THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts

AbstractThis article seeks to explore the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has interpreted and applied the principle of democracy. It examines first the democratization process upon which the EU has embarked since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and how that transformation was a positive reaction to those voices arguing that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. Next, it is argued that the CJEU has understood the principle of democracy in a way which is respectful of the two sources of democratic legitimacy at EU level, namely the Member States and the peoples of Europe. Accordingly, that understanding of the principle of democracy is illustrated by some relevant examples taken from the case law of the CJEU and the European General Court (‘EGC’). Those examples show that the CJEU has strived to protect the prerogatives of the European Parliament, the only political institution of the EU whose members have, since 1979, been elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Yet, they also show that the principle of democracy is not limited to protecting parliamentary prerogatives. That principle, like all EU constitutional principles, pervades the whole of EU law and, as such, must be read in light of societal changes. As democracy within the EU is not limited to the participation by the European Parliament in the legislative process but also encompasses other forms of governance, in particular rule-making by administrative agencies and the achievement of consensus by social partners, it is for the EU judiciary to make sure that those other forms of governance remain as democratic as possible. This can be achieved, inter alia, by making sure that they enjoy sufficient representation or are subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, the CJEU and the EGC also take into account new mechanisms which seek to strengthen the principle of democracy, such as the principle of transparency. In so doing, they aim to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU by providing sufficient means for EU citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Finally, it is contended that the principle of democracy, as interpreted by the CJEU, draws inspiration from national democracies. In so doing, the CJEU strives to place national and supranational democracies in a mutually reinforcing relationship.

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 272-280
Author(s):  
Benjamin Bodson

Alongside other actors such as the European Ombudsman, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) plays what looks like, at first sight, a key role in improving the transparency of EU legislative procedures. To take two relatively recent examples, the <em>De Capitani v. European Parliament</em> (2018) judgment was perceived as a victory by those in favor of increased transparency of EU legislative procedures at the stage of trilogues, as was the <em>ClientEarth v. European Commission</em> (2018) judgment regarding the pre-initiative stage. Both rulings emphasize the need for “allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed the basis of a legislative act…[as] a precondition for the effective exercise of their democratic rights” (<em>ClientEarth v. European Commission</em>, 2018, §84; <em>De Capitani v. European Parliament</em>, 2018, §80). Nevertheless, while the CJEU’s case law may indeed contribute to improving the legislative process’ transparency, its impact on the latter is inherently limited and even bears the potential of having a perverse effect. This article sheds light on the limits of the CJEU’s capacity to act in this field and the potential effects of its case law on the EU institutions’ attitudes or internal organization.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 1223-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslava Scholten ◽  
Marloes van Rijsbergen

Although not explicitly regulated by the EU treaties, EU agencies not only exist but also have increased in number and power. In addition, while EU agencies may exercise very similar functions to those of the Commission, Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) do not list agencies among the possible authors of non-legislative acts. The existing situation raises the questions of the extent to which the ongoing agencification in the EU is legitimate and what its limits are. This article addresses these questions in the light of the old and new Treaties and case law, including the just releasedESMA-shortsellingcase. It shows that while the Lisbon Treaty made a few steps forward on the road of legitimizing EU agencies and delegating important powers to them, the scope of powers that EU agencies can have remains unclear. In this respect, the European Court of Justice's lenient approach in theESMA-shortsellingcase is unfortunate because it neither clarifies the issue nor pushes the Union Legislator and the Member States to address it. Consequently, in the absence of clear limits, further agencification is likely to persist at the risk of increasing the democratic legitimacy deficit and remaining accountability gaps.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2019 ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Roberto Reyes Izquierdo

The aim of this paper is to analyse how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been a fundamental factor in the integration process of the European Union, in spite of the obstacles posed by the intergovernmental dynamics that have traditionally hindered the construction of a stronger, cohesive and more integrated Europe. Important principles such as direct effect or supremacy of EU law have been developed through ECJ rulings and case law, even when such principles were not literally foreseen in the foundational Treaties. Therefore, this paper argues that the role and power of the Court as an “indirect law-maker” have been essential for the construction of the European Union, and this has been possible due to the complexities and weaknesses of the legislative process involving the three main decision-makers: the Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament.


2021 ◽  
pp. 57-100
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Frank Hoffmeister ◽  
Geert De Baere ◽  
Thomas Ramopoulos

This chapter provides an overview of the treaty-making procedures in the European Union. It explains the historical evolution of primary law in the field and gives examples for each step under Article 218 TFEU (negotiation, signature, provisional application, and conclusion). Excerpts of European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law illustrate how these provisions are interpreted and applied in practice. The chapter also discusses the principles covering suspension and termination of EU agreements, and the ever more important system that allows the EU to contribute to the adoption of international secondary law under Article 218, paragraph 9 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A final section describes EU practice for adopting non-legally binding instruments and reproduces the new guidance of December 2017 issued by the Council and the Commission in this respect after the ECJ’s judgment in the case relating to the EU–Swiss Memorandum of Understanding.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-115
Author(s):  
Márk Némedi

Abstract This paper analyses the case-law of the European Court of Justice on the substantive scope of ne bis in idem in transnational cases and evaluates the findings in light of the different concepts of legal interests inherent in the concept of crime as a material notion. I argue that the application of the interpretation of the ECJ to crimes against collective interests is insufficiently justified. As a result, the interpretation of ne bis in idem based on material facts appears only partially correct and a sense of distrust seems to be cemented between member states creating obstacles to a successful reform of the principle. Part one attempts to defend that the reasoning put forward by the court lacks relevance and evaluates how this affects mutual trust. Part two analyses this interpretation in the light of different forms of legal interest. Part three examines how later case-law has tried to explain the problematic interpretation of early cases and its relationship with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The article will conclude by summarising the findings which may put into perspective the more general challenges of cooperation in criminal matters within the EU.


Author(s):  
Kuijper Pieter Jan

This chapter presents a critical analysis of the case law of the European Court of Justice and of the General Court relating to the application of the international law of treaties. It covers the some forty cases in which the Courts have referred explicitly to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, and a few more where this happened implicitly, during the period 1998–2010. Inevitably the emphasis falls on the application of the rules of treaty interpretation to the international agreements concluded by the European Union (EU), but also to the founding treaties of the EU itself. The Courts have been confronted with great regularity with questions relating to the law of treaties and thus have become increasingly sophisticated in their use of it. The recent accusation that the Court is adverse to international law seems to be based on a few dramatic cases, not on the steady stream of smaller cases in which the law of treaties plays a role.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-140
Author(s):  
Gisela Ernst

Abstract As a result of the constantly increasing number of innovative but exceedingly high priced medicines, many Member States have implemented price-regulating mechanisms to ensure the financial viability of their healthcare systems. However, the European Court of Justice applies strict criteria to these measures – some of them have already been suspended for the purposes of the free movement of goods. The European Union (EU) allowed the development of an ever-stricter case law on one hand, without changing the legal frame on the other hand. Considering the importance and the binding nature of the Court’s judgements, this leaves great uncertainty for national legislators about which measures to remedy the pricing problem are legally possible and which are not. In order to provide clarity, this article seeks to analyse the development of the case law and to define the legal scope for pharmaceutical pricing mechanisms in the EU.


Author(s):  
Dmytro Boichuk ◽  
Vitalii Hryhoriev

The article is devoted to the study of the legal nature of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law of the European Union. Within the scope of the doctrinal sources and the existing case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, the authors substantiate the logic of including existing the European Court of Human Rights case law in the EU law sources, citing arguments based on the EU law and the case law.


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