scholarly journals Aspects historiques de la relation entre le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l'homme

Author(s):  
Robert Kolb

SummaryThe author traces the historical evolution of the distinction between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. He demonstrates that the structures of the two regimes follow from the fact that while humanitarian law was designed to apply in periods of war, human rights law was to apply in periods of peace. The difference between the two are not matters of abstract logic. Rather, they have important consequences for the functioning of these important branches of international law.

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyassu Gayim

Laws regulate conducts by responding to social and political requirements. This holds true for the law of nations as well. Contemporary international law follows two separate tracks when it comes to regulating human rights and humanitarian questions. If international human rights law and international humanitarian law are intended to protect the dignity and worth of human beings, as it is often said, why follow separate tracks? Does humanity really exist? If it does, how does it relate to human rights? If the two are distinct, where do they converge? This article highlights these questions by revisiting the contours of international law.


2019 ◽  
pp. 297-304
Author(s):  
Knut Traisbach

This chapter is a comment on a reflection by Frédéric Mégret on the limits of the laws of war. It proposes a jurisprudence of limits that focuses less on absolute ideals but on the compromising and enabling space ‘in-between’ these absolutes. Relying on Hannah Arendt’s views on different conceptions of humanity, the comment critically engages with a thinking in terms of inherent opposing interests and oscillations between them. A conception of limits as reproducing inherent absolutes is disabling and passive. Instead, limits can be understood as facilitating a space that enables us to judge and to act, also through compromise. International humanitarian law and international human rights law, perhaps more than other areas of international law, depend on preserving and actively seeking this politically relevant space.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 663-680
Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen

AbstractInternational human rights law is an as-yet underused branch of international law when assessing the legality of nuclear weapons and advocating for their elimination. It offers a far greater range of implementation mechanisms than does international humanitarian law (IHL), and arguably strengthens the protections afforded to civilians and combatants under IHL, particularly in non-international armed conflict. Of particular relevance are the rights to life, to humane treatment, to health and to a healthy environment, associated with the right to a remedy for violations of any human rights.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

AbstractThe ongoing Syrian civil war calls for a re-evaluation of using force to protect human rights. This article does not rake over the much-debated issue of whether a right of humanitarian intervention exists as lex lata. Instead, it addresses the little reviewed normative issue of whether the right should exist in international law to support and reflect a pluralistic understanding of sovereignty. Despite advancements in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, this wider fabric of international law preserves Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. It denies any right of humanitarian intervention.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Karinne Coombes

This article explores the restraints international human rights law and international humanitarian law place on a State’s use of lethal force against suspected terrorists. Although the law restricts the ability to target suspected terrorists, it is argued that these limits should be respected in order to protect innocent civilians from undue harm. Under IHRL, it is argued that the right to life as a peremptory norm restricts extra-territorial targeted attacks of suspected terrorists. Accordingly, such action should only be considered lawful when it is necessary to protect the State’s population from a known threat and lesser force would not suffice. Under IHL, it is argued that there is no third category of “unprivileged” or “unlawful” combatants who are subject to lawful targeting for the duration of the hostilities; rather, non-State actors who participate in an armed conflict may be lawfully targeted for the duration of their participation, including an ongoing chain of hostile acts.Cet article explore les contraintes qu’imposent les lois internationales sur les droits de la personne ainsi que le droit international humanitaire à l’utilisation de force létale par un État contre des personnes soupçonnées de terrorisme. Quoique la loi limite l’habileté de cibler des personnes soupçonnées de terrorisme, on soutient que ces limites devraient être respectées afin de protéger les civils innocents contre des préjudices injustifiés. En rapport avec les LIDP, on soutient que le droit à la vie comme norme péremptoire limite les attaques extra-territoriales ciblées contre des personnes soupçonnées de terrorisme. Conséquemment, on ne devrait considérer de telles actions comme légitimes que si elles sont nécessaires pour protéger la population de l’État contre une menace connue et qu’une force moindre ne suffirait pas. En rapport avec le DIH, on soutient qu’il n’existe pas de troisième catégorie de combattants «non privilégiés» ou «illégitimes» que l’on peut cibler légitimement pendant la durée des hostilités; plutôt, les acteurs non étatiques qui participent à un conflit armé peuvent être ciblés légitimement pendant la durée de leur participation, y compris une série d’actes hostiles en cours.


Author(s):  
Katharine Fortin

Chapter 7 conducts a detailed analysis of the main theories of how armed groups are bound by international humanitarian law including: (i) the third parties theory; (ii) the legislative jurisdiction theory; (iii) the effectiveness theory; and (iv) theories relying upon control of territory. In conducting a critical analysis of these theories, the chapter’s purpose is to demonstrate how armed groups can be bound by international law per se. It concludes by considering what this analysis tells us about the circumstances that are necessary for armed groups to be bound by (i) human rights treaty law; and (ii) customary international human rights law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-320
Author(s):  
Kenneth S. Gallant

Traditionally, states would not grant enforcement of criminal judgments from other states. As a result, there has been a large deficit in enforcement of monetary and other remedies for victims of criminal violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. In recent decades, there has been some progress in national law and treaty law towards allowing or requiring transnational enforcement of victims’ remedies contained in foreign criminal judgments. This article examines the traditional law, modern progress concerning criminal remedies, and recent United Nations work in the area. Even with modern trends in the international law of criminal enforcement jurisdiction, it may turn out that civil judgments of restitution and reparation will be easier to obtain and enforce than criminal judgments in many, if not most, cases.


Author(s):  
Oleksiy Kresin ◽  
Iryna Kresina

Based on the concluded study, the authors demonstrate that international law recognizes the unconditional responsibility of the power occupying or exercising effective (overall, general, de facto) control over the territory for the human rights of its population, and in particular the civilian population as protected persons. Such liability exists independently of the personal liability of the representatives (agents) of that State. In this case, the state, which exercises control over the territory, is automatically responsible for any actions of organizations under its control. At the same time, it is quite difficult to determine the share of responsibility of a sovereign state for the implementation of human rights on a territory over which that state does not exercise control. The legislation of Ukraine imposes responsibility for the protection and violations of human rights in the ORDLO on Russia under both international humanitarian law and international human rights law. International humanitarian law imposes on the occupying state the obligation to ensure all the minimum humanitarian needs of the population, its basic rights related to the preservation of life, health and dignity (with special emphasis on the rights of women and children), private property, effective protection of these rights and protection from any unlawful violence, preservation of the infrastructure of the territory. The occupying State cannot be absolved of responsibility for serious human rights violations, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Decisions of international courts unequivocally extend these obligations, as well as obligations under international human rights law, to all forms of illegal control of the territory of another state. At the same time, the Constitution and legislation of Ukraine do not provide for the refusal of the state to ensure and protect human rights on its territory, even in conditions of state of emergency or war. Ukraine ensures the realization of the rights of the ORDLO population on the territory of other regions of Ukraine. Ukraine also protect and restore human rights in the territory of the ORDLO with the means provided by international law.


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