Discounting the free ride: alliances and security in the postwar world

1995 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avery Goldstein

The collective goods theory of alliances and neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for self-help. In the cases of Britain, China, and France during the early cold war, the constraints identified by neorealist theory, reinforced by the advent of nuclear weapons, prevailed. Each discounted the value of the security benefits superpower partners could provide. The second-ranking powers' decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time—an international system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies. This analysis suggests that present efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons by offering them international security guarantees are unlikely to succeed.

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
James A. Thomson

Abstract: Against the backdrop of an international system becoming more confrontational in nature, the subject of deterrence is back again. This article provides an overview of the nature of the deterrence problem during the Cold War period and today. While the broader circumstances have changed markedly, today, the central issue of deterrence remains the same as in the Cold War: how to maintain the credibility of the American threat to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of allies in the face of adversaries that can retaliate with devastating nuclear attacks against the US itself. There is little doubt about the threat of the US or other nuclear powers to retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack against their own homelands, so long as those retaliatory forces can survive the initial attack. The problem is the credibility of US extended deterrence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-186
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson

Abstract Yan Xuetong’s Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers argues that China should follow moral values in its foreign policy in order to attain international leadership. Drawing on ancient Chinese thought, Yan makes the case that China should strive for humane authority, influencing other states by leading through moral example and attracting supporters through providing benefits rather than using coercion. This essay evaluates the feasibility of China’s attainment of humane authority, which is related to status. Humane authority follows norms consistently toward rivals as well as friendly states whereas a hegemon uses a double standard. But double standards may not be so easily avoided because they derive from inherent psychological bias. The option of acquiring followers by providing them with security guarantees is not available to China in East Asia because of the prior existence of the US alliance system. Yan predicts that China’s growth will lead to a bipolar structure but points out that the conditions for a Cold War are absent. Nevertheless, technological competition between the US and China could lead to a ‘new Cold War’, which would hamper China’s efforts to widen its circle of followers. To be a humane authority, China should also avoid a war with the USA. There is a risk that naval competition could lead to local conflicts as a result of security dilemma dynamics. The two states should control status rivalry through a division of labour, by accepting the other’s pre-eminence in different areas through social cooperation.


1983 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-62
Author(s):  
Parvathi Vasudevan

Non-alignment is not a dinosaur. Never less than one-half and now almost two-thirds of the members of the United Nations Organization have styled their approach to external affairs as non-alignment. In the course of the last three decades and more, not one of the non-aligned nations has forsaken it in favour of alignment, not even in the most adverse of circumstances. On the other hand, there have been instances when some aligned countries have opted for non-alignment. The non-aligned countries are no Rip Van Winkles either. Ever alert to the realities of international affairs, they constantly endeavour to effect changes in the international power balance. During the fifties and the sixties, they helped to bring about a change in the international security order in the face of a strident Cold War. Since the beginning of the seventies, they have been working for the setting up of a New International Order (NIO) in all its three major facets, viz., the economic (New International Economic Order), the technological (New International Technological Order) and the informational (New International information Order). Non-alignment, personal preferences notwithstanding, has certainly succeeded to some extent in shaping the international system as it appears today. As the driving force of the resource-rich as also the resource-scarce yet volatile regions of the le tiers monde,1 non-alignment has almost always evoked extreme reactions, ranging from outright condemantion to lofty praise. However, having to live with non-alignment, it is necessary to ask what course non-alignment would take in the hands of its powerless votaries in the years ahead against the hindsight of what it has achieved so far. This paper endeavours to examine at some length the success and continued relevance of non-alignment with the focus on India.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 563-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans M. Kristensen ◽  
Matthew G. McKinzie

AbstractIn this article, the highly destructive potential of global nuclear arsenals is reviewed with respect to nuclear force structures, evolution of nuclear capabilities, modernization programmes and nuclear war planning and operations. Specific nuclear forces data is presented for the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea. Hypothetical, escalatory scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons are presented, including the calculated distribution of radioactive fallout. At more than seventy years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, international progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament has now nearly stalled, with the emphasis shifting to modernizing and maintaining large inventories of nuclear weapons indefinitely. This perpetuates a grave risk to human health, civil society and the environment.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Sean Morris

This article concerns two Cold War treaties on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control and whether the success of one treaty can be instrumental in leading to the reduction of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) have been essential to world peace. Although it might be impossible to envisage a world free of nuclear weapons, the post-Cold War nuclear posture requires multilateral engagement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons technology and treaties such as the NPT can be amended to include the INF treaty and therefore lead to further nuclear disarmament. This is because the NPT treaty has been granted indefinite extension and the INF treaty has been one of the success stories in nuclear disarmament and that success should be further built upon. The paper is not an exhaustive discussion of the nuclear treaties regime—rather the arguments and policy prescription in the paper are illustrative.


