An Argument for the Continued Validity of Woman-to-Woman Marriages in Post-2010 Kenya

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-328
Author(s):  
Monicah Kareithi ◽  
Frans Viljoen
Keyword(s):  
Legal Status ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Cultural Practice ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
The Right

AbstractWoman-to-woman marriage is a form of customary marriage between two women, predominantly found in Africa. These customary marriages have been and to some extent still are conducted by various communities across Africa, including in Kenya. Communities such as the Kamba, Kisii, Nandi, Kikuyu and Kuria practise woman-to-woman marriages for a variety of reasons. The legal status of woman-to-woman marriages in Kenya is uncertain due to the provisions of article 45(2) of Kenya's Constitution of 2010 and section 3(1) of the Marriage Act of 2014, which stipulate that adults only have the right to marry persons of the opposite sex. However, a holistic and purposive reading of the constitution, taking into consideration its recognition of culture and the protection of children as important values in Kenyan society, and considering the historical context within which the provisions concerning same-sex marriages were included, leads to the conclusion that these provisions were not intended to proscribe the cultural practice of woman-to-woman marriage in Kenya. The constitutional validity of woman-to-woman marriage opens the door to a more expansive and fluid understanding of “family” in Kenya.

2. The Formation and Recognition of Adult Relationships:

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gaffney-Rhys
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Forced Marriage ◽  
Same Sex Marriage ◽  
Adult Relationships ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam and assignment questions. Each book includes key debates, typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, author commentary and tips to gain extra marks. This chapter considers the formation and recognition of adult relationships i.e. marriage, same-sex marriage, civil partnerships and cohabitation. The questions included in this chapter cover: the right to marry contained in article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights; forced marriage; the difference between opposite-sex marriage, same-sex marriage and civil partnerships and the difference between marriage and cohabitation.

scholarly journals INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND THE SURVIVOR OF AN UNFORMALISED SAME-SEX CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP: Laubscher No v Duplan 2017 (2) SA 264 (CC)

Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
Lesbian Relationship ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
Civil Union ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
Domestic Partnerships ◽  
The Right

When a person dies intestate his or her heirs are determined by the provisions of section 1(1) and (2) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. Included amongst the heirs is the deceased’s surviving spouse, who either takes the entire estate or shares it with the deceased’s descendants (if any). Historically, the reference to “spouse” in the Act was taken to mean a person to whom the deceased was married in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. Accordingly, persons who were married to the deceased merely by religious rites and persons with whom the deceased was in a long-term conjugal relationship that was unformalised by marriage were excluded.The advent of constitutional democracy in South Africa resulted in a number of challenges to this status quo through reliance on the equality clause of the Bill of Rights. As a result of these challenges it has now been recognised that the survivor of a Hindu marriage, a monogamous Muslim marriage, and a polygynous Muslim marriage all have the right to inherit on intestacy as a “spouse”. Furthermore, in a groundbreaking decision in Gory v Kolver NO (Starke and others intervening) (2007 (4) SA 97 (CC)) the Constitutional Court recognised that the exclusion of the surviving partner of a gay or lesbian relationship from the right to inherit on intestacy was unconstitutional, and directed that the relevant sections of the Intestate Succession Act be amended by a reading-in of additional words to remedy the unconstitutionality. These words conferred the right to inherit on intestacy on the survivor of a monogamous permanent same-sex partnership in which the partners undertook reciprocal duties of support. At the time of writing no survivor of an unformalised opposite-sex relationship has challenged his or her exclusion from intestate succession. Possibly this reticence has been influenced by the decision in Volks NO v Robinson (2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC)) (hereinafter “Volks”). In Volks the Constitutional Court held that it is not unconstitutional for the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 to distinguish between married and unmarried persons by giving the survivor of a marriage a claim for reasonable maintenance against the estate of the deceased spouse but not giving a similar claim to the survivor of a relationship in which the parties did not marry.Paleker has raised the question whether the Gory order “must still be applied in light of the Civil Union Act” but he comes to no firm conclusion, and states tentatively that “if marriage … is a precondition for inheriting, persons in same-sex unions who have not solemnised their relationship after the coming into force of the Civil Union Act … may be precluded from inheriting intestate from each other”. On the other hand De Waal and Schoeman-Malan are clearly of the view that the order in the Gory case still operates and – whilst regarding the current position as “anomalous” – they state that it “will probably continue until the Domestic Partnerships Bill [GN36 in GG 30663 of 2008-1-14] eventually does become law”. This has also been the interpretation accepted by the Master’s office acting on advice from the Senior State Law Advisor. The different treatment accorded same-sex couples by the continued retention of the benefits conferred by Gory has been defended on the grounds of substantive equality, since many practical obstacles still stand in the way of same-sex couples formalising their relationships.The question of the continued applicability of the reading-in order in Gory has now come before the Constitutional Court in Laubscher NO v Duplan (2017 (2) SA 264 (CC)) and it is this case which is the focus of this note.

