Self-Enforcing Power Sharing in Weak States

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Roessler ◽  
David Ohls

AbstractPower sharing, in which elites from rival societal groups agree to share control of the central government, is a key source of domestic peace, enabling states to escape devastating cycles of exclusion and civil war. Yet the conditions giving rise to inclusive governance are not well understood. In contrast to existing scholarship that emphasizes the importance of external third-party mediation or strong formal institutions, we point to the structural roots of power sharing in which political inclusion stems from the distribution of societal power and the balance of threat capabilities it produces. Only when both the ruling group and a given rival group possess strong mobilizational capabilities, such that each could credibly threaten to recapture state power if excluded from the central government, does self-enforcing power sharing emerge. A strong rival induces the ruler to commit to power sharing and to reluctantly accept coup risk over civil war risk. The ruling group's own threat capabilities, in turn, constrain rivals from trying to convert their share of power into absolute power. Supported by extensive quantitative and qualitative evidence with particular reference to weak states in sub-Saharan Africa, we shed light on the conditions under which the distribution of violence within a state underwrites a peaceful and productive equilibrium. In doing so, we rethink how scholars approach the study of civil war. Rather than conceiving of it in terms of effective resistance, we model civil war as a contest for state power shaped by groups’ capabilities to project force in the capital.

2011 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Roessler

Why do rulers employ ethnic exclusion at the risk of civil war? Focusing on the region of sub-Saharan Africa, the author attributes this costly strategy to the commitment problem that arises in personalist regimes between elites who hold joint control of the state's coercive apparatus. As no faction can be sure that others will not exploit their violent capabilities to usurp power, elites maneuver to protect their privileged position and safeguard against others' first-a rising internal threat, rulers move to eliminate their rivals to guarantee their personal and political survival. But the cost of such a strategy, especially when carried out along ethnic lines, is that it increases the risk of a future civil war. To test this argument, the author employs the Ethnic Power Relations data set combined with original data on the ethnicity of conspirators of coups and rebellions in Africa. He finds that in Africa ethnic exclusion substitutes civil war risk for coup risk. And rulers are significantly more likely to exclude their coconspirators—the very friends and allies who helped them come to power—than other included groups, but at the cost of increasing the risk of a future civil war with their former allies. In the first three years after being purged from the central government, coconspirators and their coethnics are sixteen times more likely to rebel than when they were represented at the apex of the regime.


1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-197
Author(s):  
Vanita Ray

The past decade has witnessed a staggering increase in the number of refugees in Africa; from 1.5 millions in 1969, their numbers have today risen to more than 5 million—that is, of the 10 mlliion refugees in the world, 5 millions are African. Even more alarming is the fact that the number of refugees in Africa is now greater than the populations of very many African countries. They criss-cross the entire continent and there is not a single country in Africa which has not been affected by the refugee problem. And always behind the flight of these peoples is the spectre of injustice and strife, of racial persecution or civil war—all violations of human rights. The first major group of African refugees arose as a result of national liberation struggles; thousands were dispersed to the neighbouring countries. While the National Liberation Front of Algeria (FLN) fought for the country's independence (beginning 1956), many women and children waited in refugee camps in Tunisia and Morocco. Thereafter, fortunately, most of sub-Saharan Africa obtained independence peacefully, but as the waves of independence struck the strongholds of settler and white dominated southern Africa, the travails of refugees emerged once more. Massive movements of people accompanied the strife in Angola, Mozambique, as well as Guinea Bissau. Thereafter, there was a stream of refugees from South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, because of internal conflicts, Africa was having its own refugee problems. Some of the most serious ones arose out of the inter-ethnic clashes in Burundi and Rwanda, with the Tutsi fleeing Rwanda and the Hutu escaping Burundi. Then the civil war in Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo) occurred in different places at different times (1960–65 and then again in March 1977–78), and has still not completely subsided. Similar is the case of Chad; the civil war in the country, which has recurred time and again, has sent large numbers of refugees fleeing to the Cameroons. Again the 20 year civil war in Sudan caused much of its southern population to scatter to the surrounding countries and as they were returning home, Sudan started receiving Ethiopian refugees from 1967—first from Eritrea, then other parts of Ethiopia. The warfare in Ogaden, the defeat of the Somalia Army by Soviet-armed and Cuban-reinforced. Ethiopian forces in 1977–78, left Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti with large displaced populations. Large sections of the populations of Guinea, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda were forced to seek exile because of harsh rule in their countries. New waves of refugees—millions of men, women and children—came out from Nigeria following the civil war in that country. Finally, the other important category of refugee that the continent cannot ignore are the “economic” refugees—people who leave their home simply because they cannot eke out a living or are escaping starvation due to the recent droughts. This last category usually pass unnoticed as long as the host countries accept them. Nevertheless, when sent back to their own countries, as Ghana and Uganda did and most other countries would ultimately do, they have difficult problems of integration. Keeping in mind this conceptual heterogeneity of the refugees in Africa, an attempt is made to analyze three types of problems and their combinations which cause refugee migrations in sub-Saharan Africa. For this purpose, sub-Saharan Africa may be divided into three parts—Southern Africa, that is the frontline states; Tropical Black Africa and states neighbouring the Sahara. For further analysis, the cause for which people seek refuge may be characterized as: 1. Domestic instability arising out of tribal issue conflicts and apartheid; 2. Border clashes, again resulting out of tribal rivaries and apartheid; 3. Foreign intervention towards preserving domestic clientele.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darren McCauley ◽  
Rebecca Grant ◽  
Evance Mwathunga

