General Assembly

1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 637-651
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Political Independence ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Peaceful Settlement ◽  
The Right

The third special session of the General Assembly, summoned by the Secretary-General to consider “the grave situation in Tunisia obtaining since 19 July 1961,” was held from August 21 through 25, 1961. In his opening statement to the Assembly the Tunisian delegate, Mongi Slim, outlined events leading up to the crisis of July 19 when as a normal exercise of its sovereignty the Tunisian government decided to prohibit formally flights over its territory by any French aircraft and announced that aircraft which violated this prohibition would be shot down. Shortly after the notification of this prohibition, French aircraft began to fly over the Bizerta region, and, disregarding the warning shots directed against them, launched an assault, in which paratroopers and warships later joined. Furthermore, Tunisia had complied with the interim resolution adopted by the Security Council on July 22 calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all armed forces to their original positions, whereas France, in open defiance of the Security Council and of the Tunisian government, had availed itself of the Tunisian compliance by extending its perimeter of occupation and by strengthening its military potential. Mr. Slim called preposterous the French argument that its actions were in self-defense, stating that the peaceful demonstrations of the Tunisian people on Tunisian territory could not possibly have prejudiced the political independence and territorial integrity of France. Thus, since all of Tunisia's attempts to enter into negotiations with a view to the peaceful settlement of the armed conflict and the evacuation of the French base at Bizerta had been in vain, Tunisia's only course of action, other than to submit to brutal force, was to appeal to the United Nations. In closing, Mr. Slim emphasized that the problem before the Assembly had a two-fold aspect: 1) the right of Tunisia to call for the swift withdrawal of all French troops from her soil, which touched upon the Organization's responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security; and 2) the refusal of France to comply with the interim resolution of the Security Council. Thus, the question before the Assembly involved not only a conflict between France and Tunisia, but one between France and the UN as well.

The Charter Travaux Préparatoires and United Nations Powers to Use Armed Force

1966 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 81-101
Author(s):  
C. F. Amerasinghe
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
International Peace ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Peace And Security

The powers of the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations to take collective measures for the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly to maintain armed forces for that purpose, and the power of the General Assembly to finance these activities were much discussed during the recent crisis in the Organization when certain members refused to contribute to the support of the UNEF and Congo Operation. Various aspects of the matter have been discussed by writers; they have also been dealt with by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of June 1962 where it held that the UNEF and Congo Operation undertaken by the General Assembly and Security Council were intra vires the powers of these organs and that the expenses incurred by the Organization in the execution of those ventures were “expenses of the Organization” for the purposes of Article 17 (2) of the Charter. The Court and some of the judges who gave separate opinions further made a definite contribution to the interpretation of certain aspects of the Charter in the course of arriving at these conclusions.

3. Resolution of the Security Council Concerning the Implementation of the Resolutions of the General Assembly Regarding the Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments and Information on Armed Forces of the United Nations, February 13, 1947.

1947 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-410
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Atomic Energy Commission ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The One ◽  
General Regulation

The Security Council, having accepted the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946 and recognizing that the general regulation and reduction of irmaments and armed forces constitute a most important measure for strengthening international peace and security, and that the implementationof the resolution of the General Assembly on this subject is one of the most urgent and important tasks before the Security Council,RESOLVES:1. to work out the practical measures for giving effect to the resolutions of the General Assembly on 14 December 1946 concerning, on the one hand, the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the establishment of international control to bring about the reduction of armaments and armed forces and, on the other hand, information concerning the armed forces of the United Nations;2. to consider as soon as possible the report submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission and to take suitable decisions in order to facilitate its work;

Security Council: Disarmament Commission

1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 659-661
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Two Stages

The Sub-Committee (Canada, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States) of the Disarmament Commission held its 87th–157th meetings in London, March 18—September 6, 1957. On March 18, the Soviet representative presented a proposal for an international convention on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, in accordance with a resolution passed by the General Assembly at its ninth session. He outlined two stages, one to be carried out in 1957–58 and one in 1959, and stated that it would be desirable to establish control posts at such places as large ports and railway junctions and to establish zones of limitation and inspection in Europe, including the territory of both parts of Germany and that of the states adjoining them. During the first stage, the five great powers were to reduce their armed forces to levels not higher than those suggested in the Anglo-French memorandum of March 29, 1955, and the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955. During the second stage, inter alia, the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons was to becompletely discontinued and provision was to be made for the elimination of those weapons from armaments and the destruction of stockpiles of them.

scholarly journals Uniting for “Peace” in the Second Cold War: A Response to Larry Johnson

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 129-134
Author(s):  
Boris N. Mamlyuk
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
General Assembly Resolution ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
Legal Justification

Larry Johnson’s timely and important essay challenges both utopian and realist accounts of UN law and practice by reviving the debate over the nature and functions of the UN General Assembly, particularly the General Assembly’s power to deploy certain legal tactics not only to influence collective security deliberations in the UN Security Council, but also, more significantly, to provide some legal justification for multilateral military “collective measures” in the event of Security Council gridlock. One vehicle by which the General Assembly may assert its own right to intervene in defense of “international peace and security” is a “Uniting for Peace” (UFP) resolution, authorized by resolution 377(V) (1950). At its core, a “uniting for peace” resolution is an attempt to circumvent a Security Council deadlock by authorizing Member States to take collective action, including the use of force, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. General Assembly resolution 377(V) does not require resolutions to take specific legal form—language that echoes the preambular “lack of unanimity of the permanent members [that results in the Security Council failing to] exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” is sufficient to render a given resolution a UFP, provided the General Assembly resolution calls for concrete “collective [forceful] measures.” For this reason, experts disagree on precisely how many times a UFP has indeed been invoked or implemented, although informed analysts suggest UFP has been invoked in slightly more than ten instances since 1950.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 12 The Six Day War—1967

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quigley John
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Special Session ◽  
Sinai Peninsula ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
The One ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Made In

This contribution analyzes the 1967 hostilities that began when Israel attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. It sets out the relations between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other that provided the background for the hostilities. It recounts actions by Egypt that provided the immediate context for the hostilities. It examines Israel’s claim made in the United Nations Security Council that Egypt opened the hostilities, and Egypt’s rejection of that claim. It examines the reaction of the international community when the hostilities were assessed first in the Security Council and then in a special session of the General Assembly. These hostilities have been widely taken as having involved anticipatory self-defense on Israel’s part, and as a precedent justifying anticipatory, or preventive, military action. This contribution examines the extent to which that analysis is warranted.

The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict

2014 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Forced Migration ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Cultural Property ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

TheHandbookconsists of 32 Chapters in seven parts. Part I provides the historical background and sets out some of the contemporary challenges. Part II considers the relevant sources of international law. Part III describes the different legal regimes: land warfare, air warfare, maritime warfare, the law of occupation, the law applicable to peace operations, and the law of neutrality. Part IV introduces key concepts in international humanitarian law: weapons and the notion of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, the principle of distinction, proportionality, genocide and crimes against humanity, grave breaches and war crimes, internal armed conflict. Part V looks at key rights: the right to life, the prohibition on torture, the right to fair trial, economic, social and cultural rights, the protection of the environment, the protection of cultural property, and the human rights of the members of the armed forces. Part VI covers key issues such as: the use of force, terrorism, unlawful combatants, the application of human rights in times of armed conflict, forced migration, and issues of gender. Part VII deals with accountability issues including those related to private security companies, the need to focus on armed groups, as well as questions of state responsibility brought before national courts, and finally, the book addresses issues related to transitional justice.

scholarly journals He Got It Almost Right

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 116-117
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
International Peace ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
The Icj

Larry Johnson’s answer to his own question is a qualified “no.” Surely he is correct when he says that the General Assembly does not need the Uniting for Peace resolution in order to consider a matter that is on the UN Security Council’s agenda. The International Court of Justice made that clear in its Advisory Opinion on the Construction of a Wall. It is only when the Security Council is actively pursuing the matter that UN Charter Article 12(1) requires the General Assembly to defer to the Council.Johnson is also correct when he says that Uniting for Peace does not serve to enhance the authority that the UN Charter itself supplies to the Assembly to adopt non-binding resolutions intended to keep or restore peace. The ICJ also made that clear in its Advisory Opinion on the Construction of a Wall. Without relying on the Uniting for Peace resolution, the ICJ in paragraphs 27 and 28 of its Opinion approved the practice of the General Assembly to deal with matters concerning maintenance of international peace and security. The Court turned to the Uniting for Peace resolution only in the ensuing paragraphs of its Opinion, dealing with procedural matters related to the Assembly’s request for an Advisory Opinion.

scholarly journals Humanitarian Assistance and the Security Council

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Zimmermann
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Humanitarian Assistance ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Territorial State ◽  
Draft Resolution ◽  
The Right

Over the years, the Security Council has on several occasions dealt with humanitarian assistance issues. However, it is Security Council Resolution 2165(2014), related to the situation in Syria, that has brought the role of the Security Council to the forefront of the debate. It is against this background that the article discusses the legal issues arising from Security Council action facilitating humanitarian assistance to be delivered in situations of non-international armed conflict.Following a brief survey of relevant practice of the Security Council related to humanitarian assistance, the article considers the relevance, if any, of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) to humanitarian assistance to be delivered in such situations. It then moves on to analyse whether a rejection by the territorial state of humanitarian aid to be delivered by third parties may amount to a situation under Article 39 of the UN Charter. It then considers in detail whether (at least implicitly) Resolution 2165 has been adopted under Chapter VII and, if this is not the case, whether it can be still considered to be legally binding.The article finally considers what impact the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2165 might have on the interpretation of otherwise applicable rules of international humanitarian law and, in particular, the right of third parties to provide humanitarian assistance in a situation of a non-international armed conflict in spite of the absence of consent by the territorial state, and the obligations that members of the Security Council, permanent and non-permanent, have under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions when faced with a draft resolution providing for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, notwithstanding the absence of consent by the territorial state.

Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Legislative History of the United Nations Charter

1991 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy L. H. McCormack
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Right ◽  
United Nations Charter ◽  
Self Defence

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that:Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.International lawyers are still arguing about the scope of the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Most of the arguments focus on the semantics of Article 51. Those who argue for a “restrictive view” of the provision emphasise the qualifying phrase “if an armed attack occurs”.

“The Legitimacy to Legitimise”: The Security Council Action in Libya under Resolution 1973 (2011)

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 359-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantine Antonopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
International Peace ◽  
The Real ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Regional Organisations ◽  
Resolution 1973 ◽  
And Control

Abstract The power of the Security Council to adopt military measures for the maintenance of international peace and security has never been implemented as originally envisaged by the text of the UN Charter. The Council never acquired armed forces permanently at its disposal and under its command and control and it adopted the practice of authorisation of force leaving coalitions of willing States or regional organisations to implement it by conducting an operation under their command and resources with minimum control by the Council. The mandate of the operation in an enabling resolution is in principle a safeguard against abuse but its interpretation lies primarily (but not exclusively) with the participating States. The SC action in Libya intended to protect civilians (humanitarian intervention). Moreover, it revealed the real dimensions of humanitarian intervention and the vagaries of responsibility to protect: a suspension of the substance of Article 2(4).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document