Infinite Lifespans, Terraforming Planets, And Intergenerational Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Adelin-Costin Dumitru ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Feasibility Constraint ◽  
The One

When it comes to specifying the moral duties we bear towards future generations, most political philosophers position themselves on what could be regarded as a safe ground. A variant of the Lockean proviso is commonplace in the literature on intergenerational justice, taking the form of an obligation to bestow upon future people a minimum of goods necessary for reaching a certain threshold of well-being (Meyer, 2017). Furthermore, even this minimum is often frowned upon, given the non-identity problem and the challenges this presents to the topic of justice between generations. Additional issues are raised at the level of non-ideal theory, the most significant being the problem of non-compliance (Gosseries and Meyer, 2009).In this paper I intend to probe the limits of “practical political possibility” (Rawls 1999), by inquiring whether embracing the sufficiency view (Frankfurt, 1987; Crisp, 2003; Benbaji, 2005) as a distributive pattern and capabilities as a metric can lead to more burdensome obligations for present generations. More specifically, I try to show that we have a duty to invest in research that aims at prolonging the lifespan of humans (the idea can already be found in the sufficientarian literature, for instance in Farrelly, 2007). Moreover, given the Earth’s limited resources, we ought to encourage the terraforming of other planets in order to make them inhabitable for (future) people.I argue that these two seemingly far-fetched projects are in fact worthwhile goals to pursue on the one hand, and moral obligations on the other hand. Nonetheless, they are not the only ones we ought to take on; for instance, we must simultaneously pursue them and try to improve the prospects of those who fall under a sufficiency threshold here and now. That is, specifying these (prima facie) duties towards future generations is connected with stronger obligations towards the current generation.Towards the end of the paper I engage in a discussion regarding the role of the feasibility constraint in a theory of justice, as rationales pertaining to feasibility are perhaps going to be the most recurrent criticisms raised against my proposal. To that end, I defend limitarian policies, which aim at setting an upper limit to how much money individuals are allowed to possess (Robeyns, 2017; Volacu and Dumitru, 2019).

Ethics of Animal-Assisted Psychotherapy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Hediger ◽  
Herwig Grimm ◽  
Andreas Aigner
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Relevance ◽  
Therapy Animals ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Therapeutic Context ◽  
The One ◽  
Ethical Reflections ◽  
Health And Well Being

Animal-assisted psychotherapy is increasingly popular and attracts considerable attention in science. Integrating animals into therapy aims at generating added value in health and well-being of humans as well as non-human animals. This approach is reflected in the One Health perspective. However, animal-assisted psychotherapy raises issues regarding the ethical standards in the therapy setting in general and ethical reflections about our responsibilities towards therapy animals in particular. According to a dominant account in animal ethics, our moral obligations are based on welfare concerns. But this approach can be supplemented by a contextual view that highlights the moral relevance of particular relationships in animal-assisted psychotherapy. Therapy animals place moral duties on the therapist that go beyond welfare considerations and can be based on relation-based reasoning in the therapeutic context.

The Unwritten Theory of Justice

2020 ◽  
pp. 155-175
Author(s):  
Barbara H. Fried
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
General Audience ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Parallel Lives ◽  
Separateness Of Persons

Rawls’s Theory of Justice has had two parallel lives in political theory. The first—the version Rawls wrote—is a response to utilitarianism’s failure to take seriously the separateness of persons. The second—the unwritten version “received” by its general audience—is a response to libertarianism’s failure to take seriously our moral obligations to the well-being of our fellow citizens. This chapter explores how, had he written the second version, Rawls might have dealt with libertarians’ critique of “justice as fairness” as fundamentally illiberal, and how his two principles might have been transformed in the process.

ON THE VERY IDEA OF IDEAL THEORY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 55-75
Author(s):  
Alexander Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Relations ◽  
Ideal Gas ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Ideal Gas Law ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The One

Abstract:The essay agues that there is little scope for ideal theory in political philosophy, even under Rawls’s conception of its aims. It begins by identifying features of a standard example of ideal theory in physics — the ideal gas law, PV=NRT and draws attention to the lack of these features in Rawls’s derivation of the principles of justice from the original position. A. John Simmons’s defense of ideal theory against criticisms of Amartya Sen is examined, as are further criticisms of both by David Schmidtz. The essay goes on to develop a conception of the domain of social relations to be characterized by justice that suggests that as a moving target it makes ideal theory otiose. Examination of Rawls’s later views substantiate the conclusion that ideal theory as propounded in A Theory of Justice is a mistaken starting point in the enterprise of political philosophy. Differences between the domains of ideal theory in mathematics, physics, and economics on the one hand, and political philosophy on the other, reinforce this conclusion.

DAVID HUME E O “NÚMERO DE DUNBAR”: UMA HIPÓTESE EVOLUCIONISTA SOBRE OS FUNDAMENTOS DA MORALIDADE

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (138) ◽  
pp. 113
Author(s):  
Marcelo De Araújo
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
David Hume ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Convention ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Personal Histories ◽  
The One ◽  
Number Of Individuals

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é caracterizar o conceito de justiça como uma convenção social indispensável para a emergência de obrigações morais no contexto de grupos que ultrapassam o “numero de Dunbar”. O artigo retoma, por um lado, a teoria da justiça proposta por David Hume na terceira seção de Uma Investigação sobre os Princípios da Moral, e, por outro lado, a hipótese de Robin Dunbar acerca do número máximo de indivíduos com os quais uma pessoa pode manter relações sociais estáveis que envolvam laços de amizade, vínculos de família, e histórias pessoais compartilhadas.Abstract: The aim of this article is to characterize the concept of justice as na indispensable social convention for the emergence of moral duties in the contexto of groups that surpass the so-called “Dunbar’s number”. The article resumes, on the one hand, David Hume’s theory of justice, as it is discussed in the third section of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and on the other hand it resumes Robin Dunbar’s hypothesis relative to the maximum number of individuals with whom a person may keep stable social relationships that comprise kinship, fellowship, and a sense of shared personal histories.

