scholarly journals The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Christoph Schamberger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Epistemic Democracy ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Correct Alternative ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
High Chance ◽  
Moral Facts

Abstract Epistemic democracy aims to show, often by appeal to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that democracy has a high chance of reaching correct decisions. It has been argued that epistemic democracy is compatible with various metaethical accounts, such as moral realism, conventionalism and majoritarianism. This paper casts doubt on that thesis and reveals the following metaethical dilemma: if we adopt moral realism, it is doubtful that voters are, on average, more than 0.5 likely to track moral facts and identify the correct alternative. By contrast, if we adopt conventionalism or majoritarianism, we cannot expect that voters are both competent and sincere. Either way, the conditions for the application of Condorcet’s theorem are not met.

Truth-tracing versus truth-tracking: Lafont, Landemore and epistemic democracy

2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372097471
Author(s):  
Peter Niesen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Epistemic Democracy ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
Theory Of Democracy

Cognitivist theories of democratic decision-making come in two flavours, which I label transparently and intransparently epistemic. Lafont’s deliberative theory of democracy has strengths in accounting for the transparently truth-tracing power of justification but lacks a plausible account of the intransparently truth-tracking power of aggregative approaches highlighted by, among others, Hélène Landemore, such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem. I suggest opting for an approach that includes semi-transparently epistemic mechanisms, that is, truth-tracking mechanisms, the workings of which can be explained, passing the public reason test, to all citizens.

scholarly journals A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 2
Author(s):  
Johanna M. M. Goertz
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Correct Alternative ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Voting Game ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
Two Alternatives

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We also assume that this is a Poisson voting game with population uncertainty. The question is whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently so that the correct alternative is elected with probability tending to one when the number of voters tends to infinity. The previous literature shows that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three alternatives that has an inefficient equilibrium. We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium, independent of the number of alternatives. Under certain circumstances (informative types), it is unique in elections with two alternatives. The existence of inefficient equilibria in elections with more than two alternatives is generic.

scholarly journals EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY WITH DEFENSIBLE PREMISES

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Dietrich ◽  
Kai Spiekermann
Keyword(s):  
Small Groups ◽  
Wisdom Of Crowds ◽  
Contemporary Theory ◽  
Epistemic Democracy ◽  
Current Form ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
Misleading Conclusion ◽  
Better Than ◽  
The Wisdom Of Crowds

The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises – voter independence – is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem's misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework. Our theorem is related to Ladha's (1993) seminal jury theorem for interchangeable (‘indistinguishable’) voters based on de Finetti's Theorem. We also prove a more general and simpler such jury theorem.

scholarly journals REPRESENTATION IN MODELS OF EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 498-518
Author(s):  
Patrick Grim ◽  
Aaron Bramson ◽  
Daniel J. Singer ◽  
William J. Berger ◽  
Jiin Jung ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Epistemic Democracy ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Analytic Work ◽  
Direct Participation ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Collaborative Search ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
Group Search

ABSTRACTEpistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different forms of information aggregation and decision-making. The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms of votes, and the Hong–Page ‘diversity trumps ability’ result is appealed to as a justification in terms of deliberation in the form of collaborative search. Both results, however, are models of full and direct participation across a population. In this paper, we contrast how these results hold up within the familiar structure of a representative hierarchy. We first consider extant analytic work that shows that representation inevitably weakens the voting results of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We then go on to show that collaborative search, as modeled by Hong and Page, holds its own within hierarchical representation. In a variation on the dynamics of group search, representation even shows a slight edge over direct participation. This contrast illustrates how models of information aggregation vary when put into a representative structure. While some of the epistemic merits of democracy are lost when voting is done hierarchically, modeling results show that representation can preserve and even slightly amplify the epistemic virtues of collaborative search.

The Classic Framework

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin ◽  
Kai Spiekermann
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Majority Vote ◽  
Asymptotic Result ◽  
Correct Decision ◽  
Independence Assumption ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Correct Alternative ◽  
Jury Theorem

In the classic setup of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, voters decide by majority vote between two different options. The Competence Assumption is that all voters are more likely than not to identify the correct alternative with the same probability. The Independence Assumption is that the votes are statistically independent. The Sincerity Assumption is that the voters always vote for the alternative they believe to be correct. Two results follow if these conditions are met. First, the Non-asymptotic Result says that the probability of a correct decision increases in group size. Second, the Asymptotic Result says that this probability converges to 1. We show that this convergence happens very quickly.

scholarly journals Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem

2001 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian List ◽  
Robert E. Goodin
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Democracy ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Jury Theorem

Second Mechanism of Democratic Reason: Majority Rule

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Cognitive Diversity ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
The Right

This chapter argues that majority rule is a useful complement of inclusive deliberation, not just because majority rule is more efficient timewise, but because it has distinct epistemic properties of its own. It also stresses that majority rule is best designed for collective prediction—that is, the identification of the best options out of those selected during the deliberative phase. Of all the competing alternatives (rule of one or rule of the few), majority rule maximizes the chances of predicting the right answer among the proposed options. The chapter considers several accounts of the epistemic properties of majority rule, including the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Miracle of Aggregation, and a more fine-grained model based on cognitive diversity.

Moral realism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Fact ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right ◽  
Natural Fact ◽  
Moral Facts

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims. First, moral facts are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking some natural facts to be moral facts. Take, for instance, the natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Could this be a moral fact – the same fact as the fact that we ought to do the action? Or must we think of such a natural fact as the natural ‘ground’ for the (quite different) moral fact that we should do it, that is, as the fact in the world that makes it true that we should act this way? Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are. Third, it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still no guarantee that we will come up with the right answer. So what people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.

The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Ben-Yashar ◽  
Shmuel Nitzan
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Jury Theorem
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