What Should We Do About Future Generations?

1989 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yew-Kwang Ng
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Total Utility ◽  
Mere Addition ◽  
Theory X

Parfit's requirements for an ideal Theory X cannot be fully met since the Mere Addition Principle and Non-Antiegalitarianism imply the Repugnant Conclusion: Theory X does not exist. However, since the Repugnant Conclusion is really compelling, the Impersonal Total Principle should be adopted for impartial comparisons concerning future generations. Nevertheless, where our own interests are affected, we may yet choose to be partial, trading off our concern for future (or others') goodness with our self-interests. Theory X' (maximization of number-dampened total utility) meets all Parfit's requirements except the Mere Addition Principle in less compelling cases.

The Parfit Population Problem

Philosophy ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 62 (240) ◽  
pp. 131-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Locke
Keyword(s):  
Future Generations ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Population Problem ◽  
The Third ◽  
Theory X

Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons is a long, difficult and fascinating book, inside which three shorter, clearer and better books are struggling to get out. The third of these shorter but better books deals with the problem of Future Generations, and that is the book I want to discuss. In it Parfit tries, but fails, to find a theory—Theory X, he calls it—which will deal with various problems and issues which he develops, and in particular the issue which I will call the Parfit Population Problem, the problem of how many people there ought to be. In this paper I offer not so much a theory as a suggestion as to what the solution(s) might be.

Mere addition and the best of all possible worlds

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN GROVER
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Mere Addition ◽  
Mere Addition Paradox ◽  
Better Than

The quantitative argument against the notion of a best possible world claims that, no matter how many worthwhile lives a world contains, another world contains more and is, other things being equal, better. Parfit's ‘Mere Addition Paradox’ suggests that defenders of this argument must accept his ‘Repugnant Conclusion’: that outcomes containing billions upon billions of lives barely worth living are better than outcomes containing fewer lives of higher quality. Several responses to the Paradox are discussed and rejected as either inadequate or unavailable in a theistic context. The quantitative argument fails if some world is such that addition to it is not possible, i.e., if it is intensively infinite, as Liebniz claimed. If the notion of such a world is incoherent, then no world is quantitatively best and the quantitative argument succeeds, but only at the cost of embracing the Repugnant Conclusion.

Infinite Lifespans, Terraforming Planets, And Intergenerational Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Adelin-Costin Dumitru ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Feasibility Constraint ◽  
The One

When it comes to specifying the moral duties we bear towards future generations, most political philosophers position themselves on what could be regarded as a safe ground. A variant of the Lockean proviso is commonplace in the literature on intergenerational justice, taking the form of an obligation to bestow upon future people a minimum of goods necessary for reaching a certain threshold of well-being (Meyer, 2017). Furthermore, even this minimum is often frowned upon, given the non-identity problem and the challenges this presents to the topic of justice between generations. Additional issues are raised at the level of non-ideal theory, the most significant being the problem of non-compliance (Gosseries and Meyer, 2009).In this paper I intend to probe the limits of “practical political possibility” (Rawls 1999), by inquiring whether embracing the sufficiency view (Frankfurt, 1987; Crisp, 2003; Benbaji, 2005) as a distributive pattern and capabilities as a metric can lead to more burdensome obligations for present generations. More specifically, I try to show that we have a duty to invest in research that aims at prolonging the lifespan of humans (the idea can already be found in the sufficientarian literature, for instance in Farrelly, 2007). Moreover, given the Earth’s limited resources, we ought to encourage the terraforming of other planets in order to make them inhabitable for (future) people.I argue that these two seemingly far-fetched projects are in fact worthwhile goals to pursue on the one hand, and moral obligations on the other hand. Nonetheless, they are not the only ones we ought to take on; for instance, we must simultaneously pursue them and try to improve the prospects of those who fall under a sufficiency threshold here and now. That is, specifying these (prima facie) duties towards future generations is connected with stronger obligations towards the current generation.Towards the end of the paper I engage in a discussion regarding the role of the feasibility constraint in a theory of justice, as rationales pertaining to feasibility are perhaps going to be the most recurrent criticisms raised against my proposal. To that end, I defend limitarian policies, which aim at setting an upper limit to how much money individuals are allowed to possess (Robeyns, 2017; Volacu and Dumitru, 2019).

scholarly journals Calibrating Variable-Value Population Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Spears ◽  
H. Orri Stefánsson
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Small Population ◽  
World Population ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Population Ethics ◽  
Calibration Methods ◽  
Population Sizes ◽  
Mere Addition

Variable-Value axiologies propose solutions to the challenges of population ethics. These views avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle (for example, at small population sizes). We apply calibration methods to Variable-Value views while assuming: first, some very weak instances of Mere Addition, and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We find that Variable-Value views imply conclusions that should seem repugnant to anyone who opposes Total Utilitarianism due to the Repugnant Conclusion. So, any wish to avoid repugnant conclusions is not a good reason to choose a Variable-Value view. More broadly, these calibrations teach us something about the effort to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. Our results join a recent literature arguing that prior efforts to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion hinge on inessential features of the formalization of repugnance. Some of this effort may therefore be misplaced.

scholarly journals Nondeterminacy and Population Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Herlitz
Keyword(s):  
General View ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Population Ethics ◽  
Partial Orderings ◽  
Population Axiology ◽  
Plausible Theory ◽  
Mere Addition ◽  
Mere Addition Paradox ◽  
The Continuum ◽  
Formal Constraints

This paper synthesizes a general view out of Derek Parfit’s last views on how to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion and presents the general features of a plausible theory of population ethics based on Parfit’s suggestions. The paper argues that a plausible population axiology provides only partial orderings and implies that some outcomes are nondeterminate in their ranking. The paper shows, first, how the combination of what Parfit calls “imprecise equality” and the “Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle” allows one to avoid both the Continuum Argument and the Improved Mere Addition Paradox. Second, the paper shows how this is enough to in principle also refute Gustaf Arrhenius’s impossibility theorems. Third, the paper suggests that a plausible population axiology must allow for nondeterminacy, that whatever the substance of the axiology is, it can only provide partial orderings of outcomes, and that if we revise Arrhenius’s adequacy conditions these can condition what a satisfactory population axiology looks like. Finally, the paper illustrates how one can apply normative theories that allow for nondeterminacy and also infer formal constraints on the theories in light of the consequences of their application.

The Instruments of the Stabilization Fund: The Experience and Prospects

2004 ◽  
pp. 65-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mst. Afanasiev
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Oil Prices ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
The World

Сreation of the stabilization fund has become the main feature of the Russian federal budget for 2004. This instrument provides the opportunity to reduce the dependence of budget incomes on the fluctuations of oil prices. The accepted model does not consider the world experience in building of such funds as the "funds for future generations", and the increase of other revenues from the growing oil prices as well. That can lead to shortening and immobilization of the financial basis of economic growth.

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