Reflections on Proportionality, Military Necessity and the Clausewitzian War

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rotem M Giladi
Keyword(s):  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
The Political ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Operational Strategy ◽  
Military Necessity ◽  
The Law ◽  
Conceptual Foundations

This article explores the significance of the reference, in proportionality analyses, to proper purpose and legitimate ends, given the traditional aversion of international humanitarian law (IHL) to questions of (political) legitimacy. It demonstrates the centrality of that aversion in doctrinal assertions concerning the goals, characteristics and operational strategy of IHL yet argues that, at its historical and conceptual foundations, the law draws on a construction of war that presupposes legitimacy of the political type. That construction remains embedded, though implicit, in contemporary proportionality analyses.Thus, the instrumental understanding of war by Carl von Clausewitz poses several challenges to entrenched contemporary doctrinal claims about the law, how it operates and the effects it produces. This provides an impetus for critical reassessment of the aversion to politics and the interaction between the humanitarian, military and political spheres in the operation of IHL norms. Such critique helps to identify novel strategies of humanitarian protection in war outside the confines demarcated by orthodox doctrine.

The 1977 Protocols: a landmark in the development of international humanitarian law

1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (320) ◽  
pp. 483-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Kosirnik
Keyword(s):  
Initial Period ◽  
The Political ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
The South ◽  
The North ◽  
The World ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Law ◽  
East West

By adopting on 8 June 1977 the two Protocols additional to the 1949 Conventions, the States meeting in Geneva brought to a successful conclusion four years of arduous negotiations. The Protocols took four years, the Conventions only four months. Why such a huge difference?In 1949, once the initial period of instinctive rejection of anything related to war had passed, a natural consensus emerged regarding the main evils which needed to be banned by law. Besides, the delicate subject of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities — the law of The Hague, as it is called, also part of humanitarian law — was left out of the discussions. It was also a time when the political map of the world was fairly monolithic, in the sense that the North still dominated the South, and East-West tensions had not yet escalated.

From the “Right to Have Rights” to the “Critique of Humanitarian Reason”

2018 ◽  
pp. 101-124
Author(s):  
Seyla Benhabib
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Hannah Arendt ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
The Political ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Emancipatory Politics ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores Jacques Rancière's trenchant critique of Hannah Arendt, after briefly recalling Arendt's discussion of the right to have rights. It shows how Rancière not only misreads Arendt, but much of what he defends as the necessary enactment of rights is quite compatible with an Arendtian understanding of political agency. The chapter then turns to the quandaries of “humanitarian reason,” in Didier Fassin's felicitous phrase. To address them, the chapter calls for a new conceptualization of the relationship between international law and emancipatory politics; a new way of understanding how to negotiate the facticity and the validity of the law, including international humanitarian law, such as to create new vistas for the political.

The Obligation to Afford Reparation to Injured Individuals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Treaties ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.

scholarly journals The redirection of attacks by defending forces

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.

Protecting the Environment from the Perspective of the Law of Armed Conflict

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 252-260
Author(s):  
Bartłomiej Krzan
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
The Law

Abstract The present study analyses climate change from the perspective of the law of armed conflict. Climate may be both a victim and a means of warfare. Arguably, the existing normative framework is broad enough to allow for accommodating climate change. It cannot be denied that the environment is easily harmed, or at least jeopardized in times of armed conflicts. Despite the obvious lack of explicit references in the instruments of international humanitarian law, it may be argued that it is possible to fit climate change in. The accompanying analysis addresses the respective potential and the ensuing hurdles.

18 The Law of Neutrality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bothe Michael
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
The Other ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Neutral State ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.

4 Domains of Warfare

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
McCosker Sarah
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
Outer Space ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Necessity ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines ‘domains’ of warfare, which are generally understood as the operational environments in which armed conflict occurs, and to which international humanitarian law (IHL) therefore applies. Until recent decades, domains of armed conflict have been largely predicated on geospatial conceptions, denoting the physical places where armed conflict has customarily occurred: land, sea, and air. General IHL applies across all these areas—including the fundamental principles of humanity, military necessity, and proportionality; restrictions or prohibitions of certain means and methods of warfare; and basic rules requiring humane treatment of persons and respect for civilians and civilian property. Over time, however, the particular exigencies of land, sea, and air warfare have led to the development of some specific IHL rules and principles tailored to each of those environments. Discussing domains of armed conflict therefore offers a window into the historical development of IHL. It shows how the emergence of new operational environments and new means and methods of armed conflict catalyses efforts at legal regulation, which can lead to the development of new domains or sub-sets of IHL. The chapter then considers how the idea of a domain might apply to armed conflict in outer space, and armed conflict involving cyber operations and other emerging capabilities.

Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law

1977 ◽  
Vol 17 (190) ◽  
pp. 3-14
Author(s):  
Vassili Potapov
Keyword(s):  
Geneva Convention ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Law

A line of demarcation between regular and irregular combatants was drawn up in 1907 by Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Hague Regulations, provisions of which have been supplemented by Article 4 of Geneva Convention III of 1949, Articles 13 and 14 of Geneva Convention I of 1949, and Articles 12 and 16 of Geneva Convention II of 1949. Together, these provisions constituted the law on this subject.

scholarly journals The Rule of Surrender in International Humanitarian Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Buchan
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Law Of War ◽  
Legal Development ◽  
Military Necessity ◽  
Opposing Force ◽  
State Practice

Under international humanitarian law it is prohibited to make the object of attack a person who has surrendered. This article explores the circumstances in which the act of surrender is effective under international humanitarian law and examines, in particular, how surrender can be achieved in practical terms during land warfare in the context of international and non-international armed conflict. First, the article situates surrender within its broader historical and theoretical setting, tracing its legal development as a rule of conventional and customary international humanitarian law and arguing that its crystallisation as a law of war derives from the lack of military necessity to directly target persons who have placed themselves outside the theatre of armed conflict, and that such conduct is unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective. Second, after a careful examination of state practice, the article proposes a three-stage test for determining whether persons have surrendered under international humanitarian law: (1) Have persons attempting to surrender engaged in a positive act which clearly reveals that they no longer intend to participate in hostilities? (2) Is it reasonable in the circumstances prevailing at the time for the opposing force to discern the offer of surrender? and (3) Have surrendered persons unconditionally submitted to the authority of their captor?

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document