Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England

1989 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 803-832 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglass C. North ◽  
Barry R. Weingast
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Glorious Revolution ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Property Rights Protection ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
The Glorious Revolution ◽  
The Relationship

The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners—secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows.

Economic Crisis and the Mexican State: Toward a New Institutional Interpretation

2001 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Aldo R. Flores-Quiroga
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Private Investment ◽  
Glorious Revolution ◽  
Mexican State ◽  
Mexican Government ◽  
The Glorious Revolution ◽  
Siglo Xx

This article proposes an institutional interpretation of Mexico's long economic crisis of the end of the twentieth century. It argues that the inability of the Mexican government to commit credibly to protecting property rights is largely responsible for the stagnation of private investment levels between 1982 and 1995. This inability is similar to that of the English Crown in the seventeenth century, which resorted to property rights assaults to confront recurrent fiscal crises. The English solution to this problem came in the form of the Glorious Revolution and its associated reforms that stabilized the property rights regime by constraining the Crown's discretion. England's economic growth increased substantially afterwards. Mexicans have attempted a similar reform, through the adoption of domestic and international mechanisms that, as discussed in this article, stabilize the property rights regime. The reform is still unfinished, and it still faces considerable challenges, but if they are surmounted, a return to sustained economic growth is very likely. Este artíículo propone una interpretacióón institucional de la extensa crisis econóómica de Mééxico a finales del siglo XX. Aquíí se establece que la ineptitud delgovierno mexicano paracomprometerse verazmente aprotegerlos derechos de propiedad es laresponsible delestancamiento de los niveles de las inversiones privadas entre 1982 y 1995. Esta ineptitud es similar a la de la Corona inglesa en el siglo XVII, la cual recurrióó a atropellos a los derechos de propiedad para confrontar las reiteradas crisis fiscals. La solucióón inglesa a dicho problema fue la Revolucióón Gloriosa y sus reformas que estabilizaron elregimen de los derechos de propiedad limitando el poder de la Corona. Posteriormente, Inglaterra tuvo un crecimiento econóómico sustancial. Los mexicanos han intentado hacer una reforma similar a travéés de la adopcióón de mecanismos doméésticos e internacionales que,como se arguye en este artíículo, estabilizan el regimen de los derechos de propiedad. La reforma aúún no ha terminado, y todavíía se enfrenta a desafííos considerables, pero si ééstos se superan, es probable el retorno a un crecimiento econóómico sostenido.

John Company Armed: The English East India Company, the Anglo-Mughal War and Absolutist Imperialism, c. 1675–1690

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Vaughn
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
South Asian ◽  
East India Company ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Glorious Revolution ◽  
Mughal Empire ◽  
Imperial Expansion ◽  
English East India Company ◽  
Formed Part ◽  
The Glorious Revolution

During the 1670s and 1680s, the English East India Company pursued an aggressive programme of imperial expansion in the Asian maritime world, culminating in a series of armed assaults on the Mughal Empire. With important exceptions, most scholarship has viewed the Company's coercive imperialism in the later seventeenth century and the First Anglo-Mughal War as the results primarily, if not exclusively, of political and economic conditions in South Asia. This article re-examines and re-interprets this burst of imperial expansion in light of political developments in England and the wider English empire during the later Stuart era. The article contends that the Company's aggressive overseas expansion was pursued for metropolitan and pan-imperial purposes as much as for South Asian ones. The corporation sought to centralise and militarise the English presence in Asia in order both to maintain its control of England's trade to the East and in support of Stuart absolutism. By the eve of the Glorious Revolution, the Company's aggressive imperialism formed part of a wider political project to create an absolute monarchy in England and to establish an autocratic English empire overseas.

scholarly journals Complex Dynamical Behaviors of a Mixed Duopoly Game Based on Intellectual Property Rights Protection

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tong Chu ◽  
Yu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Wang
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Fractal Structures ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights Protection ◽  
Dynamical Behaviors ◽  
Property Rights Protection ◽  
Coexistence Of Attractors

Based on the oligopoly game theory and the intellectual property rights protection policy, we investigate the complex dynamical behaviors of a mixed duopoly game with quadratic cost. In the new system, a few parameters are improved by considering intellectual property rights protection and the stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium point are discussed in detail. A set of the two-dimensional bifurcation diagrams is demonstrated by using numerical modeling, and these diagrams show abundant complex dynamical behaviors, such as coexistence of attractors, different bifurcation, and fractal structures. These dynamical properties can present the long-run effects of strengthening intellectual property protection.

Party and the Augustan Constitution, 1694-1716: Politics and the Power of the Executive

1978 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-208
Author(s):  
Dennis A. Rubini
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Glorious Revolution ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Commons ◽  
The Government ◽  
Charles Ii ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Glorious Revolution

William of Orange tried to be as absolute as possible. Inroads upon the power of the executive were fiercely resisted: indeed, William succeeded in keeping even the judiciary in a precarious state of independence. To maintain the prerogative and gain the needed supplies from parliament, he relied upon a mixed whig-tory ministry to direct court efforts. Following the Glorious Revolution, the whigs had divided into two principle groups. One faction led by Robert Harley and Paul Foley became the standard-bearers of the broadly based Country party, maintained the “old whig” traditions, did not seek office during William's reign, tried to hold the line on supply, and led the drive to limit the prerogative. The “junto,” “court,” or “new” whigs, on the other hand, were led by ministers who, while in opposition during the Exclusion crisis, held court office, aggressively sought greater offices, and wished to replace monarchy with oligarchy. They soon joined tory courtiers in opposing many of the Country party attempts to place additional restrictions upon the executive. To defend the prerogative and gain passage for bills of supply, William also developed techniques employed by Charles II. By expanding the concept and power of the Court party, he sought to bring together the executive and legislative branches of government through a large cadre of crown office-holders (placemen) who sat, voted, and directed the votes of others on behalf of the government when matters of importance arose in the Commons. So too, William claimed the right to dissolve parliament and call new elections not on a fixed date, as was to become the American practice, but at the time deemed most propitious over first a three-year and then (after 1716) a seven year period.

Religion, Politics, and Oaths in the Glorious Revolution

1948 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 462-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles F. Mullet
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Glorious Revolution ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
Religious Convictions ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Glorious Revolution

Although at the end of the seventeenth century men were shifting their political terminology from the spiritual to the secular, from God to nature, they still invoked the absolutes of history, law, and scripture. They did not lightly overturn their monarch, but when the necessity for such action arose they sought absolution in concepts which the most rigorous and learned mediaeval theologian would have understood. They appealed to the law of nature but they meant the law of God; and the shift involved no betrayal of absolute standards, no withdrawal from the same ethical doctrines that had nourished their forebears. The time was soon to come when secular phrases expressed a secular outlook, but in 1689 they continued to cover the religious convictions of centuries. As soon as the bars were down and men grappled in hectic controversy, the secular side of their politics diminished and the ethical and spiritual aspects became pronounced.

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