Counterinsurgency in the Third World: theory and practice

1975 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 226-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Mack

The purpose of this essay is to provide a brief overview of the theory and practice of counterinsurgency in the Third World since World War II. Given the obvious limitations of space, descriptions of particular COIN (counterinsurgency) campaigns have been avoided except to illustrate an argument. Furthermore, this essay concentrates primarily on U.S. counterinsurgency doctrines and methods. This is not to underestimate the contributions – both theoretical and practical – made by the former colonial powers in attempting to crush the impulse to national liberation in the Third World. But the European powers – with the recent exception of Portugal – had, by the beginning of the 1960s, neither the capability nor (following a number of humiliating setbacks) much enthusiasm for further military adventures in the Third World. There have, of course, been exceptions – the French in Mali, Britain in Borneo and the Anguilla affair – but these pale into insignificance when compared with the American counterinsurgency effort in the Third World, which began to gather impetus just as the major European colonial powers were abdicating their former role as Third World policemen.1

1985 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adebayo Adedeji

One of the major objectives sought by the New International Economic Order is to secure favourable conditions for the transfer of resources to the Third World, and to ensure that they are fully utilised for the development of the countries concerned.1 However, the unprecedented growth of the global economy since World War II has not been equitably distributed between the rich and poor nations. Unfortunately, within this international scenario, the increasing external indebtedness of the latter has had, and still has, wide-ranging domestic implications that have rocked the foundations on which many African economies stand.


1974 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet G. Vaillant

The idea that Russia was the first underdeveloped country has begun to gain currency among political scientists. It implies that social processes in Russia may be profitably compared with more recent developments in the Third World. In this article I would like to test this hypothesis with respect to an important ideological controversy which took place in Russia during the nineteenth century by examining it alongside discussions among French-speaking West Africans in the period after World War II. More particularly, I would like to compare what might be called the neo-traditional themes and anti-western patriotism of the Slavophiles with the intellectual position taken by the early spokesmen of négritude.


1987 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
George W. Breslauer

SINCE World War II, Soviet policy in the Third World has gone through regular, frequent cycles, marked by different emphases in the choice of foreign policy targets and by different expectations about the nature and magnitude of the gain to be had from foreign policy initiatives. Stalin was generally disinterested in global competition in regions that were assumed to be dominated by the “imperialist” camp; he tended (with some exceptions) to deny support to nationalist regimes and radical social movements alike. Khrushchev's break-out into the Third World in the 1950's focused on nationalist regimes (India, Indonesia, Ghana, etc.) as well as radical social movements (“national liberation movements”); it was based on the expectation that, in the near future, there would be a large number of socialist states in the Third World, and that they would become allies of the socialist camp against the imperialist camp.


2019 ◽  
pp. 162-188
Author(s):  
Petra Goedde

The emergence of decolonization and national liberation movements in the Global South in the 1950s and 1960s exposed the limits of pacifism and nonviolent movement strategies. In a strange twist that escaped most cold warriors, it was the Third World liberationists’ language of freedom and liberation that made some peace advocates question their adherence to nonviolence. Sympathetic to the demands for independence in Asia and Africa, they condemned the violence with which colonial regimes and ruling elites backed by former colonial powers maintained control over indigenous populations. The level of violence from above called into question the precept of nonviolence as the best and only acceptable strategy. Nonviolence and pacifism became increasingly marginalized in the antiwar discourse as the 1960s drew to a close, contributing to the radicalization and ultimate fragmentation of the protest movements.


Author(s):  
Jochen von Bernstorff

The chapter revisits the third world struggle for a full legal recognition of ‘wars of national liberation’ in the 1960s and 70s. Supported by famous United Nations (UN) resolutions, the growing number of ‘newly independent states’ had managed to confer increasing institutional legitimacy to the still-ongoing struggles for independence by incriminating colonialism and racism, as well as by actively promoting support for third-world self-determination. Armed revolts of independence movements against colonial or racist rule between 1945 and 1975, for example in Indonesia, Vietnam, Algeria, Kenya, Namibia, Angola, Guinea, and Western Sahara, figured as ‘wars of national liberation’ in various UN resolutions. Led from beginning to the victorious end by Georges Abi-Saab, the G77 battle for the full recognition of wars of national liberation framed these wars as ‘defensive’ military actions against continuing foreign ‘aggression’ through colonialism. During the 1960s and early 1970s, this move was strongly opposed by most Western authors, who argued that these conflicts were internal struggles and thus merely ‘civil wars’ or legitimate reactions to ‘terrorist’ activities. The chapter argues that even though the third world could ultimately secure a victory in this legal struggle, it could not prevent that Cold War interventionism of the superpowers and the former metropoles, as well as proxy-wars, nationalism and militarization further destabilized the societies in the ‘newly independent states’. decolonization, international legal transformations, Bandung, hegemony, boundary drawing, Sattelzeit, law of the sea, use of force, humanitarian law, human rights law


1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-44
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Abu-Rabiʽ

Neoliberalism, as a global system, is a new war in theconquest of territory. The end of the Third World War, orCold War, certainly does not mean that the world hasovercome bipolarity and rediscovered stability under thedomination of the victor. Whereas there was a defeatedside (the socialist camp), it is difficult to identify the winningside. The United States? The European Union?Japan? Or all three? ... Thanks to computers, the financialmarkets, fiom the trading floor and according to theirwhims, impose their laws and precepts on the planet.Globalization is nothing more than the totalitarian extensionof their logic to every aspect of life. The UnitedStates, formerly the ruler of the economy, is now governed- tele-governed - by the very dynamic of financialpower: commercial free trade. And this logic has madeuse of the porosity produced by the development oftelecommunications to take over every aspect of activityin the social spectrum. The result is an all-out war.'In the 1950s and the 1960s, a phase in the history [of theThird World] that the supporters of globalization wish tomarginalize and assassinate, culture was in fact made upof two kinds: imperialisthegemonic culture and liberationisthationalistculture. Those influenced by the ideologyof globalization desire to create a new genre of culture:the culture of opening and renewal and that of withdrawaland stagnation. - Muhammad 'Abid al Jiibiri ...


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