neurobiology supports virtue theory on the role of heuristics in moral cognition

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 547-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
william d. casebeer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium

sunstein is right that poorly informed heuristics can influence moral judgment. his case could be strengthened by tightening neurobiologically plausible working definitions regarding what a heuristic is, considering a background moral theory that has more strength in wide reflective equilibrium than “weak consequentialism,” and systematically examining what naturalized virtue theory has to say about the role of heuristics in moral reasoning.

wide reflective equilibrium as an answer to an objection to moral heuristics

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-562
Author(s):  
edward stein
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Human Capacity

if, as is not implausible, the correct moral theory is indexed to human capacity for moral reasoning, then the thesis that moral heuristics exist faces a serious objection. this objection can be answered by embracing a wide reflective equilibrium account of the origins of our normative principles of morality.

Commentaries and Rejoinder on

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Gong ◽  
Douglas L. Medin ◽  
Tal Eyal ◽  
Nira Liberman ◽  
Yaacov Trope ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Psychological Distance ◽  
Temporal Distance ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cultural Systems ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Construal Levels

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.

scholarly journals The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Compelling Evidence ◽  
Ample Evidence ◽  
Cognitive Components

This chapter argues that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions are not integral to moral judgment. There is ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. The chapter concludes that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these should not be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment.

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanisms ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
In Virtue Of

The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral judgment and motivation, we’re told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings or emotions—fertile ground for sweeping debunking arguments. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, maintains that reason plays a pervasive role in our moral minds and that ordinary moral reasoning is not particularly flawed or in need of serious repair. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don’t come easily, as we are susceptible to some unsavory influences that lead to rationalizing bad behavior. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but the science warrants cautious optimism, not a special skepticism about morality in particular. Rationality in ethics is possible not just despite, but in virtue of, the psychological and evolutionary mechanisms that shape moral cognition.

Does It Matter How One Assesses Moral Reasoning? Differences (Biases) in the Recognition Versus Formulation Tasks

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (7) ◽  
pp. 1440-1464
Author(s):  
James Weber
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Ethical Dilemmas ◽  
Business Students ◽  
Learning Task ◽  
Defining Issues Test ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
Different Levels

Most business ethics scholars interested in understanding individual moral cognition or reasoning rely on the Defining Issues Test (DIT). They typically report that managers and business students exhibit a relatively high percentage of principled moral reasoning when resolving ethical dilemmas. This article applies neurocognitive processes and Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, and its more recent revision, as theoretical foundations to explore whether differences emerge when using a recognition of learning task, such as the DIT or similar instruments, versus a formulation of knowledge task, such as the Moral Judgment Interview or similar instruments, to assess individual moral reasoning. The data show that significantly different levels of moral reasoning are detected when using a recognition-based versus formulation-based moral reasoning instrument. As expected, the recognition-based approach (using a DIT-like instrument) reports an inflated, higher moral reasoning score for subjects compared with using a formulation-based instrument. Implications of these results for understanding an individual’s moral reasoning are discussed.

On Disease and Deontology: Multiple Tests of the Influence of Disease Threat on Moral Vigilance

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damian R. Murray ◽  
Nicholas Kerry ◽  
Will M. Gervais
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Disease Transmission ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Multiple Tests ◽  
Moral Domains

Threat has been linked to certain facets of moral cognition, but the specific implications of disease threat for moral judgment remain poorly understood. Across three studies, we investigated the role of perceived disease threat in shaping moral judgment and hypothesized that perceived disease threat would cause people to be more sensitive to moral violations (or more “morally vigilant”). All three studies found a positive relationship between dispositional worry about disease transmission and moral vigilance. Additional analyses suggested that this worry was more strongly related to vigilance toward binding moral foundations. Study 3 demonstrated that moral vigilance was higher in individuals for whom the threat of disease was experimentally made salient, relative to individuals in both a neutral and a nondisease threat condition. Taken together, these results suggest that perceived disease threat may influence people’s moral vigilance across moral domains.

Basic Premises and Method

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-42
Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Just War ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
High Level

The reigning method in moral philosophy is the search for reflective equilibrium. An interesting feature of contemporary moral philosophy is how much weight most theorists put on matching intuitions in test cases, rather than finding plausible, relevant, high-level moral principles that can be used to generate mid-level principles and judgments in particular situations. This chapter covers four themes in two groups. The first group concerns the author’s general approach to moral theory. It includes the role of theory and cases in the author’s own work and the role of evidence and facts in justification. The second group concerns two topics specifically relevant to just war theory: reductive individualism and the distinctive causal structure of eliminative killing.

AWide-Reflective-Equilibrium Conception of Reconstructive Formalization

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-151
Author(s):  
Winfried Löffler
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Natural Language Text ◽  
Logical Formalization ◽  
Language Text ◽  
Relevant Factors

I propose that a logical formalization of a natural language text (especially an argument) may be regarded as adequate if the following three groups of beliefs can be integrated into a wide reflective equilibrium: (1) our initial, spontaneous beliefs about the structure and logical quality of the text; (2) our beliefs about its structure and logical quality as reflected in the proposed formalization, and (3) our background beliefs about the original text’s author, his thought and other contextually relevant factors. Unlike a good part of the literature, I stress the indispensable role of initial beliefs in achieving such a wide reflective equilibrium. In the final sections I show that my approach does not succumb to undue subjectivism or the mere perpetuation of prejudice. The examples I use to illustrate my claims are chiefly taken from Anselm’s Proslogion 2–3 and the various attempts to formalize these texts.

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