Marriage, Family, Discrimination & Contradiction: An Evaluation of the Legacy and Future of the European Court of Human Rights' Jurisprudence on LGBT Rights

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1746-1763 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lucy Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Registration System ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
European Court ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been considering whether same-sex couples should have the rights to marry and to be recognized as a family under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) for over thirty years. In the 1980s the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) and the ECtHR respectively rejected the notion that same-sex relationships constituted a “family life” under Article 8 of the ECHR, and that post-operative transgendered persons had the right to marry under Article 12. However, throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium, the ECtHR handed down a body of judgments that incrementally liberalized these rights (albeit not always smoothly) in favor of LGBT persons. This evolution culminated in part on 24 June 2010, when the ECtHR passed judgment inSchalk and Kopf v. Austria.In that case the First Section of the ECtHR made a number of major, but seemingly contradictory rulings. For the first time in its history, the ECtHR ruled that same-sex relationships expressly constitute a “family life” under Article 8, and that the right to marry under Article 12 was not confined to opposite-sex couples in “all circumstances.” However, the ECtHR simultaneously ruled that Member States are under no obligation to protect that “family life,” by providing same-sex couples with access to marriage under Article 12, or an alternative registration system under Articles 8 and 14. The Grand Chamber denied the applicants' subsequent request for a referral.

PROBLEM OPSTANKA BRAKA NAKON PRAVNE PROMENE POLA JEDNOG OD SUPRUŽNIKA

2021 ◽  
pp. 423-435
Author(s):  
Veljko Vlašković ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Gender Identity ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Change ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Gender Reassignment ◽  
The Will ◽  
Birth Records ◽  
The Right ◽  
Domestic Law

By its decision in case Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002), The European Court of Human Rights has established positive obligation of states parties to find appropriate means of achieving legal recognition of one’s gender reassignment in the context of the right to protection of private life. Under the direct influence of the mentioned judgement, Constitutional Court of Serbia was deciding on constitutional complaint of a transsexual in 2012 and made the decision that administrative authorithies dealing with civil status registry have subject-matter jurisdiction to enter gender reassignment data in birth records. After, The Law on Civil Records was amended in 2018 enabling adoption of by-law act that esentially involves substantial requirements for legal recognition of preferred gender in birth records. Hence, it is possible for a transsexual to have his/her preferred gender legally recognized during the marriage. Since domestic law still does not allow same-sex marriages, the issue of such marriage survival may arise when both spouse accept legal gender reassignment deciding not to break up their marriage bond. The problem of marriage survival after legal gender reassignment in states that have enabled same-sex marriage is part of legal history. However, for legislations that insist on the heterosexual idea of marriage, these cases give rise to legal difficulties. The historical-legal and comparative-legal approach indicate that after the legal change of gender during the marriage, the values of marriage and the right to gender identity are viewed as opposites. In this regard, a transgender person is required to sacrifice marriage or to renounce his or her right to gender identity. However, the law of Serbia on this issue is, to put it mildly, indefinite. Thus, on the one hand, the Serbian Constitution supports the heterosexual view of marriage, while on the other hand it guarantees the freedom of divorce and the inviolability of human dignity. At the same time, the existing rules on the conditions for legal gender reassignment do not regulate the question of the fate of such a marriage. At the same time, within the framework of the domestic legal order, there is no direct legal means by which the mentioned same-sex marriage would end against the will of the spouses. Ultimately, there is a dilemma as to whether the preservation of the institution of marriage can be insisted on at the expense of the will of the spouses as individuals. According to domestic law, a legal change of gender in the birth records occurs on the basis of a constitutive administrative act of the municipal or city administration responsible for keeping the civil records. The mentioned administrative act determines the gender reassignment on the basis of the certificate of the appropriate health institution. The effect of gender reassignment is tied to the date of the decision of the administrative body and is valid for the future. Thus, a legal change of gender does not affect the parental relationship that may have been previously established between the person who legally changed the gender and the child. Therefore, imposing the termination of a marriage after a legal reassignment of gender of one of the spouses cannot be acceptable. However, as marital status is only one segment of the legal status of transgender persons, it is necessary to enact a special law that would regulate their legal status and eliminate problems that may arise in practice. In the case of a possible procedure for assessing constitutionality and legality, the decision of the Constitutional Court of Germany from 2008 should serve as a guide for the Constitutional Court of Serbia. According to this decision, the marriage would remain valid even after the legal change of gender of one of the spouse until the special legislation that would determine the manner of exercising the right to gender identity is adopted in cases when spouses do not want divorce.

