German Capital, The Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the Transvaal 1886–1900

1978 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.J. Van Helten
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Gold Mining ◽  
Mining Industry ◽  
The Political ◽  
The South ◽  
Railway Company ◽  
South African War ◽  
German Capital ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Republic

This article tries to throw light on one aspect of the ‘business partition’ of Africa, namely Anglo–erman economic rivalry on the Rand between 1886 and 1900. It examines the activities of the German-owned Netherlands South African Railway Company (N.Z.A.S.M.), which possessed the monopoly of construction and management of all railways connecting the republic with a seaport. The article assesses this company's impact upon the relations of the South African Republic with both the maritime colonies of the Cape and Natal and with Great Britain. Whitehall regarded the N.Z.A.S.M. as the fountainhead of ever-increasing German commercial and political penetration in the Transvaal and also considered the railway company hostile to its interests in that it allegedly discriminated against British commerce. The gold-mining industry also viewed the company with hostility, since its high freightrates increased the price of imported machinery, foodstuffs, etc. The South African Republic, on the other hand, saw the N.Z.A.S.M. as a useful means of access to both the German and Dutch capital markets, while the company arranged for diplomatic lobbying in Berlin and The Hague in favour of the Republic.By 1898, German mining interests on the Rand had managed to persuade Berlin that their interests were not served by either the Kruger regime or the German-owned N.Z.A.S.M. and that an administration more favourably disposed towards their objectives, and possibly imposed by force by the British, should not be opposed. It is therefore argued that the South African War was prompted mainly by the desire to establish British commercial hegemony on the Rand, to safeguard the interests of international mining capital and to create a more pliable polity capable of articulating and responding to these particular economic imperatives.

V. ‘Capitalist Influence’ and the Transvaal Government during the Crown Colony Period, 1900–1906.

1968 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. N. Denoon
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Gold Mining ◽  
Political Power ◽  
The South ◽  
Mining Companies ◽  
South African War ◽  
Responsible Government ◽  
Material Interests ◽  
The Face

It has become a tradition to portray Transvaal history as a struggle between Boer nationalism and international capitalism, from the beginnings of large-scale gold mining in the 1880s until the electoral victory of General Botha and Het Volk in 1907. J. A. Hobson, writing in 1899–1900, predicted that after—as before—the South African War, the Imperial Government would have to face the dilemma of choosing between ‘an oligarchy of financial Jews, and the restoration of Boer domination’, since there was no other basis of political power. In his analysis of Transvaal white politics, he admitted that some gold-mining companies (the J. B. Robinson group, Barnato's and sometimes the companies of Albu and Goertz) were hostile to the influence of larger companies (Eckstein's and Consolidated Gold Fields), but denied that this affected the monolithic nature of international capitalism in the Transvaal. Later writers on the period, who have rejected almost everything that Hobson wrote, have nevertheless endorsed his interpretation. The Boer leaders were understandably happy to approve of such an analysis, since it placed them in a flattering light as the only realistic salvation for a magnate-dominated society. General Botha, for example, ardently courted the white working men on the Rand after the War, stressing the identity of material interests between farmers and artisans, in the face of the capitalist threat. General Smuts presented a more subtle and persuasive version of the argument, when attempting to persuade the Colonial Office to grant responsible government to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.

The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment

1972 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert V. Kubicek
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Deep Level ◽  
Mining Industry ◽  
The South ◽  
Common Concern ◽  
South African War

Ever since J. A. Hobson characterized financiers as monolithic and conspiratorial, particularly those who were supposed to have been responsible for manipulating decisively events which led to the outbreak of the South African war, historians have stressed the need to examine their financial activities. However, the South African goldmining financiers have not been as thoroughly scrutinized as the politicians (Chamberlain and Kruger) or the administrators (Loch, Rosmead and Milner). Rhodes, of course, has been much studied, but more as politician and imperial strategist than as a Randlord. One recent exception to this neglect is G. Blainey's study based on an examination of mining techniques and technology. He asserts that a certain sector of the mining industry was hard hit by the policies of the Transvaal government, and that it was Randlords from this deprived sector (the deep-level operators) who triggered the Johannesburg uprising. What follows, based on the records of the mining houses, attempts to answer several questions about the key Randlords in 1895 which have often been raised but not satisfactorily answered. How monolithic and conspiratorial were the Randlords? What devices did they use to generate capital and take profits? What in 1895 were precisely their financial requirements and expectations? Was there, as Blainey suggests, a common concern about capital wants and anticipated profits which distinguished Randlords who participated in the attempt to overthrow Kruger's republic in 1895 from those who did not?IIGroups which search for profits are no more free of internecine disputes than groups which seek power.

St. John Brodrick and Army Reform, 1901–1903

1976 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lowell J. Satre
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Detailed Examination ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
The Political ◽  
The South ◽  
General Staff ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
The Public ◽  
South African War ◽  
The Government

Edwardian England has become an increasingly significant period for scholarly research. One of the more carefully examined subjects is the interrelationship between politics and army reform. The debacles of the South African War forced the governments to examine England's army, and reforms emerged after 1901. Historians have concentrated on the efforts of Balfour's administration of 1902-05 and Haldane's sojourn at the War Office from 1906 to 1912; these periods witnessed the emergence of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the reorganization of the War Office, the shaping of the General Staff and the development of the British Expeditionary Force. All of these have been subjected to detailed examination — notably, the C. I. D. in recent works by Peter Fraser and Nicholas d'Ombrain, and the War Office by W. S. Hamer.There is, however, at least one gap in the historical literature on politics and army reform: St. John Brodrick's term as Secretary of State for War, 1901-03. An understanding of Brodrick's activities is necessary, since he was, of course, the first War Secretary to attempt reforms as a response to the obvious shortcomings of the army in the South African War. A careful examination will explain why he failed in many of his programs, the political consequences of these failures, and some of his more positive contributions.The breakdown of the British army in the first few months of the South African War, which began in October 1899 and ended in May 1902, shocked and dismayed both the public and the Government.

Linchwe I and the Kgatla Campaign in the South African War, 1899-1902

1985 ◽  
Vol 26 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 169-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. F. Morton
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Control ◽  
The Political ◽  
The South ◽  
Military Action ◽  
Distribution Of Wealth ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
South African War

Although the importance of the African role in the South African War (1889-1902) is now recognized, this study of the Bakgatala ba ga Kgafela is the first to demonstrate an African perception of events and argue that the Kgatla initiated military action and pursued goals independent of a simple British vs. Boer formula. The war created major economic and political opportunities for the Kgatla, a people physically separated and colonially partitioned. Half the Kgatla lived in the Kgatla Reserve of the British-ruled Bechuanaland Protectorate, and the other half lived in the Saulspoort area of the western Transvaal under Boer rule. Their leader, Linchwe I (1874–1924), maintained his capital at Mochudi in the Protectorate and received only partial allegiance from the Saulspoort Kgatia. Soon after the war began, Linchwe involved his regiments actively in fighting alongside the British in the Protectorate and raiding on their own in the Transvaal in an effort to eliminate Boer settlement and political control in Saulspoort and other areas of the western Transvaal. Kgatia regiments also emptied Boer farms of cattle which, in addition to restoring the national herd decimated by the 1897 rinderpest, Linchwe used in establishing his political hold over the Saulspoort Kgatia. Protectorate officials were grateful for Kgatia support, but Linchwe disguised the extent and nature of Kgatia operations and concealed from the British his political objectives. Linchwe's campaign made possible in the years following the war the reunification of the Kgatia under his authority, the distribution of wealth among all his people and the reduction of colonial interference in the political lives of his people.

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