Does It Matter How One Assesses Moral Reasoning? Differences (Biases) in the Recognition Versus Formulation Tasks

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (7) ◽  
pp. 1440-1464
Author(s):  
James Weber

Most business ethics scholars interested in understanding individual moral cognition or reasoning rely on the Defining Issues Test (DIT). They typically report that managers and business students exhibit a relatively high percentage of principled moral reasoning when resolving ethical dilemmas. This article applies neurocognitive processes and Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, and its more recent revision, as theoretical foundations to explore whether differences emerge when using a recognition of learning task, such as the DIT or similar instruments, versus a formulation of knowledge task, such as the Moral Judgment Interview or similar instruments, to assess individual moral reasoning. The data show that significantly different levels of moral reasoning are detected when using a recognition-based versus formulation-based moral reasoning instrument. As expected, the recognition-based approach (using a DIT-like instrument) reports an inflated, higher moral reasoning score for subjects compared with using a formulation-based instrument. Implications of these results for understanding an individual’s moral reasoning are discussed.

Author(s):  
Joshua May

This chapter argues that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions are not integral to moral judgment. There is ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. The chapter concludes that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these should not be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment.


Author(s):  
George P.W. Lan ◽  
Sharon McMahon ◽  
Norm King ◽  
Fritz Rieger

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;" lang="EN-CA"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This paper presents the results of an analysis of the level of moral reasoning across different majors and between undergraduate and graduate business students at a middle-sized Canadian university. The Defining Issues Test (DIT2), a recent version of the original DIT test, a well-known and widely tested psychometric instrument, is used to measure the level of moral reasoning. The results showed that beginning nursing students scored significantly lower on the DIT2 tests than the upper level liberal arts and business students and that older students scored significantly higher than younger students and that the main variable affecting the level of moral reasoning was the level of formal education of the participants. Even after allowing for the variance caused by age and by the major field of study of the respondents, the level of education by itself is a significant predictor of the P (Principled) score, an output of the DIT2, which is an indicator of the level of moral reasoning. On the other hand, the gender and political views of the respondents did not affect the DIT2 P-scores significantly.<strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"></strong></span></span></p>


Author(s):  
Joshua May

The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral judgment and motivation, we’re told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings or emotions—fertile ground for sweeping debunking arguments. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, maintains that reason plays a pervasive role in our moral minds and that ordinary moral reasoning is not particularly flawed or in need of serious repair. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don’t come easily, as we are susceptible to some unsavory influences that lead to rationalizing bad behavior. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but the science warrants cautious optimism, not a special skepticism about morality in particular. Rationality in ethics is possible not just despite, but in virtue of, the psychological and evolutionary mechanisms that shape moral cognition.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-96
Author(s):  
Brandon William Soltwisch ◽  
Daniel C. Brannon ◽  
Vish Iyer ◽  

This study explores the relationship between decision-making styles and moral judgements to understand how maximizers and satisficers differ in their analysis of ethical dilemmas. It also explores the linkage between decision-making styles and the moral reasoning perspectives of absolutism and relativism, investigating if ethical ideologies play a mediating role in how maximizers and satisficers evaluate ethical situations. In order to test these relationships, data is collected from a sample of 187 upper level business students. Results indicate that maximizers are significantly more likely than satisficers to judge ethically ambiguous actions as immoral. Underlying this effect, maximizers (vs. satisficers) have a more idealistic ethical ideology.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 46-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslav Pivoda ◽  
Frank Hoy ◽  
Kiril Todorov ◽  
Viktor Vojtko

