Good Faith in Public Law: A Critical Note on the Supreme Court Judgment in Lugasi v. Minister of Communication

1983 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Gabriela Shalev
2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 299-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Cross ◽  
Christopher Knight

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

This article argues that the Senate’s refusal to consider the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court should be deemed unconstitutional. The Senate’s stonewalling disrespected the institutional needs of the judiciary, violated the constitutional norm of forbearance in the exercise of power, and assumed a Senate role in the appointments process that was never intended. Although no court would ever enjoin a recalcitrant President to make a nomination or an obstructionist Senate to meet with, deliberate over, or vote on a presidential nominee to the Supreme Court or anything else, the President’s and the Senators’ oaths to “support the Constitution” should be understood as entailing a good faith commitment to enabling the government to function.


1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Klein

In his case note on the famous Bergmann decision of the Supreme Court, Professor Akzin wrote: While the Court's conclusions seem to be perfectly justified and went so far as they could in the circumstances, the reasoning in its decision shows serious flaws… [others] seem to have sprung from the Court's unwillingness to look for help to the very thorough discussion of the issues by several Israeli scholars, notably Messrs. Sternberg, Akzin, Klinghoffer and Rubinstein. The dignity of the Court would not have suffered if the opinion-writing judge had taken a look at academic writing in a case where precedents offer little or no guidance.These remarks probably express the most original view ever put forward on this land mark case. They emphasize the crux of the complex constitutional problem discussed in the Bergmann case, i.e., the definition of the legal nature of the basic laws in the legal order of Israel. The extremely abstract questions involved in that discussion, indeed, the most abstract that exist in public law, concern the definition of the nature of the power which adopts the Constitution and more specifically, of the power which amends the Constitution.


1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-157
Author(s):  
Paul Sharon

This was an Additional Hearing granted by leave of the President of the Supreme Court for the purpose of considering the incidence, ratione personae, of the good faith requirement established under sec. 12 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973. The significance of the decision lay in the question of the liability of agents and company directors who negotiate contracts to which they are not themselves party. In particular, the Court was called upon to consider whether, on the basis of sec. 12, a company director negotiating a contract solely on the company's behalf could be held personally liable in relation to that contract, or whether he could seek refuge behind the corporate veil.The respondent, David Castro (hereafter: the Purchaser), had negotiated with Yosef Pnini (hereafter: the Appellant) for the purchase of an apartment to be built by Pnidar, Development and Building Investments Company, Ltd. (hereafter: the Company). The Appellant was manager of the Company, and he and his wife were the sole stockholders. The Appellant and the Purchaser signed a standard-form preliminary agreement which the Company used for the sale of apartments in buildings that it constructed, and the Purchaser made all payments due for the purchase of the apartment. During the course of negotiations it was not revealed to the Purchaser that neither the Company nor the Appellant owned the property upon which the apartment was to be constructed.


1986 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 450-500
Author(s):  
Shimon Shetreet

This article is based on a study on custom in public law conducted some years ago due to the welcome initiative of Prof. G. Tedeschi. Like many others, I too responded to his irresistible powers of persuasion, to conduct a study on custom in a field close to my area of interest, public law. I owe many thanks to Prof. Tedeschi, for by virtue of this study I have acquired significant perspectives for the analysis of public law.During the course of my work on another study (on judicial independence, conducted for the Jerusalem Institute for the Study of Israel), I discovered an historical document pertaining to Prof. Tedeschi, in whose honour this issue of the Israel Law Review appears. The document concerns an offer, addressed to Prof. Tedeschi in 1953, to be appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court.


1958 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 1026-1029 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Roche

I want to dissent initially from the rather constricting frame of reference that Schubert has established in his paper. He has every right in the world to set rhetorical snares, but I have no intention of walking into them. If I may summarize, Schubert asserts that he is a spokesman for a radical new direction in the study of public law, claiming that the old ways are moribund. He further urges that we should look with envy at the creative function of the social psychologists who supplied the Supreme Court with the banners it carried in Brown v. Board of Education while we were bumbling around with historical and philosophical trivia. He concludes that instead of wasting our time with talmudic disputations on whether the Supreme Court reached the “right” or the “wrong” decisions in specific cases, we should settle down to build a firm “scientific” foundation for our discipline.Not the least amusing aspect of this indictment is that I find myself billed as the defender of the ancien régime, as the de Maistre of public law. Therefore, for the benetfit of the young and impressionistic, let me break loose from Schubert's rhetorical trap: I too think that much of the research done in public law—and, for that matter, in political science generally—has been trivial.


1957 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-196
Author(s):  
David Fellman

No changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court occurred during the 1955 Term.Noteworthy among publications dealing with the Court and with constitutional law which appeared during the period under review were a first biography of James Wilson, a member of the original Court; symposia on the late Justice Roberts, the late Professor Thomas Reed Powell, and Justice Black; several interesting reappraisals of John Marshall; and additional installments of Professor Mason's important work on Justice Stone. A full scale critique of Charles Beard's interpretation of the Constitution was published, as well as a variety of writings on historical aspects of the Court, and on a wide range of problems of judicial practice and public law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-29
Author(s):  
Tom Cross ◽  
Christopher Knight

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