scholarly journals Eliminating Group Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Lars J. K. Moen
Keyword(s):  
Gain Control ◽  
Attitude Formation ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Group Agent ◽  
Interacting Agents ◽  
Social Explanations

Abstract Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their groups and produce collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents.

Redundant Group Agency

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 364-384
Author(s):  
Lars J. K. Moen
Keyword(s):  
False Beliefs ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Group Agent ◽  
Group Members

According to group-agent realism, treating groups as agents with their own intentional states, irreducible to those of the group members, helps us explain and predict the groups’ behavior. This paper challenges this view. When groups judge logically interconnected propositions, group members often have incentives to misrepresent their beliefs concerning propositions they care less about in order to increase the probability of their groups adopting their view of propositions they consider more important. Aggregating such untruthful judgments may lead to the group forming false beliefs. Treating groups as agents will then not help us explain or predict their behavior.

GROUP AGENCY AND EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCY

Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Dewitt
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Dependence ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Group Agent ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Group Agents

AbstractModern epistemic questions have largely been focused around the individual and her ability to acquire knowledge autonomously. More recently epistemologists have begun to look more broadly in providing accounts of knowledge by considering its social context, where the individual depends on others for true beliefs. Hardwig explains the effect of this shift starkly, arguing that to reject epistemic dependency is to deny certain true beliefs widely held throughout society and, more specifically, it is to deny that science and scholarship can provide true belief. Alternatively, Hardwig argues that beliefs could be granted to communities or groups but denied to individuals. This paper approaches these broad assertions using a group agency model from List and Pettit. Through a discussion of the ‘epistemic desideratum’ of group agents, I conclude that List and Pettit give us reason to accept some of Hardwig's concerns, but that attributing beliefs to groups does not require us to deny them to individuals, rather an individual can use a group agent as a source of epistemic dependence.

Video-Enhanced Microscopy--Better Visibility of Plant Cell Structures

1982 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 182-185
Author(s):  
N.S. Allen ◽  
R.D. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Diffraction Pattern ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Numerical Aperture ◽  
Gain Control ◽  
Control Unit ◽  
Camera Control ◽  
Variable Gain ◽  
Contrast Method ◽  
Fine Detail ◽  
Cell Structures

Various methods of video-enhanced microscopy combine TV cameras with light microscopes creating images with improved resolution, contrast and visibility of fine detail, which can be recorded rapidly and relatively inexpensively. The AVEC (Allen Video-enhanced Contrast) method avoids polarizing rectifiers, since the microscope is operated at retardations of λ/9- λ/4, where no anomaly is seen in the Airy diffraction pattern. The iris diaphram is opened fully to match the numerical aperture of the condenser to that of the objective. Under these conditions, no image can be realized either by eye or photographically. Yet the image becomes visible using the Hamamatsu C-1000-01 binary camera, if the camera control unit is equipped with variable gain control and an offset knob (which sets a clamp voltage of a D.C. restoration circuit). The theoretical basis for these improvements has been described.

I Like Her, Because I Like Myself: Self-Evaluation as a Source of Interpersonal Attitudes

2003 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 239-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Walther ◽  
Claudia Trasselli
Keyword(s):  
Opposite Effect ◽  
Learning Phase ◽  
The Self ◽  
Attitude Formation ◽  
Formation Processes ◽  
False Feedback ◽  
Self Evaluation ◽  
Evaluation Group ◽  
Group A ◽  
The Difference

Abstract. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that self-evaluation can serve as a source of interpersonal attitudes. In the first study, self-evaluation was manipulated by means of false feedback. A subsequent learning phase demonstrated that the co-occurrence of the self with another individual influenced the evaluation of this previously neutral target. Whereas evaluative self-target similarity increased under conditions of negative self-evaluation, an opposite effect emerged in the positive self-evaluation group. A second study replicated these findings and showed that the difference between positive and negative self-evaluation conditions disappeared when a load manipulation was applied. The implications of self-evaluation for attitude formation processes are discussed.

Orienting and Focusing in Voluntary and Involuntary Visuospatial Attention Conditions

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 198-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Wang ◽  
Jianhui Wu ◽  
Shimin Fu ◽  
Yuejia Luo
Keyword(s):  
Gain Control ◽  
Event Related Potentials ◽  
Stimulus Onset ◽  
Orientation Discrimination ◽  
Involuntary Attention ◽  
Attention Condition ◽  
Voluntary Attention ◽  
Visual Spatial ◽  
Related Potentials ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms

In the present study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) and behavioral measurements in a peripherally cued line-orientation discrimination task to investigate the underlying mechanisms of orienting and focusing in voluntary and involuntary attention conditions. Informative peripheral cue (75% valid) with long stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was used in the voluntary attention condition; uninformative peripheral cue (50% valid) with short SOA was used in the involuntary attention condition. Both orienting and focusing were affected by attention type. Results for attention orienting in the voluntary attention condition confirmed the “sensory gain control theory,” as attention enhanced the amplitude of the early ERP components, P1 and N1, without latency changes. In the involuntary attention condition, compared with invalid trials, targets in the valid trials elicited larger and later contralateral P1 components, and smaller and later contralateral N1 components. Furthermore, but only in the voluntary attention condition, targets in the valid trials elicited larger N2 and P3 components than in the invalid trials. Attention focusing in the involuntary attention condition resulted in larger P1 components elicited by targets in small-cue trials compared to large-cue trials, whereas in the voluntary attention condition, larger P1 components were elicited by targets in large-cue trials than in small-cue trials. There was no interaction between orienting and focusing. These results suggest that orienting and focusing of visual-spatial attention are deployed independently regardless of attention type. In addition, the present results provide evidence of dissociation between voluntary and involuntary attention during the same task.

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