared after Hitler's rise to power. They also offer a means of examining British foreign policy through sources inside and outside the government. Gordon Martel's volume illustrates the amount of journalistic pressure that was put on the British government to recognize and act on the likely threats to international peace. Austen and Neville Chamberlain, the sons of the great nineteenth-century Conservative politician, Joseph Chamberlain, were at the centre of the British foreign policy making process during the interwar period. Indeed, Robert Self's two volumes of letters written by Neville Chamberlain to his sisters illustrate how steeped in foreign and domestic politics the whole Chamberlain family was. Richard Grayson sees a long, unbroken attempt to accommodate Germany diplomatically starting with Austen Chamberlain and the treaty of Locarno. The importance of Neville Chamberlain's contribution to the history of British foreign policy is offered further recognition through surveys of the historiography of his premiership by David Dutton and Robert Caputi.

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saad Omar Khan

This paper examines British approaches to the caliphate from the beginning of the First World War to the aftermath of its dissolution in 1924. Background will be given as to how the Islamic conception of the caliphate shifted over time. British use of the caliphate as a political tool in the nineteenth century is also examined, especially with regards to how strong British-Ottoman ties prior to the First World War affected India’s Muslims. The primary focus, however, will be on British ties with King Hussein of the Hejaz. British suggestions of an Arab caliphate encouraged the idea that Hussein should assume the title of caliph, which would later be a cause of agitation and concern for British policy in the British Empire. This is especially true with regards to India, as fear of Indo-Muslim opinion would deeply influence British policy when it came to the Ottoman Empire’s position in the post-bellum period. With the creation of the Turkish Republic and the subsequent disestablishment of the Ottoman caliphate, Hussein, sharif of the Hejaz, would officially announce his claim to the title. This dismayed the British foreign policy establishment, which strove to avoid suggestions of complicity lest further anti-British activity be encouraged in India. Eventually, the end of Hussein would come from Ibn Saud, his principle rival in the Arab world. Despite Hussein’s status as a British ally, the widespread anger against him in the Islamic world over the caliphate would persuade the British to distance themselves from him and his religious pretensions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 252-254
Author(s):  
Tomaz Espósito Neto

O presente texto examina o livro “O Brasil na Primeira Guerra Mundial: a longa travessia”, de Carlos Daróz, que analisa a atuação brasileira na Primeira Guerra Mundial no período de 1917 a 1919.ABSTRACTThis text examines the book “O Brasil na Primeira Guerra Mundial: a longa travessia” (Brazil in the First World War: a long crossing), by Carlos Daróz, which analyses Brazilian actions in the First World War in the period from 1917 to 1919. Palavras-chave: Política Externa Brasileira; Primeira Guerra Mundial; História das Relações Internacionais.Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Policy; First World War; History of International Relations.Recebido em 03 de Fevereiro de 2017 | Aceito em 11 de Novembro de 2017Received on February 3, 2017 | Accepted on November 11, 2017DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2016.27252 


Author(s):  
Bart Stellinga ◽  
Josta de Hoog ◽  
Arthur van Riel ◽  
Casper de Vries

AbstractThe dominance of deposit money means commercial banks play a leading role in money creation. This chapter puts this situation in a historical context. The functioning of our financial monetary system and the role of banks have changed fundamentally over time. The chapter reveals that what we take for granted today was often far from self-evident yesterday. We focus on the Netherlands and discuss four periods in turn: (1) the ‘long nineteenth century’ up to the First World War, with an emphasis on the 1870−1914 period, (2) the interwar period (1918−1939), (3) the Bretton Woods period (1944−1973) and (4) the decades leading up to the latest financial crisis (1973−2008).


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 351-360
Author(s):  
Sergei A. Mironyuk

The London Inter-Allied Conference on the "Russian question" (December 11-13, 1919) is rarely mentioned by historians, but a landmark event in the history of British participation in foreign intervention in Russia - and in a broad sense an interesting phenomenon in world history. During the Conference in London participants - Britain, Italy, USA, France and Japan - discussed the future of the intervention and in general a new foreign policy strategy regarding Russia in the context of the evident Bolsheviks’ victory in the Civil War and the formation of a new system of international relations after the First World War, in which it was necessary to determine the position of Russia. The approaches and methods adopted in London, as practice shows, seem to be currently relevant. The purpose of this article is to analyze the participation of Britain and determine its role in the development of decisions of the London Inter-Allied Conference on the "Russian question" on the basis of previously uninvolved documents of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament of the United Kingdom, as well as sources of personal origin. The decisions of the London Conference on the "Russian question" put an end to largescale military assistance to the White movement and thus contributed to the end of the Russian Civil War. The British government played a key role in producing the decisions of the London Conference. The Government had prepared thoroughly for the Conference and had proposed its draft decisions.


1978 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reinhard R. Doerries

Since the early 1960s we have witnessed in West German historical writing noteworthy changes in the interpretation of the causes of the First World War and, therefore, of the meaning of that war for Germany. One is particularly struck by the refreshing debate which ensued among German scholars on Germany's war aims specifically and on Imperial Germany's foreign policy prior to the World War in general. The so-called captured German documents of the Foreign Office and other branches of the government were returned to Germany, and a younger generation of historians eagerly examined the newly available material. Remarkable, if at times controversial, studies were the result of the scholarly reexamination of the German imperial era. Yet, in all the commotion and controversy, there was one area of German foreign policy which conspicuously remained ignored or treated with astonishing marginality


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