15. Article 12: The right to marry and to found a family

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Harris ◽  
Michael O’Boyle ◽  
Ed Bates ◽  
Carla Buckley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Same Sex Marriage ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
The Right

This chapter discusses Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to marry and to found a family, subject to a wide power on the part of states to regulate the exercise of the right. National law may regulate the form and capacity to marry, but procedural or substantive limitations must not remove the essence of the right. The right to marry does not extend to same-sex marriage and there is no right to divorce. However, transsexuals are guaranteed the right to marry persons of their now opposite sex.

scholarly journals To the question of the peculiarities of the protection of family rights of persons who are married or other family unions in the practice of the european court of human rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 119-123
Author(s):  
R. Havrik
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Family Relationship ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Scientific Article ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Relationship Of

In the scientific article the author conducted a scientific study of the protection of family rights of persons who are married or other family unions in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular such family unions as de facto marriage, separation, civil partnership, we come to the following conclusions. This legal status is recognized by the European Court of Human Rights as conferring the right to protection against interference with family life, ie it is a family, similar to how a family arises as a result of a registered marriage. In this case, according to the court, the concept of "family" includes the actual family relationship, when the parties live together outside of marriage. A child born as a result of such a relationship is a member of the family from birth and due to the fact of birth. There is a connection between a child and his or her parents that is equivalent to family life, even if at the time of his or her birth the parents no longer lived together or their relationship has ended. Cohabitation is usually a prerequisite for family life, but in exceptional cases, other factors may indicate that specific relationships are stable enough to be considered as actual family ties. Another type of family union - marriage during the period of separate residence of the spouses, in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is somewhat weak and usually concerns the possibility to use the procedure of separation, but the court recognizes that the spouses have an inalienable right to initiating such a procedure. Until 2010, the European Court of Human Rights generally showed a rather restrained attitude towards this type of relationship as same-sex, not recognizing them as family, but after 2010, given the rapid liberalization of the prevailing public morality regarding same-sex relations in Europe, the European Court on human rights could not deny that the relationship of such couples is essentially "family life".

A Shift in the United Nations Human Rights Committee’s Jurisprudence on Marriage Equality? An Analysis of Two Recent Communications from Australia

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oscar I Roos ◽  
Anita Mackay
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Marriage Equality ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Right

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has not considered whether the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) encompasses a right to marry a person of the same sex since 2002 in Joslin v New Zealand. In Joslin v New Zealand the Committee determined that the right to marry contained in article 23(2) of the ICCPR referred only to opposite-sex marriage, and it foreclosed any separate claim based on the general right of nondiscrimination contained in article 26 of the ICCPR. This article maintains that two recent communications to the Committee from Australia, C v Australia and G v Australia, prefigure a shift in the Committee’s jurisprudence on marriage equality. Although the Views adopted in 2017 by the Committee in each communication do not expressly disapprove of Joslin v New Zealand, on close analysis they support a re-interpretation of the right to marry which encompasses a right to marry a person of the same sex. In the alternative, in the event that the Committee continues to adhere to the Joslin v New Zealand interpretation of the right to marry, G v Australia and C v Australia support a determination that a State Party which fails to provide for marriage equality violates the article 26 right to non-discrimination.

X and Others v. Austria (Eur. Ct. H.R.)

2014 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 620-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen A. Doty
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Freedoms ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, in X and Others v. Austria, held by a majority of ten to seven that Austria violated Article 14 (prohibition on discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) when it denied an unmarried same-sex couple the right to a second-parent adoption when second-parent adoptions are available to unmarried opposite-sex couples. This is the first time the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) has recognized a right to second-parent adoption by same-sex couples.

2. The Formation and Recognition of Adult Relationships: Marriage, Civil Partnerships, and Cohabitation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gaffney-Rhys
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Forced Marriage ◽  
Same Sex Marriage ◽  
Adult Relationships ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam and assignment questions. Each book includes key debates, typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, author commentary, and tips to gain extra marks. This chapter considers the formation and recognition of adult relationships i.e. marriage, same-sex marriage, civil partnerships, and cohabitation. The questions included in this chapter cover: the right to marry contained in article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights; forced marriage; the difference between opposite-sex marriage, same-sex marriage, and civil partnerships, and the difference between marriage and cohabitation.

scholarly journals PERILAKU SEKSUAL TRANSGENDER (Studi Komparatif Hak Asasi Manusia Antara Perspektif The Universal Declaration of Human Right dan The Cairo Declaration of Human Right)

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 254
Author(s):  
Adriana Mustafa
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Behavior ◽  
Universal Declaration ◽  
The Other ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Transgender People ◽  
Religious Teaching ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
The Right ◽  
Deviant Sexual Behavior

The emergence of the term Transgender in Indonesia first appeared in 1860 and underwent development in the 1990s. In 1986 the term Wadam (Female Adam) emerged, but changed into a transsexual (Male Female). The amendment was based on the objection of several parties because of the use of the name of Adam's Woman. It was considered impolite because the name of the Prophet Adam as.In the Universal Declaration of Human Right, there is indeed no mention of sexual orientation, it must be of the opposite sex, what is concerned about human rights to marry and build families, namely article 16 which is then used as a basis by transgender people to justify deviant sexual behavior they are through same-sex marriage. On the other hand, in the Universal Declaration of Human Right there is also article 18 which guarantees the right of everyone to believe in the teachings of his religion and practice his religious teachings well. While we all know there is no religious teaching in this world that allows sexual behavior to deviate, even the most tolerant religion.

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