Poverty alleviation and state building in peripheral areas: evidence from China

The literature suggests that the distributive allocations of local public goods help politicians secure support and thus contribute to political survival. We argue that the selective assignment of state-led infrastructure projects can bolster political control in peripheral areas by inducing the government's investment in essential administrative and security apparatus for project implementation and long-term state building. Drawing on a unique county-level dataset, we study the effects of poverty alleviation transfers in Xinjiang. We find that poverty alleviation was associated with significant increases in government spending on public management and security. In contrast, these alleviation transfers had a small and ambiguous effect on increasing agricultural production and reducing ethnic violence in the province. Our findings highlight the importance of comparing the capacity and welfare implications of distributive politics, as fiscal subsidies may change the actions of the leader's local agents more than altering the behaviors and attitudes of those who may benefit from these transfers.

Chancellor A. Merkel's “Secret of Power”: Genesis (2005 ‒ 2013)

The article is a study of the political phenomenon of German Chancellor A. Merkel, her special style of governance, objective factors and personal qualities that contributed to the construction of a long and successful career. The author analyzes in detail the period of governmental coalitions of the CDU/CSU with the SPD (2005‒2009) and the FDP (2009‒2013). It was the experience that had the greatest influence on the shaping of her image as a first female Chancellor of Germany. The theory of the difference between women's leadership and men's leadership is used in this paper. Through the prism of this theory we analyze the ways of struggle for leadership. The beginning of Merkel's career and the period of her ministerial activity were characterized by a harsh treatment of her rivals. Later she learned to do it in a softer way. The image of a consensual, supraparty leader, who knows how to find a compromise, is the result of Merkel's conscious work on herself. The need to be chancellor of a “grand coalition” and to cooperate with the SPD, an almost equal partner in terms of strength, contributed greatly to such a leadership style. The second legislative period helped A. Merkel to acquire the qualities of a “crisis manager”. In the conclusion of the article it is concluded that the basis of A. Merkel's political survival was the ability to learn quickly and adapt during various difficulties. From this point of view, the Frau Chancellor's main “teacher” was her first rival, the Social Democrat H. Schroeder. It was his political fate that allowed Merkel to come to a conclusion about the need to combine the post of chancellor and party leadership, which allowed her to stay in power for 16 years.

Party-State Capitalism in China

China’s economic model, commonly described as “state capitalist,” is now better characterized as party-state capitalism, in which the political survival of the Communist Party trumps developmental goals. Its tools for managing the economy include not only state ownership and market interventions, but increasing use of party-state power to discipline private capital. China’s entrepreneurs are now expected to adhere to the party line, as are foreign corporations operating in the country. The shift is fueling a backlash from foreign governments that view the fusion of state and private interests in China as a threat to their own national security.

Term Limits and Environmental Treaty Commitments

How does political accountability in democracies affect leaders’ incentives for international cooperation? We consider how term limits should affect international environmental agreement (IEA) participation. Pursuing environmental protection as a public good coincides with the political survival incentives of democratic leaders. Term limits decouple leaders’ policy priorities from their political survival incentives, discouraging IEA participation. However, prioritization of environmental concerns increases with economic development. As such, the effect of term limits on IEA participation should be strongest in rich democracies. We test these arguments using data from the International Environmental Agreements Database from 1970 to 2011. Democratic leaders, particularly in rich democracies, sign fewer IEAs when freed from the reelection motive. We also consider the potential that term limits could favor IEA participation if doing so aligns with a leader's preferences. This potential should be greatest in poor democracies where citizens place less emphasis on environmental protection, though we find little evidence for this expectation. The findings have important implications for understanding the determinants of IEA participation and the political accountability–international cooperation relationship. Whereas some argue that electoral incentives that cause leaders to favor present over future concerns undermine environmental cooperation, our results suggest that political accountability in democracies can promote treaty participation.

Conscription Systems, Political Survival, and Battlefield Deaths

How do countries’ conscription systems affect their ability to fight wars? Scholars have devoted significant attention to understanding how domestic political concerns influence military strategy, but we do not yet know how these concerns are shaped by military labor policies. We argue that conscription systems determine how the human costs of war are distributed throughout society, and in turn, the government’s tolerance for battlefield casualties in pursuit of victory. Using new data on every country’s conscription policy from 1800 to the present, we demonstrate that countries with selective conscription experience more casualties than those with universal conscription or volunteer militaries. To examine the mechanism we theorize, we then conduct an in-depth case study of the United States’ experience during the Vietnam War. Using adifference-in-differences design and new data on all American deaths in Vietnam, we show that changes in county death rates after the introduction of the lottery reflect electoral considerations.

Ghana’s Competitive Clientelism and Space for Long-Term Stable Policies

Given the close election results and the winner-takes-all nature of politics in Ghana, researchers have argued that the two parties are now characterized by a high degree of vulnerability, which in turn provides strong incentives for ruling elites in both parties to find strategies to ensure their political survival. This results in the distribution of state resources to political supporters and short-termism, which weakens the possibility of building a broad political consensus on any national development issues. Using the case of Ghana’s Right to Information Bill, this article will argue that there are conditions under which elite commitment to long-term development could be fostered and sustained in competitive clientelist political settings like Ghana.

The Republic of the Congo: The Colonial Origins of Military Rule

The Republic of Congo secured its independence from France in 1960. The French colonial apparatus bequeathed an ethnically divided society. Native southerners dominated the sprawling civil service and, owing to their demographic advantage, elected Congo’s first two presidents, themselves both southerners. Native northerners, otherwise marginalized economically and politically, dominated the military’s rank and file. This cleavage has animated Congolese politics since. In 1969, a clique of northern military officers toppled the southern-dominated Brazzaville government. Among its members was former paratrooper Denis Sassou Nguesso, who has ruled Congo for all but 5 years since 1979. His tenure has been marked by massive corruption, gross economic mismanagement, and persistent human rights abuses. Accordingly, despite its status as one of Africa’s leading oil producers, Congolese citizens remain among the world’s poorest. To secure his political survival, Sassou Nguesso has used Congo’s longstanding ethnic cleavage as a tool: by directing state resources to northerners and using the northern-dominated military to repress southerners, who, after enduring nearly 50 years of northern rule, are profoundly frustrated.