Security Council

1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-517

The question of the threat to Thailand was discussed by the Security Council at its 673d and 674th meetings. After again explaining the reasons for his government's belief that the condition of tension in the general region in which Thailand was located would, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the Thai representative, Pote Sarasin, again requested that the Peace Observation Commission establish a sub-commission of from three to five members to dispatch observers to Thailand and to visit Thailand itself if it were deemed necessary. The Thai draft differed from earlier Thai proposals, however, in that the original mandate of the sub-commission applie only to the territory of Thailand; if the sub-commission felt that it could not adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit in states contiguous to Thailand, the Peace Observation Commission or the Security Council could issue the necessary instructions. Representatives of New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Colombia and France spoke in support of the Thai draft. They denied, as had been alleged by the Soviet representative (Tsarapkin) at an earlier meeting, that Council consideration or action on this question would be detrimental to the success of the negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Chinese People's Republic, Soviet Union and other states in Geneva. While agreeing that it would be impropitious for the Council to consider directly the situation in Indochina as long as it was being discussed in Geneva, they argued that the question raised by Thailand was quite separate and that the Council had a duty to comply with the Thai request.

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 646-650

On April 9, 1951, the deputies of the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union began their sixth week of Paris meetings in an attempt to frame an agenda for a conference of the foreign ministers.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-229

Proposed Meeting of the Council: Meeting in Prague on October 20 and 21, 1950, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, eastern Germany and the Soviet Union issued a statement in reply to the communiqué on Germany released on September 19 by the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Charging that the position of the three western governments was merely a screen to conceal the aggressive objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the creation of mobile police formations was nothing less than the reconstitution of a German army, the eight foreign ministers stated that they considered as urgent 1) the publication by the three western powers and the Soviet Union of a statement of their intent to refuse to permit German rearmament and of their unswerving determination to create a united peace-loving German state; 2) the removal of all restrictions hindering the development of the peaceful German economy and the prevention of a resurgence of German war potential; 3) the conclusion of a German treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within one year of its conclusion; and 4) the creation of an all-German constituent council to prepare for a provisional German government. The text of the communiqué was communicated to the United Kingdom, the United States and France under cover of a Soviet note on November 3. Stating that the Prague declaration possessed “the greatest significance for the cause of assuring international peace and security” and touched the “fundamental national interests of the peoples of Europe,” the Soviet government proposed the convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers „for consideration of the question of fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement regarding demilitarization of Germany.”


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-400

The ANZUS Council held its second meeting in Washington, D.C., on September 9 and 10, 1953. While the first meeting of the Council had been devoted largely to organizational matters, the second meeting provided an opportunity for the foreign ministers of Australia, New Zealand and the United States to review the developments of the past year and to discuss common problems in the Pacific area. Prior to the opening of the meeting, there had been speculation in the press about the possibility of providing some form of associate membership in ANZUS for other countries — particularly the United Kingdom – and other international organizations. The United Kingdom was reportedly dissatisfied with its exclusion from the organization; Prime Minister Churchill had been quoted as telling the House of Commons on June 17 that he “did not like the Anzus Pact at all” and that he hoped that “perhaps larger and wider arrangements could be made which would be more satisfactory than those now in force”. According to the communique issued at the close of the meeting, however, the ministers “unanimously concluded … that to attempt to enlarge its membership would not contribute directly and materially” to the strengthening and defense of the ANZUS area. The communique pointed out that ANZUS was one of a number of arrangements for the furtherance of the security of the nations of the area; specifically the communique mentioned the mutual security pacts between the United States and the Philippines and Japan, United States defense understandings with the government of China on Formosa and the relationship of Australia and New Zealand with the other Commonwealth nations. Together, the communique noted, these arrangements ‘constitute … a solemn warning to any potential aggressor and represent the growing foundation for lasting peace in the Pacific”.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 542-542

On November 15, 1949 the United States, United Kingdom and France sent parallel notes to the governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia declaring that the United States, United Kingdom and France did not recognize the Convention of August 18, 1948, establishing the Danube Commission, as having any valid international effect. Declaring that the convention violated concepts of international waterways which had been recognized in Europe for 130 years, the note stated that it also failed to carry out the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of December 6, 1946. The convention deprived the United Kingdom and France of rights established by international agreement in 1921, and disregarded the “legitimate interest of non-riparian states.”


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-143

Austrian State Treaty: On October 31, 1951, the Foreign Minister of Austria, Karl Gruber, transmitted to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union in Vienna a note requesting these countries to reopen negotiations on the Austrian state treaty at the earliest possible moment. Subsequently, the United States High Commissioner for Austria, Walter Donnelly, stated that it was “consistent with the unswerving policy of the United States Government to terminate the occupation of Austria by means of a state treaty” and was “also in keeping with the statement of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States in Washington on September 14.” He added that the United States would continue to press for the conclusion of the treaty and withdrawal of troops from Austria, but would not withdraw until all the occupying powers were prepared to do likewise.


1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-156

The fifth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London from November 25 to December 15, 1947, to discuss the drafting of peace treaties for Germany and Austria. It met without an agreed agenda and adjourned without agreement. The first ten days were devoted to a discussion of the mechanisms necessary for the preparation of a German treaty, with two sessions devoted to the question of Austria; discussion in the last ten days centered around the problem of the related questions of immediate economic and political unity for Germany and the level of Germany's reparations payments. On most questions, press reports indicated that France, the United Kingdom and the United States were in general agreement, with the Soviet Union in opposition.


1990 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 341-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally Morphet

IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to look at the United Nations Security Council and certain of the 646 resolutions and 232 public vetoes (vetoing 192 draft resolutions) cast between 1946 and the end of 1989, and to discover in what ways both it and they have been legally and politically relevant and significant. Security Council resolutions are, of course, passed by majority vote. This had to be 7 out of 11 votes until the end of 1965 when the Council was enlarged from 11 to 15. Security Council resolutions have had since then to be passed by at least 9 votes: these can only be vetoed by the five Permanent Members (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China) if the resolution would otherwise have been passed. By the end of 1989 the veto total for each Permanent Member (the Peoples Republic of China took over the China seat in 1971) was as follows: Soviet Union 114; United States 67; United Kingdom 30; France 18 and China 3.


1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell B. Carroll

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals of October 7, 1944, reflect a development of ideas concerning international political and judicial organization in which the Section of International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association has played a significant part. Its recommendations calling for the establishment of an international organization, including an improved system for settling justiciable disputes, have found their way into resolutions of the Association, composed of some thirty thousand lawyers. These resolutions preceded the joint projects of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China for an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.


Author(s):  
Ellen Jenny Ravndal

This chapter explores all aspects of Trygve Lie’s interaction with the Security Council, beginning with his appointment process and the negotiation of the relative domains of the Council and the Secretary-General. This was a time when the working methods of the UN system were rapidly evolving through political negotiation and responses to external crises. It examines Lie’s personality and character, how he viewed his own responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security as crises arose, the legal and political tools he developed and exercised, and his changing relationship with individual permanent members and the six elected members. In the emerging Cold War, Lie’s position in the Security Council would be determined in particular by his relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. Taking initiative in response to external crises in Iran, Palestine, Berlin, and Korea, Lie succeeded in laying foundations for an expanded political role for the Secretary-General.


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