To resolve entry and growth problems, entrepreneurs use creative solutions or tricks, which some may find to be ethically questionable. Generating mistrust is a negative consequence when engaging in entrepreneurial tricks. In spite of that, 66% of entrepreneurs (out of 201 respondents) and 76% of business students (out of 213) consider using some tricks as absolutely necessary if an entrepreneur wants to succeed in his or her domestic business environment. Surprisingly optimistic, 52% of entrepreneurs and 57% of students believe that business ethics can be improved substantially by teaching business ethics to entrepreneurs. And of course, there are different levels of ethics standards or custom practices in different countries emerging from our survey in five countries and a few responses from 21 other countries. The authors also discuss the possible future for business tricks, and if there might be any benefits of them.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 547-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
william d. casebeer

sunstein is right that poorly informed heuristics can influence moral judgment. his case could be strengthened by tightening neurobiologically plausible working definitions regarding what a heuristic is, considering a background moral theory that has more strength in wide reflective equilibrium than “weak consequentialism,” and systematically examining what naturalized virtue theory has to say about the role of heuristics in moral reasoning.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105256292199601
Author(s):  
David Ohreen ◽  
Binod Sundararajan ◽  
Valerie Trifts ◽  
Scott Comber

The Russian developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky provides important theoretical underpinnings for an alternative to business ethics pedagogy. Although Vygotsky’s constructivist approach has been applied to other disciplines, such as cognitive development, moral development, and network analysis and learning, its application to business ethics education is virtually nonexistent. Vygotsky’s focus on language and peer influence provides a novel approach to ethics education. Although many business ethics instructors already use group discussion in their classes, we provide evidence that will reinforce such techniques as a crucial pedagogical method. This study is an exploratory application of Vygotsky’s developmental theory to business ethics education. Data were gathered in business ethics and management courses, with experimental and control groups, and analyzed using the Defining Issues Test and thematic-coded journal entries. Results indicated that discussions created a zone of proximal development improving the moral reasoning for most students giving them multiple perspectives and providing support to engage in deliberations and peer dialogue when discussing ethical frameworks, ethical scenarios, and ethical decision making.


1996 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Weber

AbstractThis review offers a cautious acceptance of the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) developed by Robin, Gordon, Jordan and Reidenbach. While the contribution of the MES to future empirical research of individuals’ moral reasoning is welcomed, a number of reservations or criticisms are raised regarding theory confusion, instrument confusion, and fears arising when using the MES. I conclude that the MES is a valuable compliment to existing moral reasoning instruments — the Moral Judgment Interview and the Defining Issues Test — but not a replacement of these instruments.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youn-Jeng Choi ◽  
Hyemin Han ◽  
Meghan Bankhead ◽  
Stephen J. Thoma

Introduction The Defining Issues Test (DIT) aimed to measure one’s moral judgment development in terms of moral reasoning. The Neo-Kohlbergian approach, which is an elaboration of Kohlbergian theory, focuses on the continuous development of postconventional moral reasoning, which constitutes the theoretical basis of the DIT. However, very few studies have directly tested the internal structure of the DIT, which would indicate its construct validity. Objectives Using the DIT-2, a later revision of the DIT, we examined whether a bi-factor model or 3-factor CFA model showed a better model fit. The Neo-Kohlbergian theory of moral judgment development, which constitutes the theoretical basis for the DIT-2, proposes that moral judgment development occurs continuously and that it can be better explained with a soft-stage model. Given these assertions, we assumed that the bi-factor model, which considers the Schema-General Moral Judgment (SGMJ), might be more consistent with Neo-Kohlbergian theory. Methods We analyzed a large dataset collected from undergraduate students. We performed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) via weighted least squares. A 3-factor CFA based on the DIT-2 manual and a bi-factor model were compared for model fit. The three factors in the 3-factor CFA were labeled as moral development schemas in Neo-Kohlbergian theory (i.e., personal interests, maintaining norms, and postconventional schemas). The bi-factor model included the SGMJ in addition to the three factors. Results In general, the bi-factor model showed a better model fit compared with the 3-factor CFA model although both models reported acceptable model fit indices. Conclusion We found that the DIT-2 scale is a valid measure of the internal structure of moral reasoning development using both CFA and bi-factor models. In addition, we conclude that the soft-stage model, posited by the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development, can be better supported with the bi-factor model that was tested in the present study.


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