PROBING THE LIMITS OF RAWLS’S REALISTIC UTOPIA

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 334-353
Author(s):  
Annette Förster
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Apparent Paradox ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
International Theory ◽  
Feasibility Constraint ◽  
The Law ◽  
Further Development ◽  
Theory Framework

Abstract:InThe Law of Peoples, John Rawls introduces a framework for realistic utopia, within which the limits of practicable political possibility are probed through the further development of his international theory. This essay addresses the apparent paradox of realistic utopianism within the context of, and in relation to, ideal theory, in an attempt to explore the scope and limits of Rawls’s theory. The ideas behind Rawls’s realistic utopia are discussed in detail, the concept is contrasted with ideal theory in order to assess to what extent Rawls’s framework for realistic utopia introduced inThe Law of Peoplesdiffers from other forms of ideal theory, and the limits of realistic utopianism are identified.I argue first, that, in an attempt to address the potential feasibility constraint, Rawls tries to distinguish his framework of realistic utopia from that of more traditional ideal theory. I then proceed to examine the differences between realistic utopianism inThe Law of Peoplesand ideal theory inA Theory of Justice. I then conclude that Rawls only partially meets the challenge of establishing practicable political possibility. In actuality, Rawls’s focus on ideal agents in ideal as well as nonideal theory, together with his emphasis on societies as closed and self-sufficient, ignores the potential for noncompliance by liberal and decent societies, as well as interdependencies between societies that can cause or lead to injustice, conflict, and instability. I argue that despite these flaws, Rawls’s approach nevertheless provokes new insights into the function of the principles of the ideal theory framework as guidelines for real-world policies striving toward peace, stability, and justice.

Future Generations: Present Harms

Philosophy ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 68 (263) ◽  
pp. 35-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
John O'Neill
Keyword(s):  
Special Problem ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

There is a special problem with respect to our obligations to future generations which is that we can benefit or harm them but that they cannot benefit or harm us. Goodin summarizes the point well:No analysis of intergenerational justice that is cast even vaguely in terms of reciprocity can hope to succeed. The reason is the one which Addison… puts into the mouth of an Old Fellow of College, who when he was pressed by the Society to come into something that might rebound to the good of their Successors, grew very peevish. ‘We are always doing’ says he, ‘something for Posterity, but I would fain see Posterity do something for us’.

scholarly journals The Practice-Independence of Intergenerational Justice

Utilitas ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
MERTEN REGLITZ
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
Significant Extent ◽  
Or Practice ◽  
Legitimate Interests

The question whether distributive justice is at bottom practice-dependent or practice-independent has received much attention in recent years. I argue that the problem of intergenerational justice resolves this dispute in favour of practice-independence. Many believe that we owe more to our descendants than leaving them a world in which they can merely lead minimally decent lives. This thought is particularly convincing given the fact that it is us who determine to a significant extent what this future world will look like. However, no practices that would trigger distributive obligations exist between distant generations. Thus, if we have to leave more than a minimum for future generations, we cannot conceive of distributive justice in terms of the justification of ongoing social interactions. Rather we have to think of the entire concept as an idea based on persons’ legitimate interests and capacity for well-being, and which abstracts from participation in particular practices.

scholarly journals The Well-Being of Future Generations

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Broome
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Pareto Principle ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
Future People ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Future

This chapter surveys some of the issues that arise in policymaking when the well-being of future generations must be taken into account. It considers the different sorts of discounting that may be applied to future well-being, and considers whether any of them are permissible. It next argues that policymakers cannot properly ignore the effects that different policies have on the number of future people who will come into existence. These effects are pervasive, and the chapter goes on to consider what theoretical basis is available for setting a value on them. Finally it describes the “nonidentity effect,” through which a choice of policy affects the identity of people born in the future, and examines what implications it has for intergenerational justice and for the Pareto principle.

Beyond GDP: The Quest for a Measure of Social Welfare. Part I

2012 ◽  
pp. 67-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Fleurbaey
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Well Being ◽  
National Product ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Modern Economic ◽  
Aggregate Wealth ◽  
Net National Product ◽  
Sustainability Policy ◽  
Beyond Gdp

The first part of the paper is devoted to the monetary indicators of social welfare. It is shown which methods of quantitative estimating the aggregate wealth and well-being are available in the modern economic theory apart from the traditional GDP measure. The limitations of the methods are also discussed. The author shows which measures of welfare are adequate in the dynamic context: he considers the problems of intertemporal welfare analysis using the Net National Product (NNP) for the sustainability policy and in the context of concern for well-being of the future generations.

Utopophobia

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Estlund
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Sound Theory ◽  
Theory Versus ◽  
History Of ◽  
Practical Guidance

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.

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