Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND): a good faith, effective measure pursuant to Article VI NPT or empty gesturing?

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-224
Author(s):  
Christopher P Evans
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Effective Measure ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
The Us ◽  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control

It has been 50 years since the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which established the obligation upon all States Parties to work towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI. Yet, despite extensive reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles since the Cold War peaks, nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts are currently in disarray. After the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was terminated in 2019, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty remains as the only bilateral limitation on United States (US) and Russian nuclear forces in operation and is due to expire in February 2021. The US has justified its limited nuclear disarmament progress on the premise that the current international security environment is not conducive to further nuclear disarmament. Instead, the US has recently promoted a new initiative called Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND). The initiative aims to provide a platform for all States to engage in constructive dialogue to identify ways to improve the international security environment, which make nuclear deterrence necessary while addressing the hurdles that currently impede progress towards nuclear disarmament. Significantly, the US regards CEND as an ‘effective measure’ and an illustration of its commitment towards disarmament under Article VI. This article seeks to address the US claim that CEND represents a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI. This will revisit existing doctrinal interpretative debates concerning the obligation under Article VI, particularly the requirements that negotiations and measures be adopted in good faith, and what constitutes an effective measure towards nuclear disarmament. The discussion will then determine whether the CEND initiative itself can be considered a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament, by considering its purpose, origins and implementation, and actions of the US.

scholarly journals Is Zero Disarmament Possible? Multilateralism and Nuclear Arms Control Treaties

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Sean Morris
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Nonproliferation ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Success Stories ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Policy Prescription

This article concerns two Cold War treaties on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control and whether the success of one treaty can be instrumental in leading to the reduction of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) have been essential to world peace. Although it might be impossible to envisage a world free of nuclear weapons, the post-Cold War nuclear posture requires multilateral engagement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons technology and treaties such as the NPT can be amended to include the INF treaty and therefore lead to further nuclear disarmament. This is because the NPT treaty has been granted indefinite extension and the INF treaty has been one of the success stories in nuclear disarmament and that success should be further built upon. The paper is not an exhaustive discussion of the nuclear treaties regime—rather the arguments and policy prescription in the paper are illustrative.

Nuclear Arms Control: the End of History?

2015 ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
A. Arbatov
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
World Order ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
History Of ◽  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The article is addressed to an unprecedented crisis of the system and process of nuclear arms control – including nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. During a half century history of the practical nuclear disarmament (counting from the 1963 partial nuclear tests ban treaty – PTB) this process has had many ups and downs, but never has it been so deeply deadlocked. Although the two main nuclear treaties are still implemented: the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987, their future is increasingly uncertain and their validity is eroding, just as that of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and other agreements in this crucial sphere. For the first time in the last fifty years the world is facing a real threat of totally loosing control over the most destructive weapons created in the history of mankind. What is the most amazing – this is happening half a century after the end of the Cold War, when the hopes emerged that nuclear disarmament would finally become a realistic proposition. Dramatic events in and around Ukraine are badly exacerbating the crisis of nuclear arms control, but they are not its original cause. The article is analyzing the principal reasons of the present crisis: the transforming post-post Cold War world order; Russia’s position and role in the new international environment; the military-strategic, economic and technological developments, which are leading to disintegration of former conceptual premises and mechanisms of nuclear arms control and which are not adapted to the changing objective realities. In conclusion some general proposals are provided with the aim of saving, adopting and enhancing nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation.

