North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-658 ◽  

A communiqué issued by the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on May 7, 1959, expressed the Council's opinion that, on the eve of the Geneva conference of foreign ministers, the Soviet Union appeared to be misinterpreting western intentions in proceeding with the orderly development of their program for modernizing the forces of the alliance. The Council noted further that these programs for improving NATO defences were the consequence of long established NATO policies which were arrived at through joint decisions of NATO countries; moreover, they had been in the process of implementation for over two years, and therefore they could not conceivably be designed, as alleged by the Soviet Union, to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting in Geneva.

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-484 ◽  

The Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Paris early in May 1959 to consider the proposals of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom for presentation to the Soviet Union at the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers. According to the press, the proposals won a favorable reception from the Council. No formal action of approval was required, but agreement was reached on the principle of a permanent liaison between the western ministers and the Council during the Geneva conference, scheduled to begin on May 11.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-223

The fifteen countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were represented by their defense ministers at a conference held in Paris from October 10 to 12, under the chairmanship of Lord Ismay (Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General of NATO). The meeting, which was attended by the Standing Group and the Supreme Commanders, was a preliminary to the full ministerial session, to be held in December; it was the first occasion on which the NATO defense ministers met in Council without the foreign or finance ministers. A communique issued at the close of the meeting stated that the meeting had primarily been for the exchange of information, and that the ministers had heard statements on the strategic situation and on western defensive arrangements from General Sir John Whiteley (United Kingdom), Chairman of the Standing Group, and from his colleagues on the Standing Group, General Joseph Lawton Collins (United States), General Jean Valluy (France), General Alfred M. Gruenther (SACEUR), Admiral Jerauld Wright (SACLANT) and several other officers. Following these statements, a useful exchange of views between the defense ministers took place, the communique concluded. It was reported that many of the speakers had concurred in the view that the military potential of the Soviet Union was steadily increasing, especially in the areas of atomic weapons and submarines, that the recently announced decision to reduce the armed forces in the Soviet Union and some of the people's democracies did not modify the potential of communist forces, and that it was therefore indispensable to intensify the NATO military effort, which so far had not met expectations for it.


1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Weber

At the end of the 1940s, the United States and several West European states allied to defend themselves against invasion by the Soviet Union. Balance-ofpower theory predicts the recurrent formation of such balances among states. But it says little about the precise nature of the balance, the principles on which it will be constructed, or its institutional manifestations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a peculiar mix. As a formal institution, NATO has through most of its history been distinctly nonmultilateral, with the United States commanding most decision-making power and responsibility. At the same time, NATO provided security to its member states in a way that strongly reflected multilateral principles. Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, the principle that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm. In the terms set out by John Ruggie, NATO has generally scored low as a multilateral organization but high as an institution of multilateralism.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-816

On September 15, 1951 the seventh session of the North Atlantic Council met at Ottawa. At this meeting, members were represented by their foreign ministers, defense ministers, and economic or finance ministers. Press reports indicated that the “Big Three” (United Kingdom, France, United States) intended to press for: 1) creation of a unified European army to include German units of “division” strength; 2) addition of Greece and Turkey; 3) revision of the Italian peace treaty in order to release Italy from limitations on its armed forces; 4) negotiation of a settlement of the Italian-Yugoslav dispute over Trieste.


1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 652-655 ◽  

The ninth annual Conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentarians was held in Paris on November 4–8, 1963. Addressing the parliamentarians, Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, Secretary-General of NATO, outlined the three essential aspects of the evolution in international relationships presently confronting the Alliance: first, relations between East and East—the rivalry between the Soviet Union and Communist China; secondly, relations between East and West—the questions arising from the Soviet Union's agreement to sign a partial test-ban treaty and the relations between the West and the uncommitted world; and, thirdly, relations between West and West—relations within the Atlantic Alliance itself.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-676

Military and Economic Matters: One of the major questions discussed during the summer and autumn of 1952 both in organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and between its members was the degree to which the 1952 defense commitments undertaken by NATO states at the Lisbon meeting of the Council in February, 1952, had been met. Preparatory to another meeting of the foreign ministers of NATO countries scheduled for December 15, 1952, preliminary estimates of the program for the coming year were being prepared on the basis of replies to questionnaires on the success of the current program and the outlook for 1953.


Author(s):  
Susan Colbourn

On April 4, 1949, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty: the United States, Canada, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Portugal, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. For the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty signaled a major shift in foreign policy. Gone was the traditional aversion to “entangling alliances,” dating back to George Washington’s farewell address. The United States had entered into a collective security arrangement designed to preserve peace in Europe. With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States took on a clear leadership role on the European continent. Allied defense depended on US military power, most notably the nuclear umbrella. Reliance on the United States unsurprisingly created problems. Doubts about the strength of the transatlantic partnership and rumors of a NATO in shambles were (and are) commonplace, as were anxieties about the West’s strength in comparison to NATO’s Eastern counterpart, the Warsaw Pact. NATO, it turned out, was more than a Cold War institution. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Alliance remained vital to US foreign policy objectives. The only invocation of Article V, the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defense clause, came in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Over the last seven decades, NATO has symbolized both US power and its challenges.


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