Author(s):  
Leslie Vinjamuri

Contemporary Western politics have led many to fear that the greatest threat to liberalism lies in a gradual weakening of norms integral to the liberal international order. In considering the future of international security norms, this chapter begins by examining the norms that have defined the post-Cold War era before turning to theoretical arguments about the sources of normative change and evolution. A key question for the future is whether the backlash against efforts to infuse security policies with human rights norms, the reluctance by states to enforce these norms, and the rise of new powers that do not embrace these norms will erode existing norms. This chapter will argue that the future depends upon the strategies deployed to unravel norms: the creation of new norms or adaption of existing norms in ways that create an alternative type of path dependence will be most consequential for existing norms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-224
Author(s):  
Christopher P Evans

It has been 50 years since the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which established the obligation upon all States Parties to work towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI. Yet, despite extensive reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles since the Cold War peaks, nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts are currently in disarray. After the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was terminated in 2019, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty remains as the only bilateral limitation on United States (US) and Russian nuclear forces in operation and is due to expire in February 2021. The US has justified its limited nuclear disarmament progress on the premise that the current international security environment is not conducive to further nuclear disarmament. Instead, the US has recently promoted a new initiative called Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND). The initiative aims to provide a platform for all States to engage in constructive dialogue to identify ways to improve the international security environment, which make nuclear deterrence necessary while addressing the hurdles that currently impede progress towards nuclear disarmament. Significantly, the US regards CEND as an ‘effective measure’ and an illustration of its commitment towards disarmament under Article VI. This article seeks to address the US claim that CEND represents a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI. This will revisit existing doctrinal interpretative debates concerning the obligation under Article VI, particularly the requirements that negotiations and measures be adopted in good faith, and what constitutes an effective measure towards nuclear disarmament. The discussion will then determine whether the CEND initiative itself can be considered a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament, by considering its purpose, origins and implementation, and actions of the US.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 45-108
Author(s):  
Mieczysław Stolarczyk

The research objective of this paper is the presentation of the influence (significance) of the geopolitical factor in Poland’s relations with the Russian Federation (Russia) and the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany) in the post-Cold War period, first and foremost the influence on the shares of convergent and divergent (contradictory) interests of Poland and the two countries, as well as relevant dilemmas concerning Poland’s foreign and security policies. The main research thesis is that the geopolitical factor remains one of the chief determinants of Poland’s relations with Russia and Germany despite the changes taking place in the international system (e.g. the acceleration of globalisation processes) in the last few decades. In the post-Cold War period, however, it affected Poland’s relations with Russia in a much more negative way than it did the Polish-German relations. The German problem in its traditional sense of a hazard source diminished considerably in the Polish foreign policy in the abovementioned period, while the significance of the Russian problem increased. The decision makers of the Polish foreign policy viewed Germany first and foremost as a partner and an ally (within NATO), while Russia was seen as the main hazard to Polish security, including a military hazard in the form of a direct invasion. Wishing to present more detailed matters, the paper brings to the fore i.a. the issues concerning the essence of the geopolitical factor in the foreign policies of countries, certain conditions of Poland’s geopolitical location in the post-Cold War period, the main stages of Poland’s relations with Germany and Russia in that period together with their characteristics, the main areas of divergent interests in Poland’s relations with Germany and Russia in the second decade of the 21st century, the similarities and differences in Poland’s policy toward Germany and Russia in the post-Cold War period as well as the main dilemmas of the Polish foreign policy toward the end of the second decade of the 21st century stemming from Poland’s geopolitical location between Russia and Germany. One main conclusion formulated on the basis on those deliberations is that Poland’s geopolitical location between Russia and Germany does not doom Polish relations with the two countries to a confrontational nature for historical reasons. The geopolitical factor is not an independent prime mover; it does not entail geopolitical determinism which automatically eliminates the possibility of influencing Poland’s geopolitical situation by subsequent Polish governments. The geopolitical location does not determine eternal enemies or eternal friends because one can derive various conceptions, programmes and objectives of the foreign policy from the same geopolitical location of Poland.


Author(s):  
C. Dale Walton

This chapter examines how nuclear weapons have influenced international politics, both during and after the cold war. In particular, it distinguishes between the spread of nuclear weapons to more states, which poses an increasing threat to international security, and the decline in the absolute number of nuclear weapons due to the reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. The chapter first provides an overview of the First Nuclear Age — which lasted approximately from 1945 to the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union — before discussing the risks in the Second Nuclear Age. It also considers other contemporary issues such as ballistic missile defences, the cultural dimensions of nuclear weapons acquisition, and the possibility of using nuclear weapons for terrorism. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the prospects for a Third Nuclear Age.


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