Abstract Addressing energy provision and access in Sub-Saharan Africa is a key global challenge. This paper builds a deep understanding of how fair and just energy policies and realties are in this context. It qualitatively assesses the perceptions of stakeholders in Malawi, where electricity access remains amongst the lowest in the region. Insufficient and unreliable systems of grid energy generation and distribution limit access to electricity in both urban and rural settings. Using wood fuel remains high for meeting cooking, heating, and lighting needs. Responding to these dual challenges, of lacking electricity access and ongoing wood fuel use, must be rooted in notions of equity, fairness, and justice. This paper argues that energy justice provides key insights into how best to respond to complex and interconnected issues of energy generation and access in low-income settings. Drawing on interviews with key stakeholders in policy and Malawi on addressing these challenges, this paper also outlines recommendations for policy. Overall, a just response to these energy challenges is possible, but only if it is built on local inclusive governance with fairer and effective systems of investment.


Author(s):  
Bruce A. Forster ◽  
Jessica D. Forster

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This paper provides an introduction to the concepts of governance and state weakness, fragility or failure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Selected indices of performance are presented with an emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa. As noted by the 2005 UK Commission for Africa &ldquo;The most extreme breakdown of governance is war.&rdquo; The paper discusses the concepts and definitions of civil conflict and civil war, and the prevalence of civil war in Sub &ndash;Saharan Africa.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Among the costs of civil war are the people who are displaced due to their fear for life amidst the conflict.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>If displaced persons exit the country they become refugees. The paper provides an introduction to the evolution of international humanitarian law since World War II to protect non-combatants, including refugees.</span></span></p>


Author(s):  
Michael Bratton

This chapter examines efforts to introduce multi-party politics into Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s. It first considers regime changes in the region and shows that they result from the ‘conjuncture’ of various forces. Some of these forces are structural — such as the decline of African economies, the end of the Cold War — but political actors produce others, like incumbents’ concessions, opposition protests, and military withdrawals from politics. With reference to various African examples, the chapter emphasizes the important role played by certain structural conditions in transitions to democracy during the 1990s, but suggests that outcomes more often hinged on purposive political action. It also analyses the quality of resultant African regimes and concludes by identifying several fundamental constraints on further democratization including endemic poverty and weak states.


2018 ◽  
pp. 384-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bratton

This chapter examines efforts to introduce multi-party politics into Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s. It first considers regime changes in the region and shows that they result from the ‘conjuncture’ of various forces. Some of these forces are structural—such as the decline of African economies, the end of the Cold War—but political actors produce others, like incumbents’ concessions, opposition protests, and military withdrawals from politics. With reference to various African examples, the chapter emphasizes the important role played by certain structural conditions in transitions to democracy during the 1990s, but suggests that outcomes more often hinged on purposive political action. It also analyses the quality of resultant African regimes and concludes by identifying several fundamental constraints on further democratization including endemic poverty and weak states.


2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad ◽  
Mick Moore

ABSTRACTSince the early 1990s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have established semi-autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs), organisationally distinct from ministries of finance, with some real operational autonomy, and with staff paid at rates substantially higher than those in comparable public sector jobs. This has been seen by some observers as a step to dilute the power of the central state executive. We demonstrate that this is a misreading of the story of revenue authorities in Africa. Both African governments and the international development agencies involved in the reforms see ARAs as a means of increasing central government revenues, and thus enlarging the authority of the (central) state. To date, there is little sign that the creation of revenue agencies has actually increased public revenues. It has, however, facilitated a range of reforms in the ways in which taxes are assessed and collected, and deflected pressures that might otherwise have emerged for substantial privatisation of tax collection.


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