Actuarial Assessment of Damages

1968 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Prevett

The purpose of this paper is to provide an opportunity for discussion within our profession of ‘the use of an actuarial approach and actuarial evidence’ in the assessment of damages arising out of personal injury and fatal accident litigation. The need for such a paper was intimated in the pages of our Journal by William Phillips in his Review of Principles of the Law of Damages by Professor Harry Street. Since the publication of what Phillips described as ‘from the actuarial point of view…the most important legal textbook which has been published in the last 50 years’ the employment of actuaries in this field has been widely discussed within the legal profession. The most important recent development has been the inclusion of personal injury litigation as Item VI of the first programme of the Law Commission set up by the Law Commission Act, 1965. The words quoted in the first sentence above are taken from the list of ‘Questions for Examination’ under (b) of Item VI, ‘Assessment of Damages’. The current examination being conducted by the Law Commission makes this a particularly appropriate time for a sessional meeting on this subject. The writer has had the advantage of a sight of a preliminary Working Paper prepared by the Law Commission and will be quoting certain extracts from that paper below. It must however be stressed that the Working Paper is a preliminary one which attempts to do no more than canvass views: it in no way sets out the conclusions of the Law Commission on the matters discussed.

Legal Studies ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Lewis

Schemes for compensating injury which operate alongside each other call for important policy decisions to be made concerning their inter-relationship. Are they to take account of one another and, if so, to what extent? These issues can arise in a variety of contexts. Within particular regimes they are the concern, for example, of the overlapping benefit regulations in social security law and the rules relating to contribution in insurance law. However, the focus of this article is upon personal injury litigation. It examines the policy reasons which have been used to justify the different results reached by the law when faced with the problem of ‘collateral benefits’ received by an accident victim also seeking damages. Typically, these benefits are received from the state, or an employer, or an insurer.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter assesses the process of law reform in France. Although a full-time Commission has been set up in France to deal with the codification of the law, no similar permanent institution exists for keeping the law under review and for making recommendations for its systematic reform. There is thus no French equivalent for the Law Commission such as in other countries. Therefore law reform initiative has been left entirely to government departments and Members of Parliament and this is confirmed by the 1958 Constitution. Consequently, in practice, the majority of bills have their origin in government departments, and in particular the Ministry of Justice, whose function it is to deal with the organisation of the civil and criminal justice system. The role of supreme courts in reforming the law is also highlighted in the chapter.


Philosophy ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 53 (205) ◽  
pp. 293-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. D. Woozley

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and to relate to each other two topics: (a) the admissibility of ignorance and mistake of fact as defences against negligence in crime; and (b) the inadmissibility of ignorance and mistake of law as defences against criminal charges. I am in (a) not concerned at all with torts negligence, only with criminal offences (whether common law or statutory) which can be committed negligently, where negligence suffices for liability, as in the law of homicide. This produces an untidy classification of elements, one or other of which is needed to provide the required mens rea (the exception of strict liability offences is here ignored): intention ( = purpose or aim), knowledge (or belief), recklessness and negligence. It is untidy, because the last does not belong on the same list as the other three, each of which can appropriately be called a state of mind in what we might say to be a positive sense, for each of them includes some degree of awareness of and/or attitude to relevant facts. If negligence is to be called (partly) a state of mind, it is so in a very stretched and negative way: to be told that a person was not attending to, thinking of or noticing something that he should have been is to be given some information, of a negative sort, about his state of mind, but it tells us very little, for it eliminates only one of an unlimited range of states of mind (in the positive sense). His not attending, noticing, etc., is equally compatible with his daydreaming (not attending to or noticing anything) and with his concentrating hard on something else. If negligence requires inadvertence, as is commonly maintained, then there was a state of mind which the agent should have been in but was not; if, as I would argue, it does not require inadvertence, then there was a state of mind which the agent should have been in, and maybe he was not in it, maybe he was in it. (In the present state of English law most offences of criminal negligence do require inadvertence, the notable exceptions being traffic offences such as careless driving. On the other hand, the proposal in the Law Commission Working Paper, No. 31 (1970) would not require it; the definition runs, ‘a person is negligent if he fails to exercise such care, skill or foresight as a reasonable man in his situation would exercise’. However, that is only a proposal; at present advertent negligence is rare in criminal law, although common in torts.) On this view, the questions are (1) whether his performance fell below scratch, (2) what are to be the excusing conditions for such a performance, and (3) if the answer to (1) is yes, whether his performance was covered by the excusing conditions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
F. W. H. Chan ◽  
W.-S. Chan ◽  
J. S. H. Li

1990 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Haberman ◽  
D. S. F. Bloomfield

AbstractThe paper considers a number of methods of estimating the work time lost due to sickness, unemployment and stoppages. The most satisfactory approach suggested is based on a multiple state working life table. Numerical examples of the measurement of work time lost are provided for particular application to the actuarial assessment of damages (arising out of personal injury or fatal accident). Other applications, including the pricing of unemployment insurance, are also discussed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 331-362
Author(s):  
Antal Berkes

Abstract The League of Nations set up The Hague codification conference that focused, among three specific agendas, on the responsibility of states for damage caused in their territory to the person or property of foreigners. Scholarship has dominantly ignored or considered the work of the League of Nations in the law of state responsibility as a failure, starting the story of the codification with the International Law Commission. This article proposes to rethink the dominant view and claims that the League of Nations’ codification process not only initiated, but substantially contributed to the codification of the law of state responsibility, leading to lasting methods, concepts, principles and norms that have been integrated in the contemporary canon of the rules of state responsibility.


1961 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc A. Franklin ◽  
Robert H. Chanin ◽  
Irving Mark

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