Nuclear Powers' Disarmament Obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Interactions between Soft Law and Hard Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALESSANDRA PIETROBON
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Legal Obligation ◽  
Hard Law ◽  
The Us ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

AbstractThe Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will not be effective until all the 44 states listed in its Annex 2 ratify it. A special link has been established between the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the CTBT. The disarmament obligation set by Article VI of the NPT, which has not yet been complied with, remains highly controversial. The relevant subsequent practice of the states parties to the NPT shows that the ratification of the CTBT is to be considered the first of the practical steps towards compliance with Article VI. However, as the practical steps do not set any legally binding norms, there is no legal obligation to ratify the CTBT, not even for the 44 states listed in Annex 2 whose ratification is essential. The paper deals with the position of nuclear powers party to the NPT that have not yet ratified the CTBT (most prominently the US and China) and demonstrates that these states should at least provide detailed motivation for their conduct. Otherwise, other states parties to the NPT could consider them as not complying in good faith with Article VI of the NPT and invoke the inadimplenti non est ademplendum rule to justify breaches of their own obligations under the same treaty.

Nuclear Arms Control in US Foreign Policy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Hunt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Protest Movements ◽  
New States ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The development of military arms harnessing nuclear energy for mass destruction has inspired continual efforts to control them. Since 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa acquired control over these powerful weapons, though Pretoria dismantled its small cache in 1989 and Russia inherited the Soviet arsenal in 1996. Throughout this period, Washington sought to limit its nuclear forces in tandem with those of Moscow, prevent new states from fielding them, discourage their military use, and even permit their eventual abolition. Scholars disagree about what explains the United States’ distinct approach to nuclear arms control. The history of U.S. nuclear policy treats intellectual theories and cultural attitudes alongside technical advances and strategic implications. The central debate is one of structure versus agency: whether the weapons’ sheer power, or historical actors’ attitudes toward that power, drove nuclear arms control. Among those who emphasize political responsibility, there are two further disagreements: (1) the relative influence of domestic protest, culture, and politics; and (2) whether U.S. nuclear arms control aimed first at securing the peace by regulating global nuclear forces or at bolstering American influence in the world. The intensity of nuclear arms control efforts tended to rise or fall with the likelihood of nuclear war. Harry Truman’s faith in the country’s monopoly on nuclear weapons caused him to sabotage early initiatives, while Dwight Eisenhower’s belief in nuclear deterrence led in a similar direction. Fears of a U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear exchange mounted in the late 1950s, stoked by atmospheric nuclear testing and widespread radioactive fallout, which stirred protest movements and diplomatic initiatives. The spread of nuclear weapons to new states motivated U.S. presidents (John Kennedy in the vanguard) to mount a concerted campaign against “proliferation,” climaxing with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Richard Nixon was exceptional. His reasons for signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Moscow in 1972 were strategic: to buttress the country’s geopolitical position as U.S. armed forces withdrew from Southeast Asia. The rise of protest movements and Soviet economic difficulties after Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office brought about two more landmark U.S.-Soviet accords—the 1987 Intermediate Ballistic Missile Treaty (INF) and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—the first occasions on which the superpowers eliminated nuclear weapons through treaty. The country’s attention swung to proliferation after the Soviet collapse in December 1991, as failed states, regional disputes, and non-state actors grew more prominent. Although controversies over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear programs have since erupted, Washington and Moscow continued to reduce their arsenals and refine their nuclear doctrines even as President Barack Obama proclaimed his support for a nuclear-free world.

Discounting the free ride: alliances and security in the postwar world

1995 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avery Goldstein
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
International System ◽  
Security Policies ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Self Help ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Theory Yield ◽  
Security Guarantees

The collective goods theory of alliances and neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for self-help. In the cases of Britain, China, and France during the early cold war, the constraints identified by neorealist theory, reinforced by the advent of nuclear weapons, prevailed. Each discounted the value of the security benefits superpower partners could provide. The second-ranking powers' decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time—an international system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies. This analysis suggests that present efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons by offering them international security guarantees are unlikely to succeed.

A new START to begin with: recent developments in US-Russian strategic nuclear arms reductions

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido den Dekker
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The Political ◽  
Free World ◽  
The Us ◽  
International Attention ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Arms

AbstractNuclear arms control is high on the international agenda again. With START expired, the US and Russia have been taking more time than envisaged to negotiate a START follow-on treaty. The agreed further reductions are far from impressive. As regards future nuclear arms reductions, much will depend on the political-strategic climate between the US and Russia as well as on the regional (NATO) and global (nuclear non-proliferation) levels. Instead of fixating on the end-goal of a nuclear weapons free world, international attention should focus on the small but concrete legal steps towards meaningful nuclear arms reductions. The new START should be only the beginning.

Nuclear arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities

2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 563-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans M. Kristensen ◽  
Matthew G. McKinzie
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Radioactive Fallout ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
The Cold War

AbstractIn this article, the highly destructive potential of global nuclear arsenals is reviewed with respect to nuclear force structures, evolution of nuclear capabilities, modernization programmes and nuclear war planning and operations. Specific nuclear forces data is presented for the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea. Hypothetical, escalatory scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons are presented, including the calculated distribution of radioactive fallout. At more than seventy years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, international progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament has now nearly stalled, with the emphasis shifting to modernizing and maintaining large inventories of nuclear weapons indefinitely. This perpetuates a grave risk to human health, civil society and the environment.

scholarly journals Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the US Military-political Strategy and Ukraine

2016 ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
O. Potiekhin
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Nuclear Arsenal ◽  
The Third ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us

The article deals with the main events and causes of appearance in the US of nuclear taboo under President H. Truman’s influence, who was responsible for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The consideration is given to the principles and options for containment as a separate case of non-use of nuclear weapons strategy. The positive and negative features of the nuclear deterrent doctrine and policy are shown.The author considers some aspects of the US policy in the sphere of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons related to nuclear taboo and the joint efforts of Washington and Moscow aimed at depriving Ukraine of the nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union. The discussions on the matter are revealed. The consequences of violation  of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and a lack of deterrent power against the Russian aggression in nuclear-free Ukraine are analysed. The attention is focused on the need for the US military and political assistance  to Ukraine and its provision with  appropriate weapons for strengthening international security. It is stressed that nuclear weapons play a decisive role in preventing  the third WW.

scholarly journals The Policy of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: History and Modernity

2017 ◽  
pp. 81-108
Author(s):  
A. Kudryachenko ◽  
O. Potiekhin
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
International Regimes ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Us ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

The article provides an overview of Ukrainian and foreign sources on the non-proliferation studies and interconnected with it problems of nuclear disarmament and the use of “peaceful” atom. We give little-known facts from the history of non-proliferation, attempts to put nuclear energy under effective international control and reasons why this could not be done. The main content of the article is an analysis of the NPT, IAEA and related international regimes and organizations, successes and failures in implementing the policy of non-proliferation. It is noted, on the one hand, maintaining a fairly steady non- proliferation regime since the entry into force of the NPT in 1970 – now there are only nine states with nuclear weapons, and this number remains unchanged over the past 25 years. NPT regime is almost universal – it includes 190 States Parties and only five remain outside (India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan). However, according to some forecasts, increasing threat is likelihood of becoming world “widespread nuclear proliferation” in 2030. Features of positions of the US and Russia in matters of nonproliferation policy are studied.

scholarly journals Nuclear weapons in an international security environment

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-16
Author(s):  
Krzysztof ZAŁĘSKI
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
International Security ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Analysis And Synthesis

Nuclear weapons are a historically acknowledged factor of security development and maintenance of the strategical balance. Therefore, in spite of programs preventing its proliferation, most states having such weapons modernize and develop their nuclear arsenals, perceiving it as a sign of power and a guarantee of security. The methodology employed in this article critical analysis and synthesis of reliable sources from the scope of the area of research. The nature of the article is explanatory with elements of inference. This paper presents an evaluation of circumstances inducing a state to possess nuclear weapons, in consideration of both the positive and negative consequences of their possession. In the author’s view, studying this article should at least evoke a reflection on the development of nuclear weapons as a means of forming modern